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vAbstract
A search problem lies in the complexity class FNP if a solution to the given instance
of the problem can be verified efficiently. The complexity class TFNP consists of all
search problems in FNP that are total in the sense that a solution is guaranteed to
exist. TFNP contains a host of interesting problems from fields such as algorithmic
game theory, computational topology, number theory and combinatorics. Since TFNP
is a semantic class, it is unlikely to have a complete problem. Instead, one studies its
syntactic subclasses which are defined based on the combinatorial principle used to argue
totality. Of particular interest is the subclass PPAD, which contains important problems
like computing Nash equilibrium for bimatrix games and computational counterparts of
several fixed-point theorems as complete. In the thesis, we undertake the study of average-
case hardness of TFNP, and in particular its subclass PPAD.
Almost nothing was known about average-case hardness of PPAD before a series of
recent results showed how to achieve it using a cryptographic primitive called program ob-
fuscation. However, it is currently not known how to construct program obfuscation from
standard cryptographic assumptions. Therefore, it is desirable to relax the assumption
under which average-case hardness of PPAD can be shown. In the thesis we take a step
in this direction. First, we show that assuming the (average-case) hardness of a number-
theoretic problem related to factoring of integers, which we call Iterated-Squaring,
PPAD is hard-on-average in the random-oracle model. Then we strengthen this result to
show that the average-case hardness of PPAD reduces to the (adaptive) soundness of the
Fiat-Shamir Transform, a well-known technique used to compile a public-coin interactive
protocol into a non-interactive one. As a corollary, we obtain average-case hardness for
PPAD in the random-oracle model assuming the worst-case hardness of #SAT. More-
over, the above results can all be strengthened to obtain average-case hardness for the
class CLS ⊆ PPAD.
Our main technical contribution is constructing incrementally-verifiable procedures
for computing Iterated-Squaring and #SAT. By incrementally-verifiable, we mean
that every intermediate state of the computation includes a proof of its correctness, and
the proof can be updated and verified in polynomial time. Previous constructions of such
procedures relied on strong, non-standard assumptions. Instead, we introduce a technique
called recursive proof-merging to obtain the same from weaker assumptions.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Total Search Problems
Consider the following1 combinatorial problem: for some parameter M ∈ N, we are given
an M ×M triangular grid like the one in Figure 1.1.(a) with the vertices colored either
red, blue or green, as prescribed by a function
c : [0,M − 1]× [0,M − 1]→ {R,G,B},
where [a, b] denotes {a, a+ 1, . . . , b− 1, b}. There are restrictions to the colouring of the
vertices that lie on the boundary:
1. the ones at the bottom are all red: i.e., ∀i ∈ [0,M − 1] : c(0, i) = R;
2. the ones on the left, excluding the one coloured red, are all green: i.e., ∀i ∈
[1,M − 1] : c(i, 0) = G; and
3. the rest of the vertices, excluding the ones already coloured, are all blue: i.e.,
∀i ∈ [1,M − 1] : c(M − 1, i) = c(i,M − 1) = B.
However, no restriction is placed to colouring the internal vertices. The goal of the problem
is to find a trichromatic triangle, i.e., a triangle consisting of a red, green and blue vertex
each. The problem is trivial to solve if the colouring function is represented explicitly, say
as an M ×M table: for example, an algorithm that simply searches all the 2M2 triangles
is efficient. But what if we set M = 2m for some parameter m ∈ N and then present the
colouring function succinctly as a circuit
C : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}m → {0, 1, 2} (1.1)
that is of size poly(m)? The circuit C would take as input the coordinates of a vertex
represented as two m-bit strings and return its colour encoded using {0, 1, 2}. For a
algorithm to be deemed efficient, it would now have to run in time poly(m) and therefore
the brute force approach from before is no longer efficient. Let us call this problem
Sperner.
Totality of Sperner. Although Sperner may at first seem like any other search prob-
lem that one encounters in computational complexity theory, it has one distinguishing
feature: a theorem of Sperner [101] guarantees the existence of a solution, i.e. trichro-
matic triangle. Hence, Sperner is total. To see this, let’s consider a walk starting from
the bottom left triangle as shown in Figure 1.1.(a). One enters this triangle via the green-
red edge and continues the walk by entering one of the adjacent triangles always taking
a green-red edge with the green vertex on the left — this is an invariant. Let us see what
can be said about the walk.
1This example is taken from a lecture given by Constantinos Daskalakis at MIT.
2(a)
A
B C×
A
B C
×
(b)
Figure 1.1: (a) Sperner’s Lemma on an 8×8 grid. The walk is continued by always taking
a green-red edge with the green vertex on the left (invariant) (b) Why the invariant rules
out the walk looping.
1. Firstly, the walk cannot exit the grid because of the invariant: there is only one
green-red edge (which is the one we took into the grid) and this cannot be used as
an exit as it is incorrectly oriented.
2. Secondly, the walk cannot end up in a loop either. To see this, suppose for contra-
diction that the walk does loop at some ∆ABC as shown in Figure 1.1.(b). Further
suppose, without loss of generality, that the triangle was exited through the edge
AB, which means that c(A) = R and c(B) = G. Since the walk loops at ∆ABC,
it must be entered through both of the other edges AC and BC. However, we can
argue that this is impossible without violating the invariant: if c(C) = G then the
triangle can be entered only via AC; on the other hand, if c(C) = R then it can
be entered only via BC. (In case ∆ABC is trichromatic, then it cannot be both
entered and exited).
Therefore, since the grid is finite, the only reason the walk halts must be because it
encountered a trichromatic triangle.
1.1.1 TFNP and its Subclasses
Sperner is archetypal of the type of problems that we consider in this thesis. Firstly,
it is a search problem: we are asked to find a solution, unlike decision problems which
are posed as yes-no questions. Moreover, its search space (i.e., the set of all triangles) is
exponentially-large but is succinctly-representable (via the colouring circuit C). Secondly,
given a solution, it is possible to efficiently verify its validity: given ∆ABC purported
to be trichromatic, one simply checks that {c(A), c(B), c(C)} = {R,G,B} using the
circuit C. Finally, and most importantly, such a trichromatic triangle can be, as we saw,
guaranteed to exist making the problem total. Let us formalise these notions a bit more
(the full definitions are given later in §2.1).
3A search problem P is defined by an efficiently-decidable set of instances I ⊆ {0, 1}∗
such that for every instance I ∈ I there exists a set of solutions s(I) ⊆ {0, 1}∗. It is anNP
search problem if the set of solutions is also efficiently-decidable: i.e., given a purported
solution S ∈ {0, 1}∗ to an instance I ∈ I, checking whether S ∈ s(I) is efficient in the size
of the instance. The class of allNP search problems is called Functional Non-deterministic
Polynomial-time (FNP). Thus, FNP is the search counterpart of the (decision) class
NP. Moreover, an NP search problem is total if the set of solutions for every instance is
non-empty. With the goal of collectively studying all such problems, including Sperner,
Megiddo and Papadimitriou [78] defined the class Total Functional Non-deterministic
Polynomial-time (TFNP). They went on to show (see Theorem 2) that this class is in
fact the same as F(NP ∩ co-NP), i.e. the search counterpart of NP ∩ co-NP. Here
co-NP is the complementary class of NP (i.e., strings not in the language have succinct
refutations).
TFNP contains a host of interesting, non-trivial problems from fields such as algo-
rithmic game theory, computational topology, number theory and combinatorics. Perhaps
the two most widely-known examples are:
1. Nash, the problem of finding the equilibrium strategy in a (bimatrix) game, which
is guaranteed to exist by Nash’s celebrated theorem [81], and
2. Factoring, the problem of computing the (unique) prime factorisation of a given
integer, which is guaranteed to exist by the fundamental theorem of arithmetic.
The former is fundamental to understanding game theory and therefore economics, whereas
the latter forms the backbone of cryptography and internet security. Studying the struc-
ture of such diverse problems and the relationship between them was one of the original
motivation behind the definition of TFNP. For instance, reducing Factoring to Nash–
i.e., showing that solving Nash is at least as hard as factoring integers – would bridge
two seemingly different fields of research. One could then borrow ideas from one field and
apply it to the other.
1.1.1.1 The Subclasses of TFNP
It is known that TFNP is unlikely to contain FNP-complete problems unless NP =
co-NP [78] (see Theorem 3). Moreover, TFNP is a semantic class and therefore unlikely
to have a complete problem.2 Therefore, we need a different notion to qualify the hardness
of problems in TFNP. To this end, one studies its syntactic subclasses which are defined
based on the combinatorial principle used to argue totality [84]. For instance, one of the
subclasses is defined based on the well-known pigeonhole principle (PPP) and another
based on the parity argument (PPA). These subclasses do contain canonical complete
problems: i.e., the subclass is defined as the set of all search problems that are polynomial-
time Karp-reducible (Definition 8) to this canonical problem. Therefore in order to study
the class in its entirety, it suffices to focus on the canonical complete problem.
2A complexity class is said to be syntactic if it possible to efficiently check whether an appropriately
standardized machine (say a Turing machine or a Boolean circuit) indeed defines a language in the class.
On the other hand, a class is semantic if this is not possible and there is a “promise” involved [85].
Phrased differently, for a syntactic class it is guaranteed that a machine defines some language in that
class, whereas this might not be the case for a semantic class. Examples for syntactic classes are P, NP
and PP; whereas RP and co-RP are semantic classes. It is believed that semantic classes are unlikely
to have complete problems. A thorough discussion can be found at this thread on StackExchange.
4FP
CLS
PPAD
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PWPP
PPA PPPPLS
PTFNP
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FNP
Figure 1.2: The TFNP landscape. The arrows indicate containment.
The subclasses of TFNP, along with the relationship between them, are illustrated
in Figure 1.2. It is believed that the major subclasses PPP, PPA and PLS are funda-
mentally different [6]. More formally, it was shown in [6] that there exist oracles relative
to which the complete problem of one is not (even) Turing-reducible to that of others.
This is not surprising since the combinatorial existence theorem that is used to guarantee
totality is of different flavour for different classes. With this in mind, we describe the
subclasses below, especially the canonical complete problem that captures its structure,
and mention some of the interesting problems that they contain (see Figure 1.4). Since
one of the subclasses, PPAD, is the focus of this thesis, we will cover it in more details
in §1.1.2, following the discussion.
Polynomial Pigeonhole Principle (PPP). As the name suggests, the existence of so-
lution for problems in PPP is guaranteed by the pigeonhole principle: if n pigeons
are placed in m < n pigeonholes then at least one pigeonhole must contain more
than one pigeon. The hardness of this class is captured by its canonical complete
problem Pigeon, which is described below.
Definition 1 ([84]). Pigeon
• Instance. A circuit C : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
• Solution. One of the following:
1. Preimage of 0m: x ∈ {0, 1}m such that C(x) = 0m
2. Collision: x, y ∈ {0, 1}m such that C(x) = C(y)
An interesting problems that lies inside the class (but is not known to be complete)
is EqualSums [4]: given a1, . . . , an ∈ N such that
∑︁
i∈[1,n] ai < 2
n − 1, find two
subsets S ̸= T ⊆ [1, n] such that ∑︁i∈S ai = ∑︁i∈T ai. Recently, it was shown that
5000 001 010 011
100 101 110 111
(a)
000 001 010 011
100 101 110 111
(b)
Figure 1.3: Sample Lonely instance with eight vertices {0, 1}3. The output of the circuit
is indicated in (a) by the dotted, directed edges: i.e., an edge (u, v) implies that C(x) = y.
The solid, undirected edges are the edges in the implicit (involution) graph shown in (b):
i.e. an edge (u, v) implies that C(x) = y and C(y) = x. The unpaired vertices are in black.
Note that the two nodes 010 and 101 remain unpaired because they are violations.
a problem related to Blichfeldt’s theorem on lattices (Blichfeldt) is complete for
PPP [100]. This is the first natural problem that was shown to be complete for the
class.3
Polynomial Parity Argument (PPA). The class captures computational problems
whose totality is rooted in the handshaking lemma for undirected graphs: every
(finite) undirected graph has an even number of vertices of odd degree. The hard-
ness of this class is captured the problem Lonely described below.4
Definition 2 ([84]). Lonely
• Instance. A circuit C : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
• Guarantee. 0m is unpaired: C(0m) = 0m
• Solution. One of the following:
1. Unpaired vertex: x ∈ {0, 1}m \ {0m} such that C(x) = x
2. Violation: x, y ∈ {0, 1}m such that C(x) = y but C(y) ̸= x
Intuitively, C defines an involution (i.e., a graph with degree at most one) over
{0, 1}m with (x, y) being an edge if and only if C(x) = C(y) but with 0m unpaired
(see Figure 1.3). By handshaking lemma, therefore, there exists another vertex
that is paired with itself. Some of the problems that belong to PPA include the
Borsuk-Ulam theorem from topology (Borsuk-Ulam) and Necklace Splitting [45]
from combinatorics. The aforementioned problems are also known to be complete
for PPA.
Polynomial Local Search (PLS). PLS was defined to capture the difficulty of finding
a local optimum in optimization problems such as the Travelling Salesman Problem.
The principle that guarantees the existence of such optima is that every directed
3A problem is considered to be “natural” if its description does not inherently involve a circuit. For
instance Sperner is a natural (combinatorial) problem, whereas Pigeon is not as its definition is tied
to a circuit.
4We note that problems like Leaf, Odd and Even are all polynomial-time equivalent to Lonely
(with respect to Karp reductions) and therefore are also complete for PPA [6]. Although they are also
canonical in nature, their definition relies on a circuit that maps n bits to O(n) or poly(n) bits. We find
the n to n circuit in Lonely to be more minimal and therefore prefer to use it over the others.
6acyclic graph (DAG) has a sink. The canonical complete problem for the class is
called Local-Search (LS) and is described below [65].
Definition 3 ([65]). Local-Search (LS)
• Instance.
1. A successor circuit S : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
2. A potential circuit F : {0, 1}m → [0, 2m]
• Solution. Local optimum: x ∈ {0, 1}m such that F(x) ≥ F(S(x))
Intuitively S and F, together, implicitly define a DAG where (x, y) is an edge if
y = S(x) and F(y) ≥ F(x), and the goal is to find the sink of this DAG. The
well known algorithms for finding a local optimum such as Simplex Algorithm or
Gradient Descent can be considered as simple traversals of this graph towards to
the sink.
Polynomial Parity Argument on Digraphs (PPAD). PPAD is contained inPPA∩
PPP and could be regarded as the directed version of the class PPA. The class
became a subject of intensive study due to its relation to the problem Nash. Pa-
padimitriou showed that Nash belongs to PPAD via a reduction to End-of-Line
(EOL), its canonical complete problem. A reduction in the opposite direction was
later established in a sequence of works [39, 33]. PPAD also contains other impor-
tant problems like computational counterparts of Brouwer and Katukani fix-point
theorems as complete. We will see in §1.1.2 why Sperner, the combinatorial prob-
lem that we started off our discussion of TFNP with, also belongs to this class.
Continuous Local Search (CLS). Roughly speaking, the class CLS ⊆ PLS∩PPAD
contains “continuous” variants of the problems in PLS [40]. The complete problem
for the class is called Continuous-Local-Optimum (CLO), and it is similar to
Local-Search but the successor and value circuits are now guaranteed to behave
“smoothly” (through Lipschitz continuity). The class is particular interesting to
the game theory community as a plethora of games (e.g., Simple Stochastic Games,
Mean-Payoff Games) are known to lie inside this class [43]. Another interesting
problem that lies in this class (but not known to be complete) is End-of-Metered-
Line (EOML) [62]. As the name suggests, EOML is closely-related to EOL and
we will exploit this connection to extend all of our results for the class PPAD to
CLS (see §2.3).
Before moving on to PPAD, we briefly discuss the remaining subclasses. The class
Polynomial Weak Pigeonhole Principle (PWPP) [64] contains problems related to finding
collisions in functions. Although it is contained in PPP, the relationship of PWPP
with the rest of the subclasses is not well-understood. PPADS is a more restricted
version of PPAD. Finally, the subclass Provable Total Functional Non-deterministic
Polynomial-time (PTFNP) was recently introduced with the goal of developing a more
unified complexity theory of TFNP problems [52]. It contains all of the subclasses that
we have discussed above, but the membership of some of the “rogue” TFNP problems like
Factoring or Ramsey (given a graph of size 22m find either a clique or an independent
set of size m) in PTFNP is yet to be established.
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Figure 1.4: Problems in TFNP. The canonical complete problems for their classes are in
blue. The dotted line is used to separate complete problems from the rest. Factoring
is in red to highlight that the inclusion is via a randomised Karp reduction.
81.1.2 The Complexity Class PPAD
PPAD can be considered to be the “directed” or “oriented” analogue of the class PPA
(which makes it easier than PPA). The principle that underlies this class is the directed
formulation of the handshaking lemma: for any (finite) digraph, if there exists an un-
balanced vertex, i.e. a vertex with unequal in- and out-degree, then there exists another
unbalanced vertex. The canonical complete problem for this class goes by the name End-
of-Line (EOL): given a (standard) source in a directed graph where every vertex has
both in-degree and out-degree at most one, find a sink or another source [84]. This prob-
lem can be solved in linear time when the graph is given explicitly, but there is no known
algorithm solving it in polynomial time when the input is an implicit representation of
the graph describing the successor and predecessor of every vertex, as described below.
Definition 4 ([84]). End-of-Line (EOL)
• Instance.
1. A successor circuit S : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
2. A predecessor circuit P : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
• Guarantee. 0m is unbalanced: P(0m) = 0m and S(0m) ̸= 0m
• Solution. An unbalanced vertex v ∈ {0, 1}m: P(S(v)) ̸= v or S(P(v)) ̸= v ̸= 0m
To see why totality is not semantic but syntactic, we have to first explain a few
technicalities [51]. Note that any badly defined edge, i.e. S(u) = v and P(v) ̸= u or P(v) =
u and S(u) ̸= v, qualifies as a solution of EOL as defined above (because P(S(u)) ̸= u
or S(P(u)) ̸= u respectively: see Figure 1.5.(a). Note that 0m is a source of the graph,
unless P(S(0m)) ̸= 0m, in which case 0m is a valid solution to the problem as stated above.
One could now think of “sanitised” EOL instance (S′,P′) with such badly defined edges
turned into self-loops: see Figure 1.5.(b). The circuits S′ and P′ can intuitively be viewed
as succinctly implementing a directed graph of degree at most one over {0, 1}m, where
for each pair of vertices v and u there exists an edge from v to u if and only if S′(v) = u
and P′(u) = v (see Figure 1.5.(c)). Given that 0m is unbalanced, the goal is to another
unbalanced vertex. Such a vertex must always exist by the handshaking lemma.
It is easy to see why EOL reduces to Pigeon: the reduction simply sets C(x) := S(x).
Since 0m doesn’t have a preimage in this Pigeon instance, the adversary must return a
collision and these correspond to the sink and its predecessor. The reduction from EOL
to Lonely, although intuitive, is trickier and can be found, for example, in [6].
Sperner is in PPAD. An obvious way to solve any given EOL instance is to sim-
ply follow the standard path, i.e. by starting from the standard source and iteratively
applying the successor circuit until one hits a sink. An obvious way to solve any given
Sperner instance is to simply follow the walk that we used to establish the existence of
a trichromatic triangle. Both approaches could potentially take super-polynomially many
steps. At first glance, from the way the problems are solved, it seems that Sperner
and End-of-Line share some structural similarities: both problems can be solved by
following a well-defined (directed) walk starting from a standard source vertex to its end.
We formalise this intuition by showing that Sperner is indeed Karp-reducible to EOL
and consequently that Sperner ∈ PPAD.
90000
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 1.5: Sample End-of-Line instance with 16 vertices {0, 1}4. The output of the
successor (resp., predecessor) circuit is indicated in (a) by the dotted (resp., dashed),
directed edges: i.e., a dotted (resp., dashed) edge (u, v) implies that S(u) = v (resp.,
P(u) = v). The vertices having badly defined edges are shown in red. The graph in (b)
corresponds the “sanitised” EOL instance (S′,P′) where the such edges have been turned
into self loops. The solid, directed edges are the edges in the implicit graph shown in (c):
i.e. an edge (u, v) implies that S(x) = y and P(y) = x. The source and sink vertices are
shown in blue; self-loops are in black.
Figure 1.6: Sperner is Karp-reducible to End-of-Line. The End-of-Line instance
that is constructed out of the Sperner instance is shown using dotted lines. The
source and sink of the EOL instance corresponds to the trichromatic triangles (which
are shaded). The triangles which are not the part of any walk are considered to be
self-loops.
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Theorem 1 ([84]). Sperner is Karp-reducible to End-of-Line.
Proof (sketch). The reduction almost follows from the proof for totality of Sperner that
we explained in the introduction. We need an extended version of that argument which
establishes the existence of an odd number of trichromatic triangles, discussed next. Let
us call the walk we used to establish the first trichromatic triangle the standard walk.
Consider any trichromatic triangle ∆ABC other than the one established by the standard
walk: e.g., see Figure 1.6. Suppose for the time being that it has green-red edge with a
green vertex on the left. Let us start a walk from ∆ABC using the same rules as before.
By the same argument as before, this walk can neither exit the grid nor loop with itself.
By the same argument that ruled out loops, it can also be established that this walk
cannot collide with the standard walk. Therefore, since the grid is finite, the walk halts
at another trichromatic triangle. In the complementary case that ∆ABC has a green-red
edge with a green vertex on a right, we simply perform the walk backwards with the rules
reversed. That is the trichromatic triangles are all, except the standard one, paired up.
The actual reduction proceeds as follows. Let the Sperner instance be presented
using the colouring circuit C : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}m → {0, 1, 2}. We associate every triangle
∆ABC implicit in this instance with vertex of the EOL instance. (Therefore the size of
labels of this EOL instance is 6m.) In particular, the bottom-left triangle acts as the
standard source of the EOL instance (06m) and the trichromatic triangles, depending on
their orientation, will correspond to either a source or a sink. The successor circuit, on
input a vertex interpreted as the coordinates of ∆ABC, uses C to determine whether
it is possible to walk out of this triangle, i.e., if there exists a green-red edge with the
green vertex on the left. If so it returns the coordinates of next triangle as its output;
otherwise, it returns the coordinates of ∆ABC itself. The functioning of the predecessor
is symmetrically opposite. Note that the standard walk, used to establish the existence of
the first trichromatic triangle, is mapped to the path starting off at the standard source
of the EOL instance. In case there exists other (pairs of) trichromatic triangles in the
Sperner instance, these will also result in directed paths: e.g., see Figure 1.6. (Note
that cycles are a possibility in this EOL instance as shown in Figure 1.6). It follows that
from any unbalanced vertex in the EOL instance, we can recover the coordinates of a
trichromatic triangle, completing the reduction.
1.2 Cryptography and Total Search Problems
Over the years, the research community has striven to classify total search problems into
the subclasses of TFNP, which has resulted in a rich network of reductions. This, in some
sense, reinforces the belief that these problems are hard in the worst case – i.e., for every
efficient algorithm there exist instances of the problem that are hard to solve.5 But it could
very well be the case that these problems are easy in the average case, say, because of some
heuristic algorithm that solves most instances of the problem. One such example is the
5Currently, no PPAD-complete problem is known to admit a sub-exponential-time worst-case algo-
rithm. However, on the face of it, all TFNP problems could be potentially solvable in polynomial time
without defying our understanding of the broader landscape of complexity theory (e.g. no surprising
collapse of any important complexity classes seems to be implied by assuming TFNP ⊂ FP) We do
however know of worst-case hard instances for a specific algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium [97] or
of oracle-based worst-case hard instances of PPAD-complete problems [58, 3].
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Lemke-Howson algorithm, which efficiently solves most instances of Nash that occur in
practice [72]. In light of this, it is natural to seek “extrinsic” evidence supporting TFNP
hardness. That is, as raised in Papadimitriou’s original paper [84], whether something
can be said about the average-case hardness of total problems. In particular, do there
exist efficiently-sampleable distributions of instances on search problems that would fail
all heuristics?
Since proving average-case hardness unconditionally implies that P ̸= NP we would
have to instead reduce from search problems that are assumed to be hard-on-average,
i.e. under a average-case hardness assumption. One source of such problems is modern
cryptography where the ability to sample problems that are hard-on-average is necessary
to build even the most basic functionalities like encryption and signatures – problems
that are hard in the worst case are simply not sufficient. For instance, the security of
one of the components of HTTPS (i.e., Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) is under the
assumption that Factoring is hard-on-average. Another example is the widely-deployed
DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) and EC-DSA (Elliptic-Curve DSA) signature schemes
which have discrete-logarithm problem (DLP), the problem of computing the discrete
logarithm in a prime-order group, at their heart. The main reason to believe that these
problems are hard is that even after decades of search for efficient algorithms, they remain
elusive.
1.2.1 Average-Case Hardness in TFNP
The aforementioned cryptographic hard problems, Factoring and DLP, are both total
and therefore imply average-case hardness in TFNP. Since we strive for minimality, the
question that naturally follows is whether these problems also imply hardness in any of
its lower subclasses. The benefits of such a result would be two-fold. Firstly, it would
rule out heuristics for the subclass. To be more precise, it would give us a way to sample
instances of the problem such that any efficient algorithm would fail to find a solution
to the problem. For example, establishing average-case hardness in PPAD would allow
us to sample instances of Nash that defeats the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Secondly, it
would shed more light on the structure of that hard problem. This is interesting from the
point of view of a cryptographer as it would have potential implications to cryptanalysis
of the hard problem.
Average-case hardness under standard cryptographic assumptions was long known for
some of the higher subclasses of TFNP. The most notable results are the following.
1. One-way permutations (OWPs) implies hardness of PPP [84]. Let (π, y∗) denote an
instance of OWP, where π : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m is a circuit evaluating the OWP and
y∗ ∈ {0, 1}m is the challenge that is supposed to be inverted. The Karp reduction
maps (π, y∗) to the Pigeon circuit
Cy∗(x) := π(x)⊕ y∗
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operation. Since π is a permutation, this Pigeon
instance does not have any collision. Therefore the only solution is the preimage
of 0m, i.e., x∗ ∈ {0, 1}m such that π(x∗) = y∗, which is the solution to the OWP
instance.
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2. Hardness of PWPP from collision-resistant hash functions (CRHFs) follows triv-
ially. It is folklore that hardness of PPP also follows from CRHFs. Given a CRHF
H : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m−1 that shrinks the input by one bit, the Karp reduction maps
it to the Pigeon circuit
C(x) := 1∥H(x),
where ∥ denotes the string-concatenation operator. Since this instance does not
map any element to 0m, the only solutions are collisions in the circuit and each such
collision yields a collision to the CRHF. Since problems like Factoring, DLP, SIS
(i.e., the short integer solution problem on lattices [2]) imply CRHFs, it follows that
they also give rise to PPP-hardness.
3. Factoring implies hardness of PPA albeit via randomised reductions [25, 64].
Given an instance N ∈ N of Factoring the reduction, roughly speaking, defines
the Lonely instance as
C(x) := x−1 mod N,
with 1 ∈ Z∗N set to be the trivial unpaired vertex. Since one of the other unpaired
vertices in this instance is an element x ̸= 1 ∈ Z∗N such that x2 = 1 mod N , one of
the factors of N can be extracted by computing GCD(x− 1, N).
Other results are known regarding average-case hardness in TFNP. Huba´cˇek, Naor and
Yogev [61] constructed hard TFNP problems from one-way functions (or, in fact from
any average-case hard NP language) under complexity-theoretic assumptions used in
the context of derandomization. As a consequence, TFNP is hard-on-average in Pessi-
land [63] (where hard-on-average languages exist but one-way functions don’t) under the
aforementioned complexity-theoretic assumptions. This result was recently strengthened
in [86] to show unconditional average-case hardness of TFNP in Pessiland. However, it
is not known whether these distributions gives rise to average-case hardness in any of the
syntactic subclasses of TFNP. Komargodski, Naor and Yogev [69] demonstrated a close
connection between the existence of collision-resistant hashing and the Ramsey problem
(Ramsey). Ramsey is not known to lie inside any of the syntactic subclasses of TFNP
though (see Figure 1.4).
1.2.1.1 Barriers to Average-Case Hardness
The relatively small progress on showing average-case hardness of total search problems
from weak general assumptions (like one-way functions, which is very unstructured) mo-
tivated a line of works focusing on limits for proving average-case hardness. The implau-
sibility of using worst-case NP hardness [65, 78] was later strengthened to show that it
is unlikely to base average-case TFNP hardness even on problems in the polynomial hi-
erarchy [24], and to show that any randomized reduction from a worst-case NP language
to an average-case TFNP problem would imply that SAT is checkable [77]. A recent
result [95] applies to the whole of TFNP and shows that any attempt for basing average-
case TFNP hardness on (trapdoor) one-way functions in a black-box manner must result
in instances with exponentially many solutions. This is in contrast to all known construc-
tions of average-case hard PPAD problems that result in instances with a small number
of solutions.
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1.2.2 Average-Case Hardness in PPAD
In the previous section we saw how certain cryptographic primitives impart hardness to
some of the subclasses of TFNP that are higher up. It is currently not known whether
any of these results can be extended to lower subclasses like PPAD or CLS. Neither
was it not known if their average-case hardness could be based on other cryptographic
primitives like fully-homomorphic encryption. This was the state of affairs until a series
of results established a connection between a newly-introduced cryptographic primitive
known as program obfuscation and the hardness of PPAD.
Loosely speaking, program obfuscation allows us to efficiently “scramble” programs
without losing its functionality [5]. That is, given a program P represented in an appropri-
ate model of computation (say, Turing machines or Boolean circuits), the obfusctor returns
its scrambled version ˆ︁P such that P(x) = ˆ︁P(x) on all inputs x (completeness). There
are various notions of soundness, the strongest being that of virtual black-box (VBB)
obfuscation: the obfuscated program ˆ︁P should not reveal any information on P other
than its input-output behaviour. It was shown in [5] that this notion is not attainable
in general, and they suggested weakening the soundness requirement to indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation (IO): the obfuscations of two functionally-equivalent programs should
be indistinguishable. It turned out that this weakened notion is still strong enough to
obtain interesting, non-trivial results (such as public-key encryption from private-key en-
cryption) [96]. Moreover, many candidate construction were proposed, albeit from new,
non-standard hardness assumptions [47].
PPAD-hardness via obfuscation. The connection between obfusction and PPAD-
hardness was first observed in [1]. They showed how to obtain hard distribution of in-
stances of the End-of-Line problem using VBB obfuscation. On a high level construction
can be divided into two steps (see §2.2 for a detailed explanation):
1. construct hard distribution of a promise problem called Sink-of-Verifiable-Line
(SVL) using VBB obfuscation and one-way functions; and
2. given this SVL instance, simulate End-of-Line using reversible black pebbling [8].
Bitansky, Paneth and Rosen [13], in their breakthrough paper, demonstrated how the
first step above can be carried out using sub-exponentially-secure IO (i.e., the soundness
should hold with respect to adversaries that run in time sub-exponential in the secu-
rity parameter). This gave the first extrinsic evidence of PPAD hardness and provided
a plausible method to sample potentially hard-on-average End-of-Line instances us-
ing the candidate for IO from [47]. The result in [13] was extended by Huba´cˇek and
Yogev [62], who observed that the second step in the above construction essentially,
for free, yields instances the End-of-Metered-Line problem, which lies in the class
CLS ⊆ PLS ∩ PPAD. Both results were subsequently strengthened by relaxing the
underlying assumptions:
1. Garg, Pandey and Srinivasan [48] reduced from breaking IO with polynomial (in-
stead of sub-exponential) hardness (or alternatively compact public-key functional
encryption) and one-way permutations;
2. Komargodski and Segev [70] reduced from breaking quasi-polynomially secure private-
key functional encryption and sub-exponentially-secure injective one-way functions.
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1.3 Overview of the Thesis
In one way or another, all of the above assumptions used to construct hard instances of
PPAD are closely related to IO, whose attainability is not implausible but nevertheless
still lies within the domain of speculation. Given that many candidate IO schemes have
been broken, and that surviving ones are yet to undergo extensive evaluation by the cryp-
tographic community, it is desirable to base PPAD-hardness on alternative assumptions.
In this thesis, we take a step in this direction by showing PPAD-hardness under assump-
tions that are of a different flavour from obfuscation (and arguably weaker). We give a
summary of our results in §1.3.1 and then in §1.3.2 provide a high-level overview of the
techniques used to obtain these results. Our results demonstrates new ways for sampling
hard-on-average PPAD instances, based on assumptions of seemingly different nature
than those required by prior work (e.g., number-theoretic, in contrast to ones related to
obfuscation).
1.3.1 Main Results
In this thesis, we present two constructions of hard distribution of End-of-Line. The first
construction relies on the (average-case) hardness of a number-theoretic search problem
that we call Iterated-Squaring, and requires a random oracle, i.e. a random function
that is accessible to all parties [7]. The second construction relaxes these assumptions to
a considerable degree. On a high level, both the constructions deploy the same technique,
i.e., incrementally-verifiable computation via recursive proof-merging. In particular, the
second construction can be considered to be a strengthening of the first. We next state,
informally, the two main theorems in this thesis.
1.3.1.1 PPAD-Hardness from Iterated-Squaring
Our first construction is based on the hardness of Iterated-Squaring (IS), a number-
theoretic search problem related to Factoring, described below.
Definition 5 ([26, 94]). Iterated-Squaring (IS)
• Instance.
1. Modulus N ∈ N
2. Group element x ∈ Z∗N
3. Time parameter T ∈ N
• Solution. f(N, x, T ) = x2T mod N
To generate a hard distribution of IS instances, N is chosen as the product of two
random λ/2-bit safe primes6 and x is sampled uniformly at random from Z∗N . Computing
f for moduli chosen as above was suggested as a hard problem by Rivest, Shamir and
Wagner[94], who conjectured that for any T , computing f either requires Ω(T ) sequential
time or total computation sufficient to factor N . The latter requirement is in place as IS
6A prime of the form p = 2p′+1 is a safe prime if p′ is also a prime; conversely, p′ is a Sophie Germain
prime if 2p′ + 1 is also a prime.
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is at most as hard as Factoring. To be more precise, the knowledge of the factors of N
allows computing f using a standard shortcut (see §3.1.1) Our hardness assumption on
IS is milder: it is sufficient for us that the solution f(N, x, T ) cannot be computed in time
poly(λ) for some (potentially exponentially large) T (see Assumption 2 in §3.1.2). Our
reduction also requires assuming access to a random oracle, which is used in the context of
transforming a log T -round public-coin interactive proof from [88] into a non-interactive
one (see the discussion below). The reduction can be informally stated as follows.
Theorem (informal). For a security parameter λ ∈ N, let N be a modulus sampled as
described above. If there exists a time parameter T = T (λ) ∈ [︁ω(poly(λ)), 2λ]︁ such that
no poly(λ)-time algorithm can solve the Iterated-Squaring instance (N, x, T ) with
non-negligible probability, then there exists a hard distribution of End-of-Line instances.
1.3.1.2 PPAD-Hardness from Fiat-Shamir Methodology
In our second construction, we relax the hardness assumption from Iterated-Squaring
to the mild complexity-theoretic assumption that #SAT, the problem of counting the
number of satisfying assignments to a CNF formula, is hard in the worst case. In addition
we rely on the so-called Fiat-Shamir methodology [44], a technique used to transform a
public-coin interactive protocol into a non-interactive protocol, which we explain next.
Recall that in an interactive protocol a prover (which is usually unbounded) tries
to convince a computationally-bounded verifier of the validity of a statement, e.g. the
number of satisfying assignments to a SAT instance. The protocol is usually executed
over several rounds, over which the prover and verifier exchange messages with each other
as shown in Figure 1.7.(a). The verifier is probabilistic and if the random coins used to
sample its messages can be public, we say that the protocol is public-coin (and otherwise
it is secret-coin). The protocol is said the be sound if it is hard for the prover to convince
the verifier of a false statement, e.g. of wrong number of satisfying assignments to a SAT
instance.
In the Fiat-Shamir methodology, a public-coin interactive protocol is compiled into
a non-interactive protocol by, loosely speaking, replacing the verifier in the public-coin
protocol with a hash function H sampled randomly from a family of hash functions H.
This is carried out as follows: in each round i ∈ [1, ρ], instead of obtaining the message
from the verifier, the prover computes it itself by hashing the transcript of the protocol
(so far) using H. As a result, in the non-interactive version of the protocol, the prover
simply simulates the verifier by computing the hash internally and then only sending the
last message over as shown in Figure 1.7.(b). Given the original interactive protocol is
sound, we say that the Fiat-Shamir Transform maintains soundness (or simply, is sound)
if the non-interactive protocol that results by applying the transform is also sound.
For our construction, we require the Fiat-Shamir Transform to maintain soundness
for the Sumcheck Protocol, an interactive protocol that was used in [75] to show that
#SAT ∈ IP. That is, it allows a prover to convince a verifier of the number of satisfying
assignments to a SAT instance. The protocol runs in n rounds, where n denotes the
number of variables in the #SAT instance. Since breaking the soundness of Fiat-Shamir is
reducible to #SAT (in fact to SAT) it follows that efficiently solving the above distribution
is no easier than breaking Fiat-Shamir.
16
P V
I
α1
β1
...
αρ−1
βρ−1
αρ
(a)
PFS VFS
I,H
α1, . . . , αρ
(b)
Figure 1.7: The Fiat-Shamir Transform. (a) An ρ-round interactive protocol between a
prover P and a verifier V. I denotes the statement that the prover is trying to convince
the verifier about. The i-th message from the prover to the verifier is denoted by αi; the
i-th message in the opposite direction is denoted by βi. (b) The non-interactive protocol
as a result of the transform. The i-th message from the verifier βi is now computed by the
prover (by itself) as the hash of the transcript (with respect to V) up to that point, i.e.
H(I, α1, β1, . . . , αi−1). Therefore only the prover messages α1, . . . , αρ are now required to
be sent.
Theorem (informal). Solving the End-of-Line problem is at least as hard as breaking
the (adaptive) soundness of the Fiat-Shamir Transformation, when applied to the Sum-
check Protocol.
Moreover, we show that the soundness indeed holds when H is instantiated with a
random oracle.7 Therefore, we get the following theorem and its corollary.
Corollary (informal). If #SAT is hard (in the worst case) then, relative to a random
oracle, there exists a hard distribution of End-of-Line instances.8
Two remarks are in order. Firstly, there is growing evidence that it might be possible
to instantiate the Fiat-Shamir using hash functions that are constructed from standard
assumption [27]. Therefore, it is plausible that the hardness of our construction is based
an object other than the random oracle. We show in §4.4 that this is indeed that case
under some strong assumptions on fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE). We defer this
discussion to §4.1.1 in Chapter 4. Secondly, all of the above results (including the above
instantiation using FHE) can be strengthened to achieve hardness in CLS ⊆ PLS ∩
PPAD by applying the observations in [62]. We discuss more on this in §2.3 in the next
chapter.
1.3.2 Techniques
In both constructions, we follow the blueprint from [1, 13] that we briefly discussed in
§1.2.2. That is, we proceed via the following two steps:
7In fact, the usage of random oracle in the previous result can be thought of applying a variant of the
Fiat-Shamir Transform to the protocol from [88].
8In the original paper [34], we had claimed that the corollary holds just relative to a random oracle,
without the additional assumption on #SAT. However, this is not correct: see Remark 12.
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1. construct hard distribution of the Sink-of-Verifiable-Line (SVL) problem; and
2. given an SVL instance from the above distribution, simulate End-of-Line using
reversible black pebbling.
Since the second step is more or less similar to previous constructions, in this overview
we focus on the first step. In particular, we explain it from the point of view of the first
construction (from Iterated-Squaring) since it is conceptually simpler to explain.
However, it still suffices to demonstrate the essential techniques that underlies both con-
structions (viz. incremental computation, recursive proof-merging, unique proofs). We
defer the overview of the second construction to Chapter 4 and limit ourselves here to
highlighting its differences from the first (at the end of the section). Since SVL is cen-
tral to these constructions, first we formally define it the section below and explain its
relationship with the notion of incrementally-verifiable computation [103].
1.3.2.1 Sink-of-Verifiable-Line
Definition 6 ([103, 13]). Sink-of-Verifiable-Line (SVL)
• Instance.
1. A successor circuit S : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
2. A verifier circuit V : {0, 1}m × [1, 2m]→ {0, 1}
3. Length L ∈ [1, 2m]
• Promise. For every v ∈ {0, 1}m and i ∈ [1, 2m], V(v, i) = 1 if and only if:
1. i ≤ L; and
2. v = Si(0m).
• Solution. Sink vertex: v ∈ {0, 1}m such that V(v, L) = 1
Intuitively, the circuit S can be viewed as implementing the successor function of a
directed graph over {0, 1}m that consists of a single path, the “standard path”, starting
at 0m. The circuit V enables to efficiently test whether a given vertex v is of distance i
from 0m on this standard path, and the goal is to find the vertex that lies at a distance
L from 0m, the standard sink. Note that not every tuple (S,V, L) is a valid SVL instance
since V might not satisfy the promise about its behaviour: see Footnote 2. Moreover,
there may not be an efficient algorithm for verifying whether a given tuple (S,V, L) is a
valid instance, hence this problem lies outside of TFNP.
Relationship with incrementally-verifiable computation (IVC). Consider a party
A carrying out a time-intensive (deterministic) computation C like, e.g., testing whether
a number Mp is a Mersenne prime (which takes months for the primes being presently
tested). There could arise scenarios where A must discontinue computing C but would
like to hand over the intermediate state to another party B who then continues the com-
putation. However B might be distrustful of A and the purpose of IVC is to help bridge
this distrust.
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Figure 1.8: Sample Sink-of-Verifiable-Line instance with 16 vertices (i.e., m = 4)
with a standard path of length L = 8 . The output of the successor circuit is indicated
by the directed edges: i.e., an edge (u, v) implies that S(u) = v. The source and standard
sink vertex are in blue. The vertices that lie off the standard path, thus rejected by the
verifier, are in black.
Suppose that on input I, the computation of C goes through the sequence of configu-
rations
C0 → . . .→ CT
for some (large) T ∈ N. Instead of computing C plainly as above, the idea in IVC is
to carry it out verifiably using an alternative program ˆ︁C which, to every intermediate
configuration Ci, attaches a succinct proof πi := π(C0
i−→ Ci) that attests to the fact that
Ci is obtained from C0 in i steps.
9 Therefore the sequence of configurations for the IVC
would look like:
(C0, π0)→ . . .→ (CT , πT ). (1.2)
Any party should be able to use πi to efficiently verify that the Ci is indeed the i-th step in
the computation. Moreover, given any intermediate configuration (Ci, πi) of ˆ︁C, computing
the next configuration (Ci+1, πi+1) should be incremental, i.e. takes time comparable to
computing Ci+1 from Ci. Together, the incremental and verifiable nature of ˆ︁C, enables A
to halt at any intermediate stage of the computation and B to take over from that point
onward.
It is not difficult to see how IVC could potentially be used to design a hard SVL
instance. We start off by setting the standard path in the SVL instance as the sequence
of configurations in eq.(1.2). Given a vertex (Ci, πi), the successor circuit uses the incre-
mental property of IVC to (efficiently) compute (Ci+1, πi+1) and returns it as the next
vertex. The verifier circuit, on the other hand, simply invokes the verifiable property of
IVC. Although there are several issues that needs to be addressed with the above ap-
proach (which we do in §1.3.2.3), we see next in our first construction how some of the
ideas indeed turn out quite useful.
1.3.2.2 Sink-of-Verifiable-Line from Iterated-Squaring
To explain our construction, we rely on a slightly different formulation of SVL where the
standard source can be any arbitrary vertex v0 ∈ {0, 1}m. This formulation can be shown
to be equivalent to Definition 6: see Lemma 1 and Remark 3.
9By succinct, we mean the size of the proof should be (almost) independent of the run-time T ). Note
that IVC can be trivially achieved without the succinctness requirement. For example, ˆ︁C could simply
maintain all the previous configurations in the proof: i.e., πi := C0, . . . , Ci−1.
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P V
I = (N, x, T, y)
µ
r
I ′ = (N, x′, T/2, y′)
Figure 1.9: The halving sub-protocol between a prover P and a verifier V for T > 2 results
in a statement I turned into a new statement I ′.
Consider the following natural approach for reducing the computation of f(N, x, T )
to an instance of SVL of length L = T and vertices of size λ (i.e. m = λ). The graph’s
source v0 is a random x ∈ Z∗N , and the successor circuit S is the squaring modulo N
function, yielding the standard path:
x→ x2 → x22 → x23 · · · → x2T (modN). (1.3)
Notice that, assuming x2
T
mod N cannot be computed in time poly(λ) for a sufficiently
large T , it is hard for any polynomial-time algorithm to find the node that is T steps from
the source x.
In order to complete the reduction to SVL, we need to provide an efficient V that
certifies that a vertex v = y is obtained by invoking S for i successive times on x. This is
where Pietrzak’s proof system for certifying y = f(N, x, T ) comes into play [88].
Pietrzak’s proof system. Pietrzak’s protocol allows a prover to convince a verifier that
a tuple I = (N, x, T = 2t, y) satisfies the relation y = x2
T
mod N – i.e., it is an interactive
proof system for the decision problem corresponding to IS. Moreover, remarkably, it
does not require either prover or verifier to know the factorization of N . The protocol is
recursive in the time parameter T and invovles t = log T rounds of interaction. In the first
step, the prover sends the midpoint µ = x2
T/2
mod N as a commitment to the verifier. If
x2
T/2
= µ mod N and µ2
T/2
= y mod N
both hold, then so does the original claim. This reduces the task of proving a statement
for parameter T to proving two statements for parameter T/2. Next, using a random
challenge r ← {0, 1}λ (interpreted as an integer), the verifier and prover merge these
two statements into a single statement by computing a random linear combination x′ :=
xr·µ mod N and y′ := µr·y mod N and setting I ′ = (N, x, T = 2t, y) as the new statement.
The above constitutes the “halving” sub-protocol, which is illustrated in Figure 1.9. One
can show that if the statement (N, x, T, y) is wrong, then with overwhelming probability
over the choice of r so is the new statement (N, x′, T/2, y′). The halving sub-protocol is
repeated t times, halving the time parameter T each time, until we arrive at a claim for
T = 1 at which point the verifier can efficiently check the correctness itself by performing
a single squaring.
The protocol, being public-coin, can be made non-interactive using an analogue of
the Fiat-Shamir Transform. For this, the verifier’s messages (i.e., the r’s) are computed
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by applying a hash function H to the prover’s messages. The non-interactive proof on
challenge (N, x, T ) is of the form (N, x, T, y, µ1, . . . , µt), and we denote it by π(x
T−→ y).
We point out the following three crucial properties of the protocol where λ, if you recall,
denotes the size of N in binary representation:
Property 1: Given (N, x, ℓ, y), computing π(x
ℓ−→ y) requires ℓ+poly(λ) multiplica-
tions in Z∗N and poly(λ) space (if one is not given y, an additional ℓ multiplication
are used to first compute y = x2
ℓ
, but we will always be in a setting where either
ℓ = 1 or y is known).
Property 2: The size of a proof π(x
ℓ−→ y) is poly(λ, log ℓ) bits.
Property 3: Given two proofs π(x
ℓ−→ y), π(y ℓ−→ z) as “advice”, computing the proof
π(x
2ℓ−→ z) can be efficiently reduced to computing a proof π(x′ ℓ−→ y′). We call this
property proof-merging
An attempt using efficient proof-merging. As mentioned above, our goal is to use
Pietrzak’s protocol in order to efficiently implement a verification circuit V that, given
(v = y, i) verifies that y = x2
i
mod N , i.e., that y indeed lies at the i-th position on the
standard path described in eq.(1.3). A first attempt would be to simply augment the
vertex labels xi = x
2i mod N in eq.(1.3) with a corresponding proof, i.e., consider the
standard path
π(x0
0−→ x0)→ π(x0 1−→ x1)→ π(x0 2−→ x2)→ · · · → π(x0 T−→ xT ),
where the circuit V simply runs the efficient proof verification algorithm of Pietrzak’s
protocol. This change renders the standard path efficiently verifiable. However, it is now
not entirely clear how to implement the successor circuit S efficiently. Since the labels
now comprise of proofs, and S is consequently required to efficiently “update” a proof
π(x0
i−→ xi) to π(x0 i+1−→ xi+1). We do not know how to implement this for Pietrzak’s
proof system. To overcome this issue, we use the ability to “merge” proofs, in the sense
that given proofs π(x
ℓ−→ y), π(y ℓ−→ z) one can efficiently compute a single proof π(x 2ℓ−→ z).
Given the ability to merge proofs, we can construct a valid SVL instance by consid-
ering a standard path where going from the i-th vertex to the i+1-th vertex we augment
the label (now consisting of multiple “partial” proofs) with a proof for the single step
π(xi
1−→ xi+1), and then merge the latest proofs as long as they are for the same time
parameter (i.e., if the last two proofs are of the form π(a
ℓ−→ b), π(b ℓ−→ c) merge them into
π(a
2ℓ−→ c)). This results in a standard path where the first few vertices are:
π(x0
0−→ x0)→ π(x0 1−→ x1)→ π(x0 2−→ x2)→ π(x0 2−→ x2)∥π(x2 1−→ x3)→
π(x0
4−→ x4)→ π(x0 4−→ x4)∥π(x4 1−→ x5)→ · · ·
where crucially the number of proofs contained in each label always remains below log T .
We remark that this construction is conceptually similar to Valiant’s construction of
general-purpose incrementally-verifiable computation. We provide a detailed comparison
below in §1.3.2.4.
Strictly speaking, Pietrzak’s proof system does not support efficient merging of proofs
as outlined above. However, it does support somewhat efficient proof-merging as in Prop-
erty 3. Our key observation is that this somewhat-efficient merging is already sufficient,
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as explained next, to construct a valid SVL instance where both the successor circuit S
and verification circuit V run in poly(n) time.
Our construction via recursive proof-merging. Suppose that we could construct
an SVL instance where starting with a label x, after L(ℓ) invocations of S (for L(·) to be
defined) we arrive at a label that contains a proof π(x
ℓ−→ y) establishing y = x2ℓ mod N .
Then we can get an SVL instance where starting with some label x we arrive at a proof
π(x
2ℓ−→ z) making 3 · L(ℓ) invocations of S. The idea is to first compute π(x ℓ−→ y) in
L(ℓ) steps, then π(y
ℓ−→ z) in another L(ℓ) steps (while keeping the first proof π(x ℓ−→ y)
around in the label), and finally using another L(ℓ) steps to recursively merge those two
proofs into π(x
2ℓ−→ z) using Property 3. The recursive algorithm outlined above satisfies
L(2ℓ) = 3 · L(ℓ) steps, and as L(1) = 1, solving this recursion we get L(ℓ) = ℓlog 3.
Thus, x2
T
mod N is reached after L(T ) = T log 3 invocations of S. The above (recursive)
construction can be thought of as an incrementally-verifiable procedure [103] to compute
x2
T
mod N : incremental in the sense that in each step we make some progress towards the
goal of computing x2
T
mod N and verifiable in the sense that each step of the computation
can be validated.
Comparison with the second construction. The second construction can be viewed
as an alternative instantiation of the ideas explained above with two main differences
concerning the underlying assumptions. First, the underlying computational problem
— and therefore the hardness assumption — is different: in the second construction
we switch to the (worst-case) hardness of #P, which is weaker than our assumption
on Iterated-Squaring. Therefore, secondly, the interactive protocol underlying the
second construction needs to be switched accordingly to the Sumcheck Protocol. As we
will explain later, this renders the second construction a significant strengthening of the
first (with respect to the assumptions).
1.3.2.3 Dealing with Imperfect Verifier
One important detail that we have totally glossed over in the above description is that
Pietrzak’s proof system is not “perfect” and therefore neither is the verifier which is built
on top of this proof system. Since the verifier is not perfect, the SVL instance that we
obtain above does not quite meet the requirements laid down in the definition of SVL
(Definition 6). In particular, there are two issues that are inherited from the proof system:
1. Since the proof system does not have perfect soundness, the verifier may accept
vertices corresponding to wrong proofs as lying on the standard path.
2. It could very well be that there are multiple correct proofs for the same statement.
That is the proofs might not be unique and therefore the proof systems might be
unambiguous.
Note that these same issues affect the construction of SVL from incrementally-verifiable
computation outlined in §1.3.2.1. We deal with this issue in two steps.
1. First, we define an imperfect version of the SVL problem. To be more precise,
we relax the promise of SVL to accept vertices that lie off the standard path and
22
then add these off-the-path vertices as solutions to the instance. As long as these
additional solutions are hard to find, breaking the SVL instance should still be
tantamount to finding the sink of the standard path. We remark that this almost
holds for the above proof system: it is statistically sound but does not have unique
proofs. Fortunately though by slightly changing the algebraic setting we can obtain
a proof system with statistically-unique proofs. We will formally define the new
problem, which we call Relaxed-Sink-of-Verifiable-Line (RSVL), in the next
chapter (§2.4).
2. Next, we show that RSVL is (randomised) Karp-reducible to EOL by carefully
arguing that the reduction from SVL to EOL still goes through despite the intro-
duction of additional off-the-path solutions.
1.3.2.4 Parallels with Valiant’s Construction
In [103], Valiant describes a compiler that allows carrying out any given (even exponentially-
long) computation in an incrementally-verifiable manner. Our attempt in §1.3.2.2 at con-
structing SVL instances assuming efficient merging of proofs is inspired by his approach,
which we describe next. For T ∈ N, let
C = C0 → . . .→ CT
denote the computation that we would like to carry out in an incrementally-verifiable
manner. Let us suppose there exists a (non-interactive) proof system that allows us to
prove statements of the form Ci
ℓ−→ Cj, i.e. Cj is obtained from Ci in ℓ steps of computation.
Further, let’s assume that the proofs system supports efficient merging of proofs in the
following sense: given two proofs π(Ci
ℓ−→ Cj) and π(Cj ℓ−→ Ck), we can efficiently compute
a single proof π(Ci
2ℓ−→ Ck) that is of the same size as the original ones.
Given the ability to merge proofs, the incrementally-verifiable computation (IVC) of C
can be described inductively as follows. To increment the computation by one step from
the i-th configuration to the i + 1-th configuration, we augment the configuration (now
consisting of multiple “partial” proofs) with a proof for the single step π(Ci
1−→ Ci+1), and
then merge the latest proofs as long as they are for the same time parameter — i.e., if
the last two proofs are of the form π(Ci
ℓ−→ Cj) and π(Cj ℓ−→ Ck) then merge them into
π(Ci
2ℓ−→ Ck). This results in a sequence of configurations (with the original configurations
dropped for the sake of space):
π(C0
0−→ C0)→ π(C0 1−→ C1)→ π(C0 2−→ C2)→ π(C0 2−→ C2)∥π(C2 1−→ C3)→
π(C0
4−→ C4)→ · · · → π(C0 T/2−−→ CT/2)∥ . . . ∥π(CT−2 1−→ CT−1)→ π(C0 T−→ CT ).
Note that, crucially, the number of proofs contained in each label always remains below
log T . Therefore, if the proof system is succinct, then the blow-up in the size of the
configurations is polynomial (assuming T is at most exponential in the size of the input).
The main contribution in [103] was constructing a proof system that allows efficient
merging using a technique called recursive proof-composition. The construction in [103]
deployed strong non-interactive CS proofs of knowledge as the underlying proof system
(also known as SNARKs.), with very efficient (e.g. linear-time) knowledge extractors re-
quired to enable recursive proof-composition. Constructing such proof systems under
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more standard (falsifiable) assumptions is a notoriously hard proposition [10, 50]. Con-
structions usually rely on knowledge assumptions or are presented in the random oracle
model. Our assumptions, on the other hand, are comparatively milder. For our second
construction, we only assume standard (adaptive) soundness of the concrete and natural
cryptographic protocol obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir Transform to the interactive
Sumcheck Protocol. One consequence of this distinction is that we prove our construc-
tion is sound in the random oracle model, whereas no such proof is known for Valiant’s
construction.10
We note, moreover, that in Valiant’s construction the proofs are not unambiguous,
and thus it is not clear how to use his scheme to obtain hard instances in PPAD.11
1.3.3 Organisation
In Chapter 2, we provide the prerequisite formal definitions (§2.1) and discuss in detail
some of the previous works that serve as bases for the results in Chapters 3 and 4.
In particular, we focus on the results in [13] and [62] which establish hardness in
PPAD (§2.2) and CLS (§2.3), respectively, using indistinguishability obfuscation.
We end the chapter with a section (§2.4) on the Relaxed-Sink-of-Verifiable-
Line (RSVL) problem, which will serve as our gateway to PPAD/CLS hardness
in the subsequent chapters.
In Chapter 3, we present the first of the two constructions of hard distributions of the
RSVL problem. The hardness assumption on Iterated-Squaring along with
its relevant background is described in §3.1. Our construction is inspired by an
interactive protocol from [88], which is described in detail in §3.2. The construction
itself is finally given in §3.3. There we will see how recursive proof-merging works
and we regard this to be the main technical novelty in this thesis. Most of the
content in this chapter is from [36].
In Chapter 4, we present the second construction of hard distributions of the RSVL
problem. The construction is based on the classical Sumcheck Protocol from [75],
which is described in detail in §4.2. The hardness of the construction is based on the
soundness of the Fiat-Shamir Transform for the Sumcheck Protocol. We formulate
this precisely in §4.2, and also show that it holds in the random-oracle model. The
construction itself (§4.3) also relies on recursive proof-merging and is on a high level
similar to the one in the previous chapter. Finally in §4.4, using ideas from [27],
we show that the assumption on the soundness of the Fiat-Shamir Transform holds
under strong assumptions on fully-homomorphic encryption. Most of the content in
this chapter is from [34] and its full version [35].
We conclude with Chapter 5, where we discuss some of the avenues that could be further
explored. We also briefly mention some of the concurrent works regarding PPAD-
hardness that are pertinent to this thesis.
10The issue is that Valiant’s proof system cannot be composed to prove statements about a non-explicit
oracle.
11A key ingredient in Valiant’s construction is a CS proof [79] obtained via a Merkel Hash applied to a
PCP. This is not unambiguous because small changes to a correct PCP string will change the proof, but
will only be noticed by the verifier with small probability. A recent work [80] has managed to construct
incrementally-verifiable PCPs, but their construction is not unambiguous either.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we explain the previous works that serve as bases for the results in
Chapters 3 and 4. In particular, we focus on the results in [13] and [62], which use
indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) to establish hardness in PPAD (§2.2) and CLS
(§2.3), respectively. We end the chapter with a section on a relaxed version of Sink-of-
Verifiable-Line (§2.4) that will serve as our gateway to PPAD and CLS hardness.
But first we fix the notation and recall some prerequisite formal definitions in §2.1.
2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Notation
• Throughout, we use [a, b] to denote {a, a+ 1, . . . , b− 1, b}, the sequence of integers
from a to b (both inclusive).
• We use straight font to denote algorithms, circuits and protocols (e.g., A, C, PP),
calligraphic font to denote sets (e.g., I,H), bold face to denote complexity classes
(e.g., P, NP) or vectors (e.g., v, µ), small caps to denote problems or languages
(e.g., Factoring, SVL). Polynomials, functions and events are in normal math
mode (e.g., p(n), trace, bad).
• For a variable n, by poly(n) we refer to the set of all polynomials (over integers)
in n. Whenever we say some quantity is in poly(n) (e.g., the running time of
an algorithm), we mean that there exists a polynomial p(n) ∈ poly(n) defining
that quantity. The definition of poly(n) is naturally extended to more than one
variables. These conventions apply to the sets quasipoly(n) (quasi-polynomials)
and polylog(n) (polynomials in log(n)).
• We refer to an algorithm (resp., circuit), which can be probabilistic, as “efficient” if
its running time (resp., size) is poly(n), where n denotes the size of its input.
• A function ϵ : N → [0, 1] is negligible if for every polynomial p(n) ∈ poly(n) there
exists an n0 ∈ N such that ϵ(n) ≤ 1/p(n) for all n ≥ n0; negl(n) denotes the set
of all negligible functions in n. If ϵ(·) is not negligible, we say it is non-negligible;
whereas ϵ(·) is overwhelming if 1− ϵ is negligible. Finally, ϵ : N→ [0, 1] is noticeable
if there exist c, n0 ∈ N such that ϵ(n) > 1/nc for all n ≥ n0.
• For a distribution X, x← X denotes sampling randomly according to the distribu-
tion X. For a set X , x ← X denotes sampling uniformly at random from the set
X . Similarly, x← X is used to denote the output of a randomised algorithm (with
fresh random coins).
• All logartihms are base 2 unless otherwise stated.
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2.1.2 Search Problems
The definition of search problems is originally from [78, 85]. In this thesis we prefer to
use an alternative, equivalent formulation from [65] given next. The justification is given
in the remark following the definition.
Definition 7 (Search problem). A search problem P = (I, s) consists of an efficiently-
decidable set of instances1 I ⊆ {0, 1}∗ such that for every instance I ∈ I there exists a
set of solutions s(I) ⊆ {0, 1}∗. An algorithm A is said to solve P if, given as input an
instance I ∈ I, it:
1. outputs a solution S ∈ s(I); or
2. outputs ⊥ if s(I) = ∅ (i.e., if no solution exists).
The language LP that encodes the corresponding decision problem can be defined as
the subset of instances that have a solution:
LP := {I ∈ I : s(I) ̸= ∅} ⊆ I,
or equivalently using the relation
RP := {(I, S) : I ∈ I, S ∈ s(I)}.
Thus, intuitively, the solutions correspond to certificate of membership.
Remark 1 (On the domain of instances). Observe that LP is defined as a subset of
the valid instances I, and therefore the complement of LP is defined with respect to I
(LP = I \ LP). This is contrary to the convention of defining a language as a subset
of all strings and therefore every string is an instance (i.e., I = {0, 1}∗). The same
applies to the definition of search problems in Definition 7. Note, however, that the two
definitions are equivalent as long as the inclusion of a string in I is efficiently-decidable
(which we assume). It turns out to be convenient in our context to restrict the domain
to a subset of well-defined instances I ⊆ {0, 1}∗ since this allows a cleaner definition of a
problem: simply describe the syntax of its instance and solution.2 Consider, for example,
Iterated-Squaring (IS) from Definition 5. A string parsed as (N, x, T ) ∈ N3 is a valid
IS instance only if x ∈ Z∗N . Therefore the set of instances of IS is
IIS :=
{︁
(N, x, T ) ∈ N3 : x ∈ Z∗N
}︁
and the algorithm that decides membership in IIS simply runs the Extended Euclidean
Algorithm to check if x is invertible modulo N .
Notions of reducibility. We now define the two notions of reducibility between search
problems that we use throughout: Karp reducibility (also known as Many-One reducibil-
ity) and Turing reducibility (also known as Cook reducibility). While the definition of
Turing reducibility is similar to that for decision problems, the definition of Karp re-
ducibility is slightly different [78].
1To be formal, there exists an efficient algorithm D that when given a string I ∈ {0, 1}∗ decides (in
time poly(|I|)) whether I ∈ I.
2Instead, if we had to work in a setting where all strings are required to be valid instances, then we
would have to define a efficient encoding that surjectively maps valid tuples to strings.
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Definition 8 (Karp reducibility). A search problemP1 = (I1, s1) is said to be (polynomial-
time) Karp-reducible to another search problemP2 = (I2, s2) if there exists two polynomial-
time computable functions f and g such that
1. f maps every instance I1 ∈ I1 of P1 to a valid instance I2 ∈ I2 of P2; and
2. g maps every solution S2 ∈ s2(I2) of the instance I2 to a solution S1 := g(S2) ∈ s1(I1)
of I1.
Definition 9 (Turing reducibility). A search problem P1 is said to be (polynomial-time)
Turing-reducible to another search problem P2 if there exists a polynomial-time (oracle-
aided) Turing machine R(·) that solves P1 (as defined in Definition 7) when given oracle-
access to a solver A for P2.
It is worth pointing out that in cryptography, one usually deals with Turing reductions:
given oracle access to an adversary that breaks a cryptographic protocol, the reduction
algorithm breaks the cryptographic primitive. However for studying complexity classes,
Karp reductions are preferred as they capture the finer structure of problems better than
Turing reductions (e.g., NP = co-NP with respect to Turing reductions, but not Karp
reductions).
2.1.3 NP Search Problems
In this section we formally define an NP search problem and the corresponding class
FNP.
Definition 10 (Class FNP). A search problem P = (I, s) is a Non-deterministic Poly-
nomial-time (NP) search problem if the set of solutions is efficiently-decidable: i.e., for
every I ∈ I and its associated set of solutions s(I) ⊆ {0, 1}poly(|I|), given a candidate
solution S ∈ {0, 1}poly(|I|) it is decidable in polynomial time (in |I|) whether S ∈ s(I).
The class of all NP search problems is called Functional Non-deterministic Polynomial-
time (FNP).
A few remarks about FNP, in particular about its relationship with NP, are in place.
The class FNP can alternatively be defined as the set of all NP search problems that
are Karp-reducible to FSAT, the search counterpart of SAT [85]. This is analogous to
the definition of NP in terms of SAT. Note that SAT is self-reducible (with respect to
Turing reductions) [98]: i.e., given an oracle that decides SAT, it is possible to find a
satisfying assignment and therefore break FSAT. It follows that FP = FNP if and only
if P = NP [85]. This relationship would suggest, as pointed out in [85], that the study
of FNP is uninteresting. However, it turns out that search problems corresponding to
certain trivial decision problems in NP ∩ co-NP are themselves non-trivial. As we see
next, this class corresponds exactly to TFNP.
2.1.4 Total NP Search Problems
The definition of TFNP is obtained from that of FNP by imposing the additional con-
straint that every instance must have a solution. This formal definition is given next,
followed by the definition of the notion of average-case hardness that we use to study
them.
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Definition 11 (Class TFNP). An NP search problem P = (I, s) is total if the following
holds:
• Totality: Every instance has a solution, i.e., ∀I ∈ I : s(I) ̸= ∅.
The class Total Functional Non-deterministic Polynomial-time (TFNP) consists of the
set of all total problems in FNP.
Definition 12 (Average-case hardness in TFNP). A TFNP search problem P = (I, s)
is hard-on-average if there exists an efficient instance-sampling algorithm IP such that the
following holds:
• Totality: Every instance has a solution, i.e., for every λ ∈ N
Pr
I←IP(1λ)
[s(I) ̸= ∅] = 1.
• Hardness: For every efficient adversary A, there exists a negligible function ϵ such
that for every λ ∈ N
Pr
I←IP(1λ)
S←A(I)
[S ∈ s(I)] ≤ ϵ(λ)
We say that IP defines a hard distribution on the instances of problem P.
Remark 2. The definition of average-case hardness for (general) search problems can be
obtained by dropping the first point from Definition 11 .
Completeness in TFNP. We conclude the definitions by recalling a theorem from [78]
which states that TFNP = F(NP ∩ co-NP) (Theorem 2). It can then be argued that
TFNP is unlikely to contain an FNP-complete problem (Theorem 3). This, taken into
account with the fact that TFNP is semantic (cf. the discussion in Footnote 2), means
that one ends up studying its syntactic sub-classes. We focus on two such classes, PPAD
and CLS, in the two following sections.
Theorem 2 ([78]). TFNP = F(NP ∩ co-NP).
Proof (Sketch). It is easy to show one direction of the containment, i.e. TFNP ⊆ F(NP∩
co-NP), by simply viewing a problem P ∈ TFNP as a problem in FNP. To show the
converse, i.e. that F(NP ∩ co-NP) ⊆ TFNP, we exploit the correspondence between
a search problem and its decision problem discussed in Definition 7. Consider a search
problem P = (I, s) in F(NP ∩ co-NP) and its corresponding decision problem LP ∈
NP ∩ co-NP. Since LP ∈ co-NP, it follows that its complement LP ∈ NP. Therefore,
the solution set s(I) of an instance I ∈ I can be defined as the union of certificate
of memberships in LP and LP. Since LP and LP together cover whole of I, it follows
that every instance in P has at least one solution (viz., a proof of membership or a
refutation).
Theorem 3 ([78]). There is an FNP-complete problem in TFNP if and only if NP =
co-NP.
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Proof. The “if” part follows Theorem 2. To see the converse, suppose for contradiction
that TFNP contains a FNP-complete problem P. Moreover, let FSAT, the search coun-
terpart of the NP-complete problem SAT, be Karp-reducible to P via two polynomial-
time computable functions f and g. Next, let’s consider an unsatisfiable FSAT instance
ϕ. By the totality of P, there exists a solution S to the instance f(ϕ) of P (which is
efficiently verifiable). It follows that ϕ has a (succinct) certificate of unsatisfiability in
the form of g(S) which puts UNSAT, the canonical co-NP-complete problem, in NP.
This shows that co-NP ⊆ NP and since these are complementary classes it follows that
NP = co-NP (see [85, Proposition 2]).
2.2 Hardness in PPAD
We start with a slightly different formulation of the End-of-Line problem in which the
standard unpaired vertex can be an arbitrary vertex v0. As shown in the lemma below, it
is equivalent to the original formulation [84, 13] with 0m as the standard unpaired vertex
as in Definition 4.
Definition 13. End-of-Line (EOL)
• Instance.
1. A successor circuit S : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
2. A predecessor circuit P : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
3. A vertex v0 ∈ {0, 1}m
• Guarantee. v0 is unbalanced: P(v0) = v0 and S(v0) ̸= v0
• Solution. An unbalanced vertex v ∈ {0, 1}m: P(S(v)) ̸= v or S(P(v)) ̸= v ̸= v0
Lemma 1. Definition 4 is equivalent to Definition 13.
Proof. First, any EOL instance (S,P) where the source is 0m can be trivially transformed
to an instance (S,P, v0 = 0
m). Second, we can reduce in the opposite direction by shifting
the main line by v0 as follows. Given an EOL instance (S,P, v0), define the new EOL
instance as (S′,P′) with source 0m, where S′(v) := S(v⊕ v0) and P′(v) := P(v⊕ v0), where
⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operation.
Remark 3. Note that this general technique can be applied to any search problem where
part of the instance is some significant vertex (e.g., Pigeon, SVL).
PPAD-hardness from IO. Recall from §1.3.2 that the construction of hard distribu-
tion on EOL instances in [13, 1] follows the following blueprint:
1. construct hard distribution of SVL; and
2. given an SVL instance from the above distribution, simulate EOL using reversible
black pebbling.
The first step in [13] makes crucial use of indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) for circuits.
Then they use techniques from reversible computing to obtain, in a fairly generic manner,
an instance of EOL. As our constructions of hard End-of-Line instances follow a similar
blueprint, let us go through these steps in more details.
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2.2.1 Hard SVL Instances from IO
Consider the following construction of an SVL instance using a pseudorandom function
(PRF) F. For a fixed key K picked at random from the key-space of the PRF, let vi
denote its evaluation using this key at i: i.e. vi = FK(i). For a security parameter λ, the
SVL instance consists of a standard path of length L = ω(poly(λ)) and the i-th vertex
on this path is set as (i, vi) as shown below.
(0,FK(0))→ (1,FK(1))→ (2,FK(2))→ · · · → (L− 1,FK(L− 1))→ (L,FK(L))
The verifier circuit V on input a vertex (i, v) accepts if and only if v = vi. The successor
circuit S, given as input a valid vertex (i, vi) returns (i+1, vi+1). Although this construc-
tion is functional, it is inherently easy to solve: to ensure functionality, the key K must
be hardwired into the successor and verifier circuits, and this allows anyone to compute
the sink.
The issue with the above construction is that there is no means to ensure functionality
without giving out the key (since a PRF is a symmetric-key primitive). This is where IO
comes to the rescue. Recall that an obfuscator IO takes a program P, here represented
as a Boolean circuit, as input and returns a functionally-equivalent circuit ˆ︁P. Now, let us
reconsider the construction described above but instead with the successor and verifier
circuits obfuscated: ˆ︁S := IO(S) and ˆ︁V = IO(V). By the completeness of IO, the func-
tionality of the successor and predecessor circuits is preserved. Moreover, its soundness
property ensures that the hardwired key K remains “hidden” and consequently the sink
too remains hidden thanks to the pseudorandomness of a PRF.
To formally show that the SVL instance is indeed hard, one uses the punctured pro-
gramming technique from [96] to show that one cannot distinguish the above obfuscated
circuits from their “punctured” counterparts where the standard path has been “erased”
from a random point onwards. The sink in the SVL instance defined by such circuits is
hidden information-theoretically. We refer the readers to [13] for further details.
2.2.2 Simulating the Predecessor Circuit
Given an SVL instance SVL = (S,V, L), the End-of-Line instance EOL = (S,P, v0) is
essentially simulated using reversible black pebbling, a game on directed acyclic graphs
that was introduced to model reversible computation [8]. We formally define the game
and the complexity-measure that is relevant to our discussion (i.e., space-complexity) in
Definition 14 and then proceed to explain how the actual simulation is carried out in
Lemma 2.
Definition 14 ([8]). For a directed acyclic graph G = (V , E), consider a sequence P :=
(P0, . . . ,PL) of pebbling configurations, where Pi ⊆ V for all i ∈ [0, L]. We call such a
sequence a reversible black pebbling strategy for G if the following two criteria are satisfied:
1. Two subsequent configurations in the sequence differ only in one vertex and the
following rule is respected in each move: a pebble can be placed on or removed from
a vertex if and only if all its parents carry a pebble.
2. The initial configuration is empty (i.e., P0 = ∅) and in the final configuration (PL)
all the sink nodes are pebbled.
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The space-complexity of a strategy P = (P0, . . . ,PL) for a DAG G is defined as
SG(P) := max
i∈[0,L]
|Pi|.
The space-complexity of a DAG G is the minimum space-complexity over all of its strate-
gies PG:
S(G) := min
P∈PG
SG(P). (2.1)
A strategy matching the space-complexity of a DAG is deemed space-optimal for that
DAG.
Lemma 2 ([1, 13]). Sink-of-Verifiable-Line is Karp-reducible to End-of-Line.
Proof. Notice that it is easy to construct the predecessor circuit in an inefficient way. One
can simply modify the labels of the vertices to contain the entire history of the previous
steps on the SVL line. Given such labels, implementing the predecessor is easy: simply
remove the last element from the label. However, the obvious issue of this transformation
is that the size of the labels eventually becomes exponentially large, which would render
the resulting circuits S and P inefficient relative to the size of the SVL instance. To
resolve this, we rely on reversible black pebbling.
For an SVL instance SVL = (S,V, L), let us consider the implicitly-defined standard
path {0m = v0, . . . , vL}, where the i-th vertex is vi := SVL.Si(v0) (see Figure 2.1). Since
the EOL instance EOL = (S,P,v0) we define, with a standard path {v0, . . . ,vL}, is
determined by the space-optimal reversible black pebbling strategy for this standard path,
let us look at this particular strategy. For simplicity, let us consider the case when the
length of the standard path is L = 2l for some l ∈ N – the case when L is not a power of
2 can be handled by dividing it into segments that are of length a power of 2.
There are l pebbles that can be placed on positions indexed by positive integers. The
rules of the pebbling game from Definition 14 restricted to path graphs simplifies to: a
pebble can be placed in or removed from position i if and only if either there is a pebble
in position i − 1 or i = 1. The goal of the game is to place a pebble in position 2l − 1,
the lone sink. As shown by Chung, Diaconis and Graham [37], the space-optimal strategy
achieves the goal of the game in a recursive manner. Their main idea is to exploit the
symmetry of the rules for placing and removing pebbles. Specifically, that it is always
possible to reverse any sequence of moves. Suppose there is a way to get to 2l−1− 1 using
only l − 1 pebbles. Then, place an additional pebble at 2l−1. Next, free the first l − 1
pebbles by reversing the original sequence of moves performed in the first part. Finally,
perform the same sequence starting from 2l−1. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, this strategy
will end with a pebble at position 2l − 1 while using only l pebbles.
The standard path implicit in EOL corresponds to the above space-optimal strategy,
and its successor and predecessor circuits simply simulate it (see Figure 2.1). To be more
precise, each vertex vi in EOL corresponds to a configuration in the strategy and thus its
label consists of the labels of all those vertices in SVL that are pebbled. Subsequently,
a vertex in EOL has a label representing the states of at most l = log(L) pebbles, i.e., a
tuple of pairs vi := ((vi1 , i1), . . . , (vil , il)) where each pebble corresponds to a pair (vi, i)
where, if you recall, vi = SVL.S
i(v0). (We presume that configurations with strictly less
than l pebbles are padded accordingly.) For example, the labels on the standard path
v0, , . . . ,v27 of the EOL instance given in Figure 2.1 are:
(v0, 0)→ (v0, 0)∥(v1, 1)→ (v1, 1)→ (v1, 1)∥(v2, 2)→ . . .→ (v0, 0)∥(v7, 7)→ (v7, 7).
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...
v0 v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
Figure 2.1: Simulating S and P using reversible pebbling. Each path graph above corre-
sponds to an SVL instance (v0, . . . , v7) of length 8 (with the other vertices in self-loops).
The EOL instance is determined by the space-optimal strategy for this path graph given
above.
The rest of the tuples, that is the ones containing pairs that do not verify, become self-
loops. Therefore, the resulting instance has a unique solution, a sink that identifies a
solution to the original SVL instance.
The successor circuit for EOL now simply simulates the space-optimal strategy. If
the next move in the strategy involves placing a pebble, the successor EOL.S computes
the label corresponding to this vertex by invoking SVL.S and appends it to the current
label. On the other hand, if the next move is a removal, it also simply removes the label
corresponding to this vertex. The functioning of the predecessor circuit is analogous.
The space-optimal strategy demonstrates that by storing only l intermediate states we
can implement EOL.S and EOL.P that traverse the exponential SVL line from 0m to
vL = S
L(0m). However, this comes at a slight cost: the length of the standard path in this
EOL instance is Llog(3) and the size of its labels is 2m · logL. In particular, every vertex
corresponding to an intermediate state of the strategy is followed by the subsequent state,
and the final step of the strategy is a self-loop under EOL.S. For a more formal description
of the reduction see [62].
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2.3 Hardness in CLS
Recall thatCLS consists of all problems that are Karp-reducible toContinuous-Local-
Optimum (see [40] for the formal definition). To establish average-case hardness in CLS,
however, we rely on End-of-Metered-Line (EOML) [62], a problem that is known to
lie in CLS but not known to be complete.
Definition 15 ([62]). End-of-Metered-Line (EOML)
• Instance.
1. A successor circuit S : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
2. A predecessor circuit P : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
3. A meter circuit M : {0, 1}m → [0, 2m]
• Guarantee.
1. 0m is unbalanced: P(0m) = 0m and S(0m) ̸= 0m
2. 0m is the first vertex: M(0m) = 1
• Solution. A vertex v ∈ {0, 1}m satisfying one of the following:
(i) End of line: either P(S(v)) ̸= v or S(P(v)) ̸= v ̸= 0m,
(ii) False source: v ̸= 0m and M(v) = 1,
(iii) Miscount: either M(v) > 0 and M(S(v)) − M(v) ̸= 1 or M(v) > 1 and
M(v)−M(P(v)) ̸= 1.
The goal in EOML is the same as in EOL, but now the task is made easier as one
is also given an “odometer” circuit M. On input a vertex v, this circuit M outputs the
number of steps required to reach v from the source. Since the behaviour of M is not
guaranteed syntactically, any vertex that attests to deviation in the correct behaviour of
M also acts as a solution and thus puts End-of-Metered-Line in TFNP.
2.3.1 Reducing SVL to EOML
The approach of Bitansky et al., that was explained in the previous section, was extended
by Huba´cˇek and Yogev [62] to CLS under the same assumptions. They observed that
in addition to simulating the successor and predecessor circuits, the simulation of SVL
using reversible black pebbling yields a natural odometer M, an algorithm that simply
returns the index of the pebbling configuration. Therefore, the same reduction basically
yields an EOML instance.
Lemma 3 ([62]). Sink-of-Verifiable-Line is Karp-reducible to End-of-Metered-
Line.
Proof. The construction of the successor and predecessor circuits for the EOML instance
EOML = (S,P,M) is the same as in Lemma 2 – what is missing is the description of the
odometer circuit M. However, it can be easily implemented as follows. For every valid
pebbling configuration (i.e., a vertex that is not a self-loop), the meter EOML.M simply
34
outputs the number of steps taken in the pebbling strategy so far plus one (which can be
computed efficiently just from the configuration itself) and the self-loops are given value
0. Thus, the resulting End-of-Metered-Line instance (S,P,M), like the End-of-Line
instance in Lemma 2, corresponds to a graph with a single line traversing the sequence of
all the configurations visited by the space-optimal revsersible black pebbling strategy.
2.4 Relaxing the SVL Problem
The definition of the SVL problem that we saw in Definition 6 (§2.2) is very rigid in the
sense that its verifier circuit V behaves “perfectly”. The instances that result from such
a verifier consist of a single standard path that starts at the source vertex and ending at
the sink (see Figure 1.8). The verifier attests to every vertex on this path and rejects the
ones that lie off it. In particular, this means a verifier cannot accept two different vertices
for the same index.
0000
Figure 2.2: Sample Relaxed-Sink-of-Verifiable-Line instance with 16 vertices (i.e.,
m = 4) with a standard path of length L = 6. The output of the successor circuit is
indicated by the directed edges: i.e., an edge (u, v) implies that S(v) = v. The source
(resp., sink) vertices are in red (resp., blue). The vertices that lie off the path but are
accepted by the verifier, i.e. the relaxed vertices, are in red and the paths they form are
the dashed ones. Thus, it is possible that the blue sink with the dashed incoming edge is
also accepted as the L-th vertex on the line, i.e. as a solution. The vertices rejected by
the verifier are in black.
The construction of SVL from IO (presented in §2.2.1) did have such a perfect verifier
thanks to the power of obfuscation. However, we saw in the overview of our constructions
(§1.3.2) that in some cases these vertices comprise of (non-interactive) proofs. To meet
the stringent requirements of the SVL verifier would require designing (non-interactive)
proof systems that are both perfectly sound (i.e., false proofs are always rejected) and
unambiguous (i.e., every statement has a unique proof). Sometimes, however, such proofs
are hard to construct or outright impossible. Instead we relax the promise involved in
SVL to accommodate imperfect proof systems via a Relaxed-Sink-of-Verifiable-
Line problem.
Definition 16. Relaxed-Sink-of-Verifiable-Line (RSVL)
• Instance.
1. A successor circuit S : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m
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2. A verifier circuit V : {0, 1}m × [1, 2m]→ {0, 1}
3. Length L ∈ [1, 2m]
• Promise. For every v ∈ {0, 1}m and i ∈ [1, 2m], V(v, i) = 1 if
1. i ≤ L; and
2. v = Si(0m).
• Solution. One of the following:
(i) The sink: a vertex v ∈ {0, 1}m such that V(v, L) = 1; or
(ii) False positive: a pair (v, i) ∈ {0, 1}m × [0, 2m] such that v ̸= Si(0m) and
V(v, i) = 1.
The main difference from Definition 6 is that the promise about the behaviour of the
verifier circuit V is relaxed so that it can also accept vertices off the standard path: the
promise is relaxed from an if and only if to an if. However, any vertex off the main
line accepted by V is an additional solution, a false positive. Consequently, for the SVL
instance to remain hard, these off-the-path vertices need to be computationally-hard to
find. In Lemma 4 we show that despite the relaxed promise, RSVL reduces to EOML
and therefore constructing hard distributions of EOML is reduced to constructing hard
distributions of RSVL.
Lemma 4. Relaxed-Sink-of-Verifiable-Line is (randomised) Karp-reducible to End-
of-Metered-Line.
Proof. The proof of the lemma follows by inspection of the reductions from SVL to EOL
(Lemma 2) and SVL to EOML (Lemma 3). Let RSVL = (S,V, L) be an RSVL instance.
Let’s consider the EOML instance EOML = (S,P,M) obtained by applying the reduction
in Lemma 3 to this RSVL instance. (Recall that the length of the standard path in this
EOML instance is Llog(3) and the size of its labels is 2m·logL.) The main issue is that due
to the relaxed guarantee, we might have introduced additional solutions besides the sink
corresponding to vL = RSVL.S
L(0m). We argue that any such solution will correspond to
a false positive in the RSVL instance. To this end, we claim that EOML has the following
properties.
1. Every vertex v is labelled by a tuple of l = log(L) pairs of the form (v, i) ∈ {0, 1}m×
[1, L].
2. Every vertex v that is not a self-loop (i.e., with EOML.S(v) ̸= v or EOML.P(v) ̸= v)
contains in its label only pairs (v, i) ∈ {0, 1}m × [1, L] such that RSVL.V(v, i) = 1
and is given a non-zero value by EOML.M.
3. A vertex v lies on the main directed line starting at the standard source correspond-
ing to the initial pebbling configuration if and only if it contains in its label only
pairs (v, i) ∈ {0, 1}m × [1, L] such that v = RSVL.Si(0m).
Items 1 and 2 are immediate from the description of the reduction. Item 3 follows since
any vertex v which is not a self-loop corresponds to a valid pebbling configuration. Thus,
if the label of v contains only pairs (v, i) ∈ {0, 1}m × [1, L] such that v = RSVL.Si(0m)
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then the successor (resp., predecessor) of v on the main directed EOML line is the
successive (resp., preceding) pebbling configuration. Note that the converse implication
is straightforward.
Consider any vertex v that is a solution (of any type from Definition 15) to EOML.
If the label of v contains a pair of the form (v, L) then we have found a solution to the
relaxed SVL instance. By Item 2, RSVL.V(v, L) = 1 and either v is the sink of the RSVL
instance (when v = RSVL.SL(0m)) or (v, L) is a false positive (when v ̸= RSVL.SL(0m)).
Otherwise, we show that the solution v must contain a false positive in its label.
First, notice that there are no other solutions on the main directed line besides the sink
containing (vL, L) in its label (this sink falls into the previous case we already handled).
Therefore, v lies off the main standard path and, by Items 2 and 3 above, its label must
contain a pair (v, i) such that RSVL.V(v, i) = 1 but v ̸= RSVL.Si(0m), i.e., a false positive.
Since there are log(L) such pairs in the label, we can select the false positive (v, i) with a
noticeable probability simply by picking one of the pairs in the label uniformly at random
(rendering it a randomised Karp reduction).
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Chapter 3
PPAD-Hardness via Iterated-Squaring
In the previous chapter, we saw how the task of constructing hard distribution of End-of-
Line reduces to constructing a hard distribution on theRelaxed-Sink-of-Verifiable-
Line (RSVL) problem. In this chapter, we formally present our first construction of hard
distribution of RSVL, denoted RSVL1. The hardness of the construction, if you recall,
is in the random-oracle model under an assumption on Iterated-Squaring (IS). The
exact hardness assumption along with its relevant background is described in §3.1. Since
our construction is inspired by Pietrzak’s interactive protocol for the decision problem
corresponding to IS [88], we describe it in detail in §3.2. The construction of the RSVL
instance is finally given in §3.3, and there we also explain the notion of recursive proof-
merging which constitutes the main technical novelty in this thesis.
3.1 Hardness Assumption
We begin this section with the Rivest, Shamir and Wagner (RSW) time-lock puzzle and
the hardness assumption that underlies its security (Assumption 1). Then, in §3.1.2,
we describe the weaker assumption (Assumption 2) sufficient for the hardness of our
construction.
3.1.1 The RSW Time-Lock Puzzle
Rivest, Shamir and Wagner [94] introduced the notion of time-lock puzzles. Such a puzzle
is specified by a sampling algorithm which, on input a security parameter λ ∈ N and a time
parameter T , outputs a puzzle instance I and the corresponding solution S. The solution
S can be computed given only the puzzle I making T simple sequential steps. The security
property requires that even an adversary with poly(λ) parallelism cannot compute the
solution much faster than the honest (sequential) algorithm. They also propose a simple
and elegant construction: on input (λ, T ), a puzzle is sampled by choosing two random
λRSA/2-bit primes p, q (see Remark 4), which define a λRSA-bit modulus N := p · q,
together with any x ∈ Z∗N . The puzzle and solution are then defined as
I := (N, x, T ), S = f(N, x, T ) := x2
T
mod N.
Observe that this is precisely the search problem Iterated-Squaring (IS) from Defi-
nition 5. The solution to the puzzle, or equivalently to the IS instance, can be efficiently
computed by the puzzle-sampling algorithm in two steps using the knowledge of the group
order φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1) as
e := 2T mod φ(N), S := xe mod N. (3.1)
It follows that IS is at most as hard as Factoring.
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Theorem 4 (Folklore). Iterated-Squaring is Karp-reducible to Factoring.
We do not know whether the converse holds, i.e., whether Factoring reduces to IS
for any T = T (λ). It is conjectured in [94] that the fastest way to solve IS without the
knowledge of the group order is through repeated squaring:
x→ x2 → x22 → x23 → . . .→ x2T (mod N). (3.2)
In particular, parallelism (beyond what can be used to speed up a single squaring) does
not allow to compute the solution any faster. In other words, IS is conjectured to be an
inherently-sequential computational problem. Below we state this conjecture explicitly:
we use “running time” to denote the total computation of an algorithm, while actual clock
time of a computation is referred to by “sequential time”. For instance, if the algorithm is
given as a circuit, then the running time would depend on its size, whereas the sequential
time only on its depth.
Assumption 1 (Sequential hardness of IS [94]). For a security parameter λ ∈ N, let N
be the product of two random λRSA/2-bit primes and x ← Z∗N be sampled uniformly at
random. Consider any T ∈ N and any algorithm A such that T and running time of A is
significantly smaller than what is required to factor N . Any A that solves the IS instance
(N, x, T ) with a non-negligible probability requires sequential time not much less than T
times the sequential time required for a single squaring in Z∗N .
Remark 4 (λ vs. λRSA). A construction with security parameter λ is supposed to guaran-
tee λ bits of security i.e., it should ideally take an adversary O(2λ) computation to break
the construction using the best known attacks. Therefore, λRSA is computed from λ by
taking into account the best-known factoring algorithms (which currently is the General
Number Field Sieve (GNFS) [73]). For instance, for 128-bit security the size of the mod-
ulus currently recommended is 2048 bits. However since the GNFS is a sub-exponential
algorithm, asymptotically speaking, one could assume that λRSA ∈ poly(λ) and we will
do this throughout the chapter.
3.1.2 Our Number-Theoretic Assumption
The hardness result in this chapter is based on a weaker assumption where we just require
that for some superpolynomial T , a variant of IS cannot be solved in polynomial time.
The exact algebraic setting for our assumption, as formally stated in Assumption 2, differs
slightly from that in Assumption 1. We highlight the differences below and justify at the
end of the section (Proposition 1) why these changes do not really affect the strength of
the assumption.
1. First, the group that we assume our hardness is the group of signed quadratic
residues QR+N , described in §3.1.2.1, which carries slightly more structure than Z∗N .
This extra structure helps guarantee unambiguous soundness in Pietrzak’s protocol:
see §3.2.2 for the details.
2. Second, we require the primes p, q that define the modulus N to be safe primes.
This is to ensure that QR+N contains no sub-group of small order, a property that
is exploited to prove statistical soundness of the proof system (Lemma 6).1
1One can prove soundness of the protocol also when a standard RSA modulus is used (i.e., p and q
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3.1.2.1 Signed Quadratic Residues
For two safe primes p and q, and N := p ·q the signed quadratic residues [46, 59] is defined
as the group
QR+N := {|x| : x ∈ QRN},
where |x| is the absolute value when representing the elements of Z∗N as{︃
−N − 1
2
, . . . ,
N − 1
2
}︃
. (3.3)
Since −1 ∈ Z∗N is a quadratic non-residue with Jacobi symbol +1, the function |·| acts
as an (efficiently-computable) isomorphism2 from QRN to QR
+
N , and as a result QR
+
N is
also a cyclic group, with the group operation defined as
a ◦ b := |a · b mod N |.
However, unlike for QRN , membership in QR
+
N can be efficiently tested since QR
+
N = J
+
N
where JN is the group of elements with Jacobi symbol +1 and
J+N := {|x| : x ∈ JN} = JN/{±1}.
In other words, to test whether a given x ∈ Z∗N (represented as in eq.(3.3)) belongs also to
QRN+, ensure that x ≥ 0 and that its Jacobi symbol is +1 using [38, Algorithm 1.4.10].
Generators of QR+N . Before moving on the assumption, we point out some properties of
the set of generators of the quadratic residues. This will prove useful later in establishing
hardness of the RSVL instance proposed in §3.3 (Claim 6.2 in Theorem 6). Let’s denote
by QR⋆N ⊂ QR+N the set of generators of QR+N :
QR⋆N :=
{︁
x ∈ QR+N : ⟨x⟩ = QR+N
}︁
.
If N := p · q = (2p′ + 1)(2q′ + 1) is the product of λRSA/2-bit safe primes, then we have
|QRN | =
⃓⃓
QR+N
⃓⃓
= p′ · q′ and |QR⋆N | = (p′ − 1)(q′ − 1) = p′ · q′ − p′ − q′ + 1 .
Our first observation is that a random element in QR+N almost certainly also belongs to
QR⋆N :
Pr
x←QR+N
[x ∈ QR⋆N ] = 1−
p′ + q′ − 1
p′ · q′ ≥ 1−
1
2λRSA/2
. (3.4)
Looking ahead, we will only be able to prove soundness of the protocol for statements
(N, x, T, y) if x ∈ QR⋆N . Although we can efficiently check if some x is in QR+N , we cannot
efficiently check if it also belongs to QR⋆N (without knowing the factorization of N). But
are just random primes), or in fact any other group, but then one needs a computational assumption
to argue soundness of the protocol, namely, that it is hard to find elements of small order [17, 105]. So
the hardness of our RSVL instance would rely on hardness of repeated squaring in QR+N as stated in
Assumption 2, and additionally on the hardness of finding some element z where ze = x for some e of
polynomial size.
2Note, however, that the inverse of this isomorphism is hard to compute exactly because of the
quadratic residuosity assumption.
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as a consequence of the above observations, an x chosen at random from QR+N is almost
certainly also in QR⋆N .
Secondly, since the squaring function is an automorphism3 of QR+N (and also QRN)
x ∈ QR⋆N implies x2 ∈ QR⋆N . As a result, starting with any x ∈ QR⋆N , repeated squaring
generates a subset of QR⋆N : i.e., for any x ∈ QR⋆N we have{︂
x, x2, x2
2
, x2
3
, . . . , x2
(p′−1)(q′−1)−1
= x
}︂
⊆ QR⋆N . (3.5)
3.1.2.2 The Assumption
The hardness assumption that underlies the RSVL instance proposed in this chapter
is stated below. It pertains to the Iterated-Squaring problem adapted to the set-
ting of signed quadratic residues. The formal definition of the problem, which we call
Iterated-Squaring+ (IS+) to avoid conflation with IS, is given below. The descrip-
tion of the hardness assumption follows.
Definition 17. Iterated-Squaring+ (IS+)4
• Instance.
1. Modulus N ∈ N
2. Group element x ∈ QR+N
3. Time parameter T ∈ N
• Solution. f+(N, x, T ) := x2T = x ◦ . . . ◦ x⏞ ⏟⏟ ⏞
2T times
As explained in §3.1.2.1, checking whether a string that parses as (N, x, T ) is a valid
instance reduces to checking that x has a Jacobi symbol of +1 modulo N .
Assumption 2 (Average-case hardness of IS+). For a security parameter λ ∈ N, let
N := p · q be the product of two random λRSA/2-bit safe primes p, q and x ← QR+N
be sampled uniformly at random. There exists some T ∈ [︁ω(poly(λ)), 2λ]︁, such that
no poly(λ)-time algorithm can solve the Iterated-Squaring+ instance (N, x, T ) with
non-negligible probability.
Note that we allow the time parameter T to be any super-polynomial value, but restrict
it to be representable by poly(λ)-many bits. Even though it may seem that computing
the solution can only get harder as T increases, this is not actually true. For instance, if
T is the product of all λRSA/2-bit primes, then computing x
2T mod N is actually trivial
as
x2
T
mod N = x2
T mod φ(N) mod N = x2
T mod φ(φ(N)) mod φ(N) mod N = x mod N.
The final equality holds as T mod φ(φ(N)) = 0. (However, such a T takes ω(poly(λ))
bits if represented normally as an integer.) Next we argue that Assumption 2 is at most
as strong as Assumption 1 in this time parameter regime. Note that Assumption 2 is
vacuous for T ∈ O(poly(λ)).
3Note that (a ◦ b)2 = (a ◦ b) ◦ (a ◦ b) = (a ◦ a) ◦ (b ◦ b) = a2 ◦ b2, and since ·2 is a permutation on QR+N
– or on QRN as originially shown by Blum [15] – it is an automorphism.
4We note that instead of computing x2
T
, one can use the function xe
T
for any e for which xe can be
computed efficiently given x and e.
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Proposition 1. Under Conjecture 6.1 from [104], Assumption 2 is at most as strong as
Assumption 1 for T ∈ [︁ω(poly(λ)), 2λ]︁ under (randomised) Karp reductions.
Proof. We split the proof into two claims. We first argue in Claim 4.1 that a switch to
safe primes does not affect Assumption 1 as the density of safe primes among all primes
is sufficiently high under the conjecture. Then, in Claim 4.2, we show that Algorithm 2
(which is in the setting of (QR+N , ◦)) is at most as strong as this assumption (which is in
(Z∗N , ·)) with respect to randomised reductions.
Claim 4.1. Under Conjecture 6.1 from [104], Assumption 1 with safe primes is at most
as strong as Assumption 1.
Proof (Sketch). Conjecture 6.1 from [104] states that for some constant c, there are c ·
2n/n2 safe n-bit primes. If this conjecture holds, a random n-bit prime is safe with
probability ≈ c/n2. Even under a weaker requirement that there are at least 2n/poly(n)
safe n-bit primes for some polynomial in poly(n), Assumption 1 is at least as strong as an
assumption where we additionally require p and q to be safe: if a Θ(1/poly(n)) fraction
of all n-bit primes is safe, an N sampled as in Assumption 1 will be the product of two
safe primes with noticeable probability Θ(1/poly(n)2).
Claim 4.2. Assumption 2 is at most as strong as Assumption 1 with safe primes.
Proof (Sketch). Although Assumption 2 concerns the hardness of exponentiation with
respect to (QR+N , ◦) (compared to Assumption 1 which applies to hardness of exponentia-
tion modulo N), we explain below why restricting to QR+N can only make the assumption
milder. We argue in two steps using the assumption in QRN as the intermediate step.
To be specific, first we show that since QRN is a subgroup of Z∗N of sufficiently large size,
Assumption 2 in QRN is at least as strong (Step (i)); then, we exploit the isomorphism
between QRN and QR
+
N to argue that if one breaks the assumption in QR
+
N then one can
break the assumption also in QRN (Step (ii)).
Step (i) As |QRN | = |Z∗N |/4, a random element in Z∗N also belongs to QRN with proba-
bility 1/4. Thus the reduction, on challenge x ∈ Z∗N , just invokes the algorithm
A that breaks the assumption in QRN on x, and is guaranteed to succeed at
least a fourth of the time A succeeds.
Step (ii) Consider any x ∈ QRN and y := x2T mod N . By the properties of the isomor-
phism, the image of y in QR+N is y
′ = |x|2T mod N = x2T ∈ QR+N . Thus given
y′ we know that y ∈ {y′, N − y′} is one of two possible values. Although the
exact value cannot be computed (as it would contradict the quadratic residu-
osity assumption), we can guess one of the two values. Thus the assumption
in (QR+N , ◦) is as strong as the assumption in (QRN , ·).
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3.2 Pietrzak’s Proof System
The key component of our construction is Pietrzak’s interactive protocol [88] for the
decision problem corresponding to Iterated-Squaring+, i.e. showing that a tuple
I = (N, x, T, y) satisfies y = x2
T
over QR+N . There, the motivation was to construct
a cryptographic primitive called verifiable delay function [16, 17] (see the discussion in
Chapter 5). The protocol we use in this work differs in some minor aspects from the one
in [88]. These changes we introduce make the proof system less efficient but enable a
cleaner description — see Remark 7 for further details. But first, we formally introduce
the different notions of proof systems. In particular, we define unambiguous proof systems
from [93], which formalises the uniqueness property that is crucial for our constructions.
3.2.1 Proof Systems
Interactive protocols. An interactive protocol (see Figure 1.7.(a)) consists of a pair
(P,V) of interactive Turing machines that are run on a common input I. The first machine
is called the prover and is denoted by P, and the second machine, which is probabilistic,
is called the verifier and is denoted by V. In an ρ-round (i.e., (2ρ−1)-message) interactive
protocol, in each round i ∈ [1, ρ], first P sends a message αi ∈ Σa to V and then V sends a
message βi ∈ Σb to P, where Σ is a finite alphabet. At the end of the interaction, V runs
a (deterministic) Turing machine on input (I, (β1, . . . , βρ), (α1, . . . , αρ)). The interactive
protocol is public-coin if βi is a uniformly distributed random string in Σ
b. The com-
munication complexity of an interactive protocol is the total number of bits transmitted,
namely, (ρ · (b+ a) · log(|Σ|)).
Interactive proofs (IPs). The classical notion of an interactive proof for a language
L is due to Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [56].
Definition 18. An interactive protocol (P,V) is a δ-sound interactive proof (IP) for L if:
• Completeness: For every I ∈ L, if V interacts with P on common input I, then V
accepts with probability 1.
• Soundness: For every I /∈ L and every (computationally-unbounded) cheating
prover strategy ˜︁P, the verifier V accepts when interacting with ˜︁P with probability
less δ(|I|), where δ = δ(n) is called the soundness error of the proof system.
Remark 5. Just like in Remark 1, we also consider the above definition for languages
where the domain is restricted to a set of instances. This applies likewise to the definitions
that follow.
Unambiguous IPs. Reingold, Rothblum and Rothblum [93] introduced a variant of
interactive proofs, called unambiguous interactive proofs, in which the honest prover
strategy is defined for every I (i.e., also for I /∈ L) and the verifier is required to re-
ject when interacting with any cheating prover that deviates from the prescribed honest
prover strategy at any point of the interaction. Therefore, one can think such interactive
protocols as having a “unique” execution.
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More formally, if (P,V) is an interactive protocol, and ˜︁P is some arbitrary (cheating)
strategy, we say that ˜︁P deviates from the protocol at round i∗ if the message sent by ˜︁P
in round i∗ differs from the message that P would have sent given the transcript of the
protocol thus far. In other words, if the verifier sent the messages β1, . . . , βi∗−1 in rounds
1, . . . , i∗ − 1 respectively, we say that ˜︁P deviates from the protocol at round i∗ if˜︁P (I, i∗, (β1, . . . , βi−1)) ̸= P (I, i∗, (β1, . . . , βi−1)) .
We consider a slightly different formulation, where the unambiguity is required to
hold only for I ∈ L. Therefore for I /∈ L, we need to reinstate the standard soundness
condition.
Definition 19. An interactive protocol (P,V), in which we call P the prescribed prover,
is a (δ, ϵ)-unambiguosly sound IP for L if the following three properties hold:
• Completeness: For every I ∈ L, if V interacts with P on common input I, then V
accepts with probability 1.
• Soundness: For every I /∈ L and every (computationally-unbounded) cheating
prover strategy ˜︁P, the verifier V accepts when interacting with ˜︁P with probability
less than δ(|I|), where δ = δ(n) is called the soundness error of the proof system.
• Unambiguity: For every I ∈ L, every (computationally-unbounded) cheating
prover strategy ˜︁P, every round i∗ ∈ [1, ρ], and for every β1, . . . , βi∗−1, if ˜︁P first
deviates from the protocol in round i∗ (given the messages β1, . . . , βi∗−1 in rounds
1, . . . , i∗−1 respectively), then at the end of the protocol V accepts with probability
at most ϵ(|I|), where the probability is over V’s coin tosses in rounds i∗, . . . , ρ.
An IP is simply δ-unambiguosly sound if ϵ = δ.
Non-interactive proof systems. A non-interactive proof system involves the prover
sending a single message to the verifier. To give this proof system additional power5, we
assume that both prover and verifier have access to a common reference string (CRS).
When the CRS is simply a uniformly random string from some domain R, it is referred to
as a common random string. We focus on adaptive proof systems where a cheating prover
gets to see the CRS before forging a proof for a statement of its choice. As for the case
of interactive proofs, we consider unambiguous non-interactive proof systems (instead of
the standard “sound” non-interactive proof systems).
Definition 20. A pair of machines (P,V), where P is the prescribed prover, is a (δ, ϵ)-
unambiguosly adaptively sound non-interactive proof system for a language L if V is
probabilistic polynomial-time and the following three properties hold:
• Completeness: For every I ∈ L,
Pr
R←R
[V(I,P(I, R), R) = 1] = 1,
where the probability is over the random choice of the CRS R ∈ R.
5It was shown in [82] that a non-interactive protocol without a CRS exists only for trivial languages,
i.e. those in BPP.
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• Soundness: For every (computationally-unbounded) cheating prover strategy ˜︁P,
Pr
R←R
(I,˜︁π)←˜︁P(R)
[V(I, ˜︁π,R) = 1 ∧ I /∈ L] ≤ δ(|I|).
• Unambiguity: For every (computationally-unbounded) cheating prover strategy˜︁P,
Pr
R←R
(I,˜︁π)←˜︁P(R)
π←P(I,R)
[V(I, ˜︁π,R) = 1 ∧ ˜︁π ̸= π ∧ I ∈ L] ≤ ϵ(|I|).
A non-interactive protocol is simply δ-unambiguosly sound if ϵ = δ.
Remark 6. A non-interactive protocol is called an argument system if the soundness
holds only against efficient cheating prover strategy ˜︁P.
3.2.2 Pietrzak’s Protocol
An informal descsription of the interactive Pietrzak Protocol PP for the decision problem
corresponding to IS was given in §1.3.2.2. The high level ideas for the algebraic setting of
IS+ is similar and is hence omitted. We define the protocol formally in Algorithm 3.1 and
highlight some of the key differences from the original protocol from [88] in the remark
below.
Remark 7 (Comparison with [88]). We have introduced a few changes to make the proof
system simpler at the cost of efficiency. We are able to employ these changes, listed below,
as concrete efficiency is not the focus of our work — i.e., we only require the circuits S
and V in our RSVL instance to be of polynomial size.
1. The prover described above uses the minimum space necessary, even though ad-
ditional space can significantly improve the efficiency of the computation of the
proof.
2. It suffices for us to consider a time parameter of the form T = 2t — the original
protocol is described for arbitrary T .
3. We iterate the protocol until the parameter T = 2t, which is halved in every round,
is down to 1, even though it is more efficient to stop at an earlier round. In other
words, the base proof in our case is of time parameter 1, whereas it was greater than
that in [88].
3.2.2.1 Removing Interaction
The interactive protocol PP described in Algorithm 3.1 is public-coin and the proof sys-
tem has an exponentially-small soundness error, which means it could be turned non-
interactive using the Fiat-Shamir methodology [44]. However, the Fiat-Shamir Trans-
form is known to be sound in the random-oracle model when applied to constant-round
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Algorithm 3.1 Interactive Pietrzak Protocol PP [88]
1: procedure P(N, x, T, y) ▷ Prover
input
1. IS+ instance (N, x, T ) ∈ N×QR+N × N where T = 2t
2. Solution to the IS+ instance y = x2
T ∈ QR+N
2: Initialise (x1, y1) := (x, y)
3: for i ∈ [1, t] do ▷ Halving subprotocol
4: µi := x
2T/2
i
i ∈ QR+N ▷ Compute the midpoint
5: Send µi to V ▷ P→ V
6: Receive challenge ri ∈ {0, 1}λ from V ▷ P← V
7: xi+1 := x
ri
i ◦ µi, yi+1 := µrii ◦ yi ▷ Compute random linear combination
8: end for
9: HALT ▷ The prover halts without any output
10: end procedure
11: procedure V(N, x, T, y) ▷ Verifier
input same as P
output a bit indicating ACCEPT or REJECT
12: Initialise (x1, y1) := (x, y)
13: for i ∈ [1, t] do ▷ Halving subprotocol
14: Receive µi ∈ QR+N from P ▷ P→ V
15: Choose a random element ri ← {0, 1}λ ▷ Next challenge
16: Send ri to P ▷ P← V
17: xi+1 := x
ri
i ◦ µi, yi+1 := µrii ◦ yi ▷ Compute random linear combination
18: end for
19: if yt+1 = x
2
t+1 then return 1
20: else return 0
21: end if
22: end procedure
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interactive protocols.6 Nonetheless, it was shown in [88] that PP can be compiled into a
non-interactive protocol that is sound in the random-oracle model. The formal descrip-
tion of this non-interactive protocol, denoted PP, is given in Algorithm 3.2. Notice that
the transform used in PP is slightly different from the standard Fiat-Shamir Transform
we described in §1.3.1.2: the hash function in PP is applied only to the statement and the
prover’s message for that round (and not the whole transcript till that round). However,
this does not affect the soundness of the resulting non-interactive protocol as shown in
the next section.
Instantiating Fiat-Shamir. A number of recent works have aimed at relaxing the
assumptions under which the Fiat-Shamir Transform can be proved sound [68, 66, 29].
In particular, [29] shows that for statistically-sound protocols, exponentially-hard key-
derivation mechanism implies that Fiat-Shamir is sound. They also construct such KDMs
under some strong assumptions related to learning with errors and the discrete-logarithm
problem. Therefore, one could potentially argue the soundness above under much weaker
assumptions than random oracles or indistinguishability obfuscation. We see such an
instantiation for our second construction RSVL2 in §4.4, and point out that the same
machininery could be applied to the Pietrzak’s protocol PP as well.
3.2.3 Unambiguous Soundness
We show that PP is unambiguosly sound in the random-oracle model and the idea is to
show that an adversary (i.e., a cheating prover) never finds a “bad query” as defined
in Definition 21. To be precise, we first argue that these bad queries are hard to find
provided that the adversary is allowed bounded number of queries to the random oracle
(Lemma 5); conditioned on the adversary not making a bad query, we prove that unam-
biguous soundness is hard to break in the statistical sense (Lemma 6). It follows that PP
is non-interactive proof system that is statistically unambiguously sound in the random
oracle model (Theorem 5). Before moving on to the proof, we fix a notation that will be
used further in this section: we reserve
π(x
T−→ y)← PP.PH(N, x, T, x2T )
denote prescribed proofs for true statements in PP, and π˜(x
T−→ y) denote any string that
parses as a possible proof.
Definition 21 (Bad query). A query is a tuple (µ, x, y, T ) where µ, x, y ∈ QR+N and
T ∈ N. Let
r := H(µ, x, y, T ), x′ := xr ◦ µ and y′ := µr ◦ y.
We say the query (µ, x, y, T ) is bad if x ∈ QR⋆N and moreover either
6In [44] the assumption that the transform is sound was made for constant-round protocols. It was later
shown in [89] that this transformation is sound when H is instantiated with a random oracle. However,
there are examples of non-constant round interactive protocols that are unsound when the Fiat-Shamir
methodology is applied, even in the random-oracle model. One simple counter-example is to consider the
sequential composition, say n times, of a constant-round protocol that has constant soundness error. By
standard amplification techniques, the resultant protocol can be shown to have a negligible soundness
error — inverse-exponential in n to be precise — but the Fiat-Shamir Transformed protocol is totally
insecure as argued next. Since the soundness error is constant a malicious prover can basically sample
(in constant number of attempts in expectation) “favourable” messages for each round and with high
probability come up with a cheating proof.
47
Algorithm 3.2 Non-Interactive Pietrzak Protocol PP
1: procedure PP.PH(N, x, T, y) ▷ Prover
oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ ▷ Random oracle
input
1. IS+ instance (N, x, T ) ∈ N×QR+N × N where T = 2t
2. Solution to the IS+ instance y = x2
T ∈ QR+N
output Proof π(x
T−→ y) ∈ N×QR+N × N×QR+N × (QR+N)t
2: Initialise (x1, y1) := (x, y)
3: for i ∈ [1, t] do
4: µi := x
2T/2
i
i ∈ QR+N ▷ Compute the midpoint
5: ri := H(µi, xi, yi, T/2
i−1) ▷ Compute the challenge
6: xi+1 := x
ri
i ◦ µi, yi+1 := µrii ◦ yi ▷ Compute random linear combination
7: end for
8: return π(x
T−→ y) = (N, x, T, y,µ := µ1, . . . , µt)
9: end procedure
10: procedure PP.VH(π˜(x
T−→ y)) ▷ Verifier
oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ ▷ Random oracle
input Proof π˜(x
T−→ y) parsed as
(N, x, T = 2t, y,µ = µ1, . . . , µt) ∈ N×QR+N × N×QR+N × (QR+N)t
output a bit indicating ACCEPT or REJECT
11: Initialise (x1, y1) := (x, y)
12: for i ∈ [1, t] do
13: ri := H(µi, xi, yi, T/2
i−1) ▷ Recompute the challenge
14: xi+1 := x
ri
i ◦ µi, yi+1 := µrii ◦ yi ▷ Recompute random linear combination
15: end for
16: if x2t+1 = yt+1 then return 1
17: else return 0
18: end if
19: end procedure
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(i) x′ ̸∈ QR⋆N ; or
(ii)
(︂
x2
T ̸= y or µ ̸= x2T/2
)︂
and x′2
T/2
= y′.
Lemma 5 (Bad queries are hard to find). For any N = p ·q where p = 2p′+1, q = 2q′+1
are (λRSA/2)-bit safe primes, the following holds: any adversary that makes at most Q
queries to the random oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ will make a bad query with probability
at most 3 ·Q/2λ
The proof of Lemma 5 is a straightforward adaptation of [88, Lemma 1] to the setting
of QR+N . We provide it in §A.1 in the appendix for the sake of self-containment. As a
corollary of Lemma 5 we get a strong soundness guarantee for the proof system (Lemma 6).
It not only states that it is hard to find proofs for wrong statements, but it is even hard
to find any accepting proofs that differ from prescribed proofs for true statements. Since
correctness is guaranteed by construction, Theorem 5 follows.
Lemma 6 (Unambiguous Soundness of PP in the random oracle model). For any N = p·q
where p = 2p′ + 1, q = 2q′ + 1 are (λRSA/2)-bit safe, no adversary that makes at most
Q queries to the random oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ (but is otherwise computationally-
unbounded) will find a proof π˜(x
T−→ y) where
• x ∈ QR⋆N (we let the adversary choose T and x, but require x to be in QR⋆N).
• PP.VH(π˜(x T−→ y)) = 1 (proof verifies)
• π(x T−→ x2T ) ̸= π˜(x T−→ y) (proof is different from the prescribed proof for a true state-
ment)
except with probability ≤ 3 ·Q/2λ.
Proof. Let break denote the event that an adversary that makes at most Q queries to the
random oracle finds a proof π˜(x
T−→ y) such that
PP.VH(π˜(x
T−→ y)) = 1 and π(x T−→ x2T ) ̸= π˜(x T−→ y).
If bad denotes the event that a bad query is made, the probability of break can be bounded
as follows:
Pr[break] = Pr[break ∧ (bad ∨ ¬bad)]
≤ Pr[break ∧ bad] + Pr[break ∧ ¬bad]
= Pr[break|bad] · Pr[bad] ≤ 3 ·Q/2λ
Note that Pr[break∧¬bad] = 0 since if no bad queries were made then the proof π˜(x T−→ y)
must equal π(x
T−→ x2T ).
Theorem 5. In the random oracle model, PP is a statistically unambiguosly sound non-
interactive proof system for the language corresponding to IS+.
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3.2.4 Efficiency
Finally, we point out three properties concerning the efficiency of PP. In particular
Property 3, which allows for a somewhat-efficient merging of two proofs, will be absolutely
crucial in our construction of hard RSVL instance RSVL1 that follows next in §3.3.
Property 1 (Cost of computing proofs). The computational cost incurred to compute
π(x
T−→ y) ← PP.PH(N, x, T, y) is T + poly(λ) multiplications in (QRN , ◦), whereas the
space required is poly(λ) .
To see this, note that the cost of computing PP.PH(N, x, T, y) is dominated by com-
puting the µi’s, which requires T/2 squarings for µ1, T/4 for µ2 and so on and so forth,
for a total of T − 1 squarings.
Property 2 (Size of the proof). The size of a proof π(x
T−→ y) is O(λRSA · log(T )) bits.
Property 3 (Cost of merging proofs). Given two proofs π(x
T/2−−→ µ) and π(µ T/2−−→ y) as
“advice”, computing the proof π(x
T−→ y) can be efficiently reduced to computing a proof
π(x′
T/2−−→ y′).
This property emerges from the recursive nature of the protocol: we can completely
avoid computing the µ1 component in the proof π(x
T−→ y) = (N, T, x, y, µ1, µ2, . . . , µt+1)
since it is already present in π(x
T/2−−→ µ) in the form of the element µ (i.e., µ1 = x2T = µ).
That is, to compute π(x
T−→ y) given π(x T−→ µ) and π(µ T−→ y), we first compute the merged
statement
r := H(µ = µ1, I, y, T ), x
′ := xr ◦ µ, y′ := µr ◦ y (3.6)
and then, making T/2 + poly(λ) multiplications (by Property 1), compute its proof
π(x′
T/2−−→ y′) = (N, x′, T/2, y′, µ′1, . . . , µ′t) := PP.PH(N, x′, T/2, y′).
From the proof for the merged statement, we can reconstruct the proof for π(x
T−→ y) as
(N, T, x, y, µ1, µ
′
1, . . . , µ
′
t). (3.7)
3.3 The Reduction
To construct a hard distribution of RSVL instances, we rely on the hardness of solving
Iterated-Squaring+ as stated in Assumption 2. In particular, we aim to construct
an efficient successor circuit S such that applying it iteratively to the initial state (x, . . .)
we reach a (final) state (x2
T
, . . .). Meanwhile, every intermediate state can be efficiently
certified to lie on the standard path using the verifier V — in order to construct such
a V, we intend to use Pietrzak’s non-interactive proof system PP for certifying y = x2
T
just described in §3.2. We sketch in §3.3.1 why some simple approaches do not work.
The reader, however, can skip these and directly jump to §3.3.2 where we discuss the
solution using Property 3. But first, we fix some notation that will be used throughout
this section.
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Notation.
• Let Σ be an alphabet (we will use the binary {0, 1} and ternary {0, 1, 2} alphabets).
Σt denotes the set of all strings of length t over Σ; Σ≤t denotes ∪j∈[0,t]Σj (with the
empty string denoted by ε). For a string a ∈ Σt and j ∈ [0, t], a[j] refers to the j-th
symbol in a. For two strings a and b, ab represents their concatenation.
• We address each node of a complete binary tree of depth t using the binary string
that naturally encodes its position — i.e., a node at level l ∈ [0, t] is encoded by an
l-bit string and, e.g., the root is ε, its children 0, 1 and so on. An analogous system
is used for the complete trinary tree (cf. Figure 3.2).
• Finally, we reserve “nodes” to refer only to the vertices of a tree, to avoid conflation
with the vertices of the RSVL instance.
3.3.1 Intuition
We consider SVL or RSVL instances where the IS+ instance (N, x, T ) is first sampled
as in Assumption 2 with T = 2t.
Attempt 1: inefficient verifier circuit. The first idea is to sample an SVL instance
as (S,V, T, x) where
V((y, i), j) = 1 ⇐⇒ j = i, i ≤ T and y = x2i
S((y, i)) :=
{︃
(y, i) if i ≥ T
(y2, i+ 1) otherwise
The only way to solve this instance is to find the sink of the standard path (x2
T
, T ).
However as this label contains the solution to IS+, computing it should be hard under
Assumption 2. Unfortunately without knowing the group order φ(N) we cannot realize
V efficiently as computing x2
i
requires i squarings.
Attempt 2: inefficient successor circuit. To allow efficient verification, we can
replace the state (x2
i
, i) with a proof π(x
i−→ y) establishing that y = x2i . That is, for
xi := x
2i , we consider an RSVL instance (S,V, T, π(x0
0−→ x0)) where S and V are defined
as
V(π˜(x0
i−→ y), j) = 1 ⇐⇒ j = i, i ≤ T and PP.VH(π˜(x0 i−→ y)) = 1
S(π˜(x0
i−→ y)) :=
⎧⎨⎩
π˜(x0
i−→ y) if V(π˜(x0 i−→ y), i) = 0 or i = T
π(x0
i+1−→ xi+1) else if π˜(x0 i−→ y) = π(x0 i−→ xi)
unspecified otherwise.
Using soundness as stated in Lemma 6, we can argue that an adversary making a poly(λ)
number of oracle queries will not be able to find a wrong accepting proof π˜(x0
i−→ y), i.e.,
π˜(x0
i−→ y) ̸= π(x0 i−→ xi) : PP.VH(π˜(x0 i−→ y)) = 1
happens only with exponentially-small probability. Assuming the adversary does not find
such a wrong proof, the only other way to solve the instance is by finding the correct sink
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ST (π(x0
0−→ x0)) = π(x0 T−→ xT ) (i.e., a solution of type (i) as per Definition 16), which
under Assumption 2 is hard.
Unfortunately now it’s not clear how to implement the successor circuit S efficiently,
as computing a proof π(x0
i+1−→ xi+1) seems to require around i exponentiations even when
given a proof for the previous state π(x0
i−→ xi).7
Attempt 3: assuming efficient merging. Assume it is possible, say using a procedure
M, to merge proofs π(x
ℓ−→ y) and π(y ℓ−→ z) into a single proof π(x 2ℓ−→ z) in just poly(λ)
steps (rather than ℓ + poly(λ) steps required by Property 3). This allows us to define a
very simple hard RSVL instance using the recursive approach of Valiant [103]: reduce the
computation of a proof for time parameter 2ℓ to the computation of two proofs for time
parameter ℓ, and then useM to merge. The resulting algorithm F is given in Algorithm 3.3.
Algorithm 3.3 Recursive description of the RSVL instance with efficient merge.
1: procedure FH(N, x, T )
oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ ▷ Random oracle
input IS+ instance (N, x, T ) ∈ N×QR+N × N, where T = 2t
output: π(x
T−→ z)
2: if T = 1 then return π(x
1−→ x2)← PP.PH(N, x, 1, x2) ▷ Base case
3: else
4: π(x
T/2−−→ y)← FH(N, x, T/2) ▷ First recursive call
5: π(y
T/2−−→ z)← FH(N, y, T/2) ▷ Second recursive call
6: return π(x
T−→ z)← MH(N, π(x T/2−−→ y), π(y T/2−−→ z)) ▷ Invoke efficient merging
7: end if
8: end procedure
The description of the successor and verifier circuits for the corresponding RSVL
instance can now be obtained by simulating FH(N, x, T ) using stack traces. We will see in
§3.3.2 how this can be exactly (and succinctly) accomplished using the tree that captures
the execution of F (see Figure 3.1.(a)), and limit below to an informal overview.
Let xi := x
2i as before. Starting at ∅ and ending at π(x T−→ xT ), the RSVL instance
has a standard path of length T . The first few vertices on this path are:
∅ → π(x0 1−→ x1)→ π(x0 2−→ x2)→ π(x0 2−→ x2)∥π(x2 1−→ x3)→ π(x0 4−→ x4)→
π(x0
4−→ x4)∥π(x4 1−→ x5)→ π(x0 4−→ x4)∥π(x4 2−→ x6)→ · · · → π(x T−→ xT ).
The verifier V simply checks if the input label corresponds to a valid sequence of accepting
proofs, which can be done efficiently. The successor S — given that an input label is a
7As a way around the above problem, instead of assuming that S outputs the proof π(x0
i+1−−→ xi+1)
in one invocation, we can split this computation into i efficient steps. However, we again run into the
problem of implementing V efficiently, as – when computing this proof in a straight forward manner –
we have no efficient way of verifying that the intermediate states are correct. If we just let V output
1 on states where it cannot verify correctness, we will introduce “uninteresting” accepting states that
neither contain x2
T
0 nor break the soundness of the protocol (and thus we cannot conclude that solving
this instance breaks Assumption 2 or soundness).
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valid sequence — looks at the last proof in this sequence, denoted π(a
ℓ−→ b), adds the
base proof π(b
1−→ b2) to the sequence and then keeps merging the last two proofs in this
sequence as long as they have the same time parameter. For example, the third label above
is obtained by first adding the base proof π(x1
1−→ x2) to the previous label π(x0 1−→ x1)
and then doing the merge; the fifth label is obtained by adding π(x3
1−→ x4) to
π(x0
2−→ x2)∥π(x2 1−→ x3)
and then merging twice. Note that because of the merging, the number of proofs in
the labels is guaranteed to stay below log(T ) — the size of the input labels is there-
fore poly(λ, log(T )). Since π(x
T−→ xT ) contains the value of xT = x2T , finding the sink
π(x
T−→ xT ) is hard under Assumption 2. Moreover, coming up with a state that passes ver-
ification but is not of the form Si(∅) for some i requires breaking unambiguous soundness
of the underlying proof system.
Attempt 4: exploiting somewhat-efficient merging. As noted in the introduction,
the last approach is similar to Valiant’s construction of general-purpose IVC [103]. In
particular, it can be considered to be its instantiation for a specific computation, that
of solving IS+. Unfortunately we do not know how to implement efficient merging for
Pietrzak’s proof system (without resorting to heavy machinery like in [103]). Hence it is
at this point that we deviate from his construction by trading off the efficient merging
procedure for somewhat-efficient merging that Pietrzak’s proof system does allow thanks
to Property 3 (i.e., π(x
ℓ−→ y) and π(y ℓ−→ z) can be merged into π(x 2ℓ−→ z) at the cost of
computing a proof π(x′ ℓ−→ y′) which still requires i+ poly(λ) multiplications). However,
as we will explain in the next section, this property already suffices for a reduction. Our
main observation in the thesis is that even in some cases where the merging is not efficient,
his ideas might still apply.
3.3.2 The Reduction
We start below with a recursive formulation of the solution using somewhat-efficient merge
as it is intuitive and easy to understand (and extends the ideas in Algorithm 3.3). The
description of the successor and verifier circuits is later obtained by using the standard
trick of simulating a recursive algorithm using iterations and stack traces.
3.3.2.1 Recursive Proof-Merging
The main idea behind our construction is to merge the proofs recursively, exploiting Prop-
erty 3: given π(x
ℓ−→ y) and π(y ℓ−→ z), we efficiently reduce the computation of π(x 2ℓ−→ z)
to the computation of the proof π(x′ ℓ−→ y′) for x′, y′ as in the merged statement given
in eq.(3.6). Thus, the computation of a proof for time parameter 2ℓ is reduced to the
computation of 3 proofs for time parameter ℓ (unlike 2 proofs for the case merging is
efficient), which then can be reduced to computing 3 ·3 proofs of time parameter ℓ/2, and
so on and so forth until ℓ = 1 at which point we can efficiently compute the base proof.
The resulting recursive algorithm F is given in Algorithm 3.4. Note that the way F
is structured, the whole computation is being carried out in a verifiable manner: the
midpoint and the endpoint are both accompanied by proofs that they are the correct
power of x and only certified values are being used in the subsequent calls.
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Algorithm 3.4 Recursive description of the RSVL instance.
1: procedure FH(N, x, T )
oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ ▷ Random oracle
input IS+ instance (N, x, T ) ∈ N×QR+N × N, where T = 2t
output π(x
T−→ y)
2: if T = 1 then return π(x
1−→ x2)← PP.PH(N, x, 1, x2) ▷ Base case
3: else
4: π(x
T/2−−→ µ)← FH(N, x, T/2) ▷ First recursive call
5: π(µ
T/2−−→ y)← FH(N,µ, T/2) ▷ Second recursive call
6: r := H(µ, x, y, T/2) and x′ := xr ◦ µ ▷ Reduce π(x T−→ y) to π(x′ T/2−−→ y′)
7: π(x′
T/2−−→ y′)← FH(N, x′, T/2) ▷ Third recursive call
8: Parse π(x′
T/2−−→ y′) as (T/2, x′, y′, µ′1, . . . , µ′log(T/2))
9: return π(x
T−→ y) := (T, x, y, µ, µ′1, . . . , µ′log(T/2)) ▷ Reconstruct π(x T−→ y)
10: end if
11: end procedure
x
8−→ x28
x
4−→ x24 x24 4−→ x28
x
2−→ x22 x22 2−→ x24 x24 2−→ x26 x26 2−→ x28
x
2−→ x21 x21 2−→ x22 x22 2−→ x23 x23 2−→ x24 x24 2−→ x25 x25 2−→ x26 x26 2−→ x27 x27 2−→ x28
(a)
x
4−→ x24
x
2−→ x22 x22 2−→ x24 x2 2−→ x222
x
1−→ x21 x21 1−→ x22 x02 1−→ x2102 x22 1−→ x23 x23 1−→ x24 x12 1−→ x2
1
12 x2
1−→ x212 x2
1
2
1−→ x222 x22 1−→ x2
1
22
(b)
Figure 3.1: (a) The complete binary tree that corresponds to FH(N, x, 8) from Algo-
rithm 3.3. (b) The complete ternary tree that corresponds to FH(N, x, 4) from Algo-
rithm 3.4. The value of the x2, x02, x12 and x22 can be computed using eq.(3.6).
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3.3.2.2 Unwinding the Recursion
We obtain the description of successor and verifier circuits for ourRSVL instance RSVL1 =
(S,V, L, x0) by simulating F using stack traces. To this end, we view the execution of
FH(N, x, T = 2t) as a complete ternary tree τ of depth t, where each node represents
a call to F. In particular, a node i ∈ {0, 1, 2}≤t in τ is labelled by the proof πi that is
computed using that particular call to F: see Figure 3.1.(b). The children of a particular
node are, therefore, labelled by the three proofs that result from recursive calls made
within.
To be precise, the root of τ is labelled π(x
T−→ xT ) (where, if you recall, xi := x2i), its
three children
π(x
T/2−−→ xT/2), π(xT/2 T/2−−→ xT ) and π(x′ T/2−−→ x′2
T/2
),
where x′ is computed as in eq.(3.6), and so on until the leaves which are labelled using base
proofs. For example, the tree corresponding to FH(N, x, 4) is depicted in Figure 3.1.(b).
RSVL1 consists of a standard path of length L = 3
log(T ) starting at ∅ and ending at
π(x
T−→ xT ). This corresponds to a depth-first traversal of τ . The intermediate vertices
can be described using τ thanks to this correspondence: for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}t, the i-th vertex
on the standard path consists of set the of proofs in the stack of FH(N, x, T ) when its
execution begins the recursion at i — the stack trace at i, for short.
These proofs can be described in terms of τ , but we have to first recall certain defini-
tions pertaining to trees. The sibling of a node i in a tree is defined as the set of nodes
that have the same parent as i. By “left” siblings of a node i ∈ τ , we refer to the siblings
that lie topologically to the left of that node. The ancestor of a node i in a tree is the set
of node that lie on the path from i to the root. By “inclusive” ancestors of i, we refer to
set containing the ancestors of i and i itself.
A quick inspection of Algorithm 3.4 (and Figure 3.1.(b)) reveals that the stack trace
at i comprises of a sequence of proofs, one for each left sibling of the inclusive ancestors of
i. On denoting these set of nodes of τ by trace(i), the standard path in RSVL1 is defined
as
∅ = v0t → v0t−11 → v0t−12 → v10t−1 → · · · → v2t−11 → v2t → vε = π(x T−→ xT ),
where vi denotes (πj)j∈trace(i). Consequently, the label for a vertex consists of at most
2 log(T ) proofs of the underlying proof system, and we assume that labels with fewer
proofs are padded accordingly.
For example, consider the toy RSVL instance from Figure 3.2. For the node 122
(bold red), the path to the root is dashed in red, and thus its inclusive ancestors are
(122, 12, 1, ε). Its trace trace(122) = (0, 10, 11, 120, 121) is in red, and the correct label
for the 122-th vertex is thus v122 = (π0, π10, π11, π120, π121) where, for example, π0 =
π(x0
4−→ x4) and π10 = π(x4 2−→ x6).
With the standard path defined as above, the successor and verifier functions follow
quite logically. The verifier, given as input a vertex v and an index i, ensures that v is
indeed the valid stack trace at i. The successor, on the other hand, generates the stack
trace at i+1 given the stack trace at i. Both the intuitive and formal descriptions of the
circuits V and S are provided in the next section.
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0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
0 1 2
ε
Figure 3.2: A schematic diagram of τ for FH(N, x, 8). The resulting RSVL instance is
of length 27. The vertex i = 122 (resp., i + 1 = 200) is highlighted in thick red (resp.,
blue). The path from i = 122 to the root is dashed in red and the vertices in trace(i) are
in red. Similarly, the path from i+ 1 = 200 to the root is dotted in blue and the vertices
in trace(i + 1) are in blue. The vertex 0, as it appears in both the traces, is coloured in
magenta.
Remark 8 (Comparison with [42]). In a concurrent and independent work, Ephraim et al.
[42] construct “continuous” verifiable delay functions (see the discussion in Chapter 5)
and show how they can be used to construct RSVL instances. Their construction from
Iterated-Squaring is similar to ours except that they use a k + 1-ary tree (restricted
to a particular depth) instead of a ternary tree in our construction. Appropriately setting
the parameter k allows them to relax the assumption to the soundness of (i) ω(1)-round
Fiat-Shamir Transform to construct hard RSVL instances, and (ii) constant-round Fiat-
Shamir Transform to separate P∩PPAD from NC (which, e.g., implies that there exist
easy instances of Nash that are non-parallelisable). Our construction RSVL1 can be
thought of as their construction with k set to 2.
3.3.2.3 The RSVL Instance
Recall that we denote the RSVL instance described next by RSVL1 = (S,V, L, ∅), where
L = 3log(T ) for a time parameter T = 2t. Its formal definition is given in Algorithm 3.5,
which is complemented by the informal explanation below.
The verifier circuit, RSVL1.V. On input an index i and a vertex v, parsed as a sequence
of proofs (π˜j)j∈trace(i), RSVL1.V ensures that v is a valid stack trace at i by performing
a series of checks on the sequence as described below. Recall from Algorithm 3.2 that
each proof π˜j in the sequence is of the form (N, ℓj, xj, yj,µj), where ℓj denotes the time
parameter of the proof, xj and yj are its start and end points respectively, and µj denotes
the midpoints.
1. RSVL1.V first ensures that each π˜j is valid by invoking the verifier algorithm PP.V
of the underlying proof system.
2. Second, it checks whether the time parameter of each proof matches its level: the
correct time parameter of a proof π˜j is T/2
|j|, where |j| is the level of the node
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j in the tree τ (with the root at level 0 and the leaves at level t). As a con-
crete example, consider the node 122 from Figure 3.2 and the corresponding vertex
(π0, π10, π11, π120, π121). For this vertex to be valid, π0 must have length 4 (i.e.,
ℓ0 = 4) whereas π121 must be a base proof (i.e., ℓ121 = 1).
3. Finally, provided that each proof satisfies the first two conditions, RSVL1.V checks
if the end points of the proofs in the sequence chain appropriately. For every proof
π˜j in the sequence, there are two possibilities depending on whether or not π˜j
corresponds to a merged statement – we denote them cases (i) and (ii), respectively.
In case (i), the start of π˜j is computed from the two proofs that precede π˜j in the
sequence by merging them using eq.(3.6). The start of π˜j in case (ii), however, just
coincides with the endpoint of the proof that precedes it in the sequence (and in
case π˜j is the first proof in the sequence, it must start at x).
Going back to the earlier example, the sequence of proofs v122 = (π0, π10, π11, π120, π121)
is valid if
π0 ↔ π10 ↔, π11↭ π120 ↔ π121, (3.8)
where the ‘↭’ denotes case (i) and the ‘↔’ denotes case (ii). That is, for example,
x10 = y0 and x121 = y120 but since π120 is a merged proof, x120 is computed from π10 and
π11 using eq.(3.6).
The successor circuit, RSVL1.S. Given as input a vertex v, RSVL1.S first uses a
function8 index(·) to extract the index i that is implicitly embedded in the sequence of
proofs in v. Next, it confirms whether or not v is the valid i-th vertex on the standard
path, i.e. vi := (πj)j∈trace(i), by invoking the verifier V. In case v is invalid, RSVL1.S
forms a self-loop at v; otherwise, v is the valid stack trace at i and RSVL1.S utilises it to
compute the stack trace at i+ 1.
RSVL1.S first simulates the next recursion in the pipeline by adding the base proof
πi to v := (π˜j)j∈trace(i) (cf. lines 21 to 26 in Algorithm 3.5 for the exact computation
involved) and then keeps merging the last three proofs in this sequence as long as they
have the same time parameter. In particular, in the case that πi corresponds to a merged
statement (i.e., if i[t] = 2) — since some recursive call to F (up the tree τ) has been
completed — RSVL1.S has to reconstruct the resulting proof. We denote the node in τ
where this recursive call originates by source(i), and it can be obtained by truncating the
trailing 2s of i. We refer to Algorithm 3.5 (lines 29 and 30) for the exact procedure used
for reconstructing the proof for source(i), but once it possesses this proof, RSVL1.S has
all the components of the next vertex on the standard path, the stack trace at i+ 1.
For example, let us consider the successor circuit applied to v122 := (π0, π10, π11, π120, π121),
the i = 122-th vertex in the RSVL instance given in Figure 3.2. RSVL1.S first com-
putes π122, and since this concludes the recursive call F
H(N, x4, 4) at the (source) vertex
1, RSVL1.S reconstructs the corresponding proof π1 by merging twice: first it merges
π120, π121 and π122 (using eq.(3.7)) to reconstruct π12, and then it merges π10, π11 and
π12 to obtain π1. Finally it assembles the next vertex as v200 := (π0, π1), and since
8To be precise, the function index(·) on input a sequence of proof v computes the index i as follows:
it counts the number of proofs of length k in v and then encodes this count in the log(ℓ)-th trit position
of i. If there are more than two proofs of a particular length, then we assume that the function just
returns ⊥.
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Algorithm 3.5 The RSVL instance RSVL1
1: procedure RSVL1.V
H
N,x,T (v, i) ▷ Verifier circuit
hardwired IS+ instance (N, x, T ) ∈ N×QR+N × N, where T = 2t
oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ ▷ Random oracle
input
1. Index i ∈ {0, 1, 2}t
2. Label v parsed as (π˜j)j∈trace(i)
output a bit indicating ACCEPT or REJECT
2: if i > 3log(T ) then return 0
3: Set xnext = x ▷ Set starting point of the chain
4: for j ∈ trace(i) do ▷ Verify the sequence topologically from left to right
5: Parse π˜j =: (N, xj, yj, ℓj,µj)
6: if PP.VH(π˜j) = 0 or ℓj ̸= T/2|j| then return 0 ▷ Checks 1 and 2
7: else if xj ̸= xnext then return 0 ▷ Check 3
8: else ▷ Compute the next point on the chain
9: if j[|j|] = 1 then ▷ case (i): second recursion
10: Set µ := xj and compute r = H(µ, xj−1, yj, ℓj)
11: Set xnext = x
r
j−1 ◦ µ ▷ Compute the merged statement
12: else Set xnext := yj ▷ case (ii): first or third recursion
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
16: return 1 ▷ Valid stack trace at i
17: end procedure
18: procedure RSVL1.S
H
N,x,T (v) ▷ Successor circuit
hardwired IS+ instance (N, x, T ) ∈ N×QR+N × N, where T = 2t
oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ ▷ Random oracle
input Label v parsed as (π˜j)j∈trace(i) where i := index(v)
output Next label vi+1
19: if V(v, i) = 0 or i ≥ 3log(T ) then return v ▷ Invalid trace at i or i ≥ L: self-loop
20: for each j ∈ trace(i) do Parse π˜j =: (N, xj, yj, ℓj,µj)
21: if i[t] = 2 then ▷ Compute start of next base proof
22: Set µ = yi−1 and compute r = H(µ, xi−1, yi, 1)
23: Compute xnext = x
r
i−1 ◦ µ ▷ case (i): compute the merged statement
24: else
25: Let l denote the last index in trace(i) and set xnext = yl ▷ case (ii)
26: end if
27: Set π˜i := πi ← PP.PH(N, xnext, 1, x2next) ▷ Next base proof
28: if i[t] = 2 then ▷ Merge
29: Let s := source(i)
30: Set π˜s := (N, 2ℓs0, xs0, ys1, ys0, ys20, ys220, . . . , yi−2) ▷ Reconstruct source proof
31: end if
32: return vi+1 := (π˜j)j∈trace(i+1) ▷ Return stack trace at i+ 1
33: end procedure
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trace(200) = (0, 1) the newly assembled proof indeed is the stack trace at i + 1. How-
ever applying RSVL1.S again, as no merging is involved, requires simply adding the
base proof π200 to the input label (π0, π1). That is, the label for the 201-th vertex is
v201 := (π0, π1, π200).
3.3.3 Analysis
In this section we state and prove the main theorem in this chapter.
Theorem 6. For a security parameter λ ∈ N, let (N, x, T ) be sampled as in Assumption 2
and
S := SHN,x,T : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m and V := VHN,x,T : {0, 1}m × [1, 2m]
be defined as in Algorithm 3.5, where H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ is a random oracle and
m := m(T, λ) = 2 log(T ) · (log(T ) + 4) · λRSA.
Then RSVL1 := (S,V, 3
log(T ), ∅) constitutes a hard distribution of RSVL instances.
Remark 9. Note that Theorem 6 can be interpreted as a Turing reduction from IS+ (of
form described above) to RSVL. To come up with a (randomised) Karp reduction would
require replacing the random oracle with some standard model hash function. We take a
step in this direction in the next chapter (in §4.4).
Proof. First, in Claim 6.1 we show that RSVL1 is efficient: i.e., S and V are both
polynomial-sized circuits. Then, to establish hardness, we show that any adversary that
runs in time poly(λ), making up to Q = Q(λ) ∈ poly(λ) queries to the random oracle
H, has a negligible probability of success.
Recall that by Definition 16 the adversary can solve an RSVL instance in two ways:
find either (i) the real sink, which in our case contains the solution x2
T
to IS+; or (ii) a
false positive i.e., a pair (v, i) s.t. V(v, i) = 1 while Si(∅) ̸= v.
Let p(λ) denote the probability that a poly(λ)-time adversary on input (N, x, T ) as
above finds a type (i) solution: under Assumption 2, p(λ) is negligible in λ (even if we put
no bound on Q). In Claim 6.2 below we will show that finding a type (ii) solution requires
breaking the unambiguous soundness of PP and therefore, by Lemma 6, its probability is
at most 4 ·Q/2λ. Therefore, the total probability of the adversary breaking the hardness
of RSVL1 is
Pr[type(i) ∨ type(ii)] = Pr[type(i)] + Pr[type(ii)] ≤ 4 ·Q
2λ
+ p(λ) ∈ negl(λ), (3.9)
completing the proof.
Claim 6.1. S and V are both efficient, i.e. have size poly(log(T ), λ) which is poly(λ)
for T ∈ [λω(1), 2λ].
Proof. As a first step, we show that the size of the input verticesm(T, λ) is poly(log(T ), λ).
As noted in §3.3.2, a vertex consists of at most 2 log(T ) proofs of the underlying proof
system. Since the proofs in consideration have time parameter at most T , we infer from
Algorithm 3.2 that
m(T, λ) ≤ 2 log(T ) · ((log(T ) + 4) · λ),
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i.e. m(T, λ) ∈ poly(log(T ), λ) as claimed.9
Next, let us consider the verifier circuit V given in Algorithm 3.5. Note that the size of
V is dominated by the call to PP.V (line 5) and the group operation ◦ for QR+N (line 10)
inside the loop (line 3). Since the output of trace(·) consists of at most 2 log(T ) elements,
and PP.V and ◦ are both efficient, the size of V is roughly 2 log(T ) ·poly(log(T ), λ) which
is still poly(log(T ), λ).
A similar argument holds for the successor circuit S.
Claim 6.2. For (N, x, T ) as in the theorem, the probability that any adversary, which
makes at most Q queries to the random oracle H, finds a solution of type (ii), i.e. a false
positive (v, i) s.t. V(v, i) = 1 but Si(∅) ̸= v, is upper bounded by 4 ·Q/2λ.
Proof. For the event bad as defined in Definition 21, the probability that an adversary
produces a solution of type (ii) is
Pr[type(ii)] = Pr[type(ii) ∧ (bad ∨ ¬bad)]
= Pr[type(ii)|bad] · Pr[bad] + Pr[type(ii) ∧ ¬bad]
≤ Pr[type(ii)|bad] · Pr[bad] + 1/2λRSA/2 (3.10)
≤ 3 ·Q/2λ + 1/2λ (3.11)
≤ 4 ·Q/2λ.
The upper bound in eq.(3.11) above directly follows Lemma 5, and we argue below that
eq.(3.10) is a consequence of Lemma 6. The properties of QR⋆N (i.e. the generators of
QR+N) that were discussed in §3.1.2 will be crucial as it allows repeated application of
Lemma 6.
Let’s suppose that the adversary outputs a solution (v, i) of type (ii), i.e., V(v, i) = 1
but Si(∅) ̸= v, without having made a bad query. Since V accepts, v is of the form
(π˜j)j∈trace(i), and this sequence is guaranteed to be a valid chain starting at x as described
in §3.3.2.3. We argue that, provided x ∈ QR⋆N , the adversary could not have output
the type (ii) solution (v, i) since such a vertex v would equal Si(∅) and hence lie on the
standard path leading to a contradiction. Since a random x ∈ QR+N also belongs to QR⋆N
with a overwhelming probability of 1 − 1/2λRSA/2 (using eq.(3.4)), the upper bound in
eq.(3.10) follows.
Provided x ∈ QR⋆N and that the adversary never makes a bad query, let us see why
the type (ii) solution it outputs lies on the standard path. Assume that
v =: (π˜j)j∈trace(i) = {π˜j1 , π˜j2 , . . . , π˜jℓ}.
Note that π˜j1 is of the form π˜(x1
ℓ1−→ y1), where x1 = x and y1 = x2ℓ1 . Since the verifier
guarantees that the start x, the end point y1 and the time parameter ℓ1 all match the
prescribed proof, as a consequence of the unambiguous soundness of the proof system
(Lemma 6), we get π˜(x
ℓ1−→ y1) = π(x ℓ1−→ y1).
9This can also be established by analysing Algorithm 3.4. Let m(·) denote the upper bound on the
size of the vertices (in bits). This parameter is governed by the recursion m(T ) ≤ 2 log(T )+m(T/2), with
m(1) ≤ 4λ. The 2 log(T ) factor here is the cost of storing completed proofs from the first two recursions,
whereas m(T/2) is the cost of computing the proof for the merged statement (which is half the length).
Therefore m(T ) < 8 log2 T · λ ∈ poly(log(T ), λ).
60
Next, there are two possibilities: either π˜j1 ↔ π˜j2 or π˜j1 ↭ π˜j2 (with ↔ and↭
as defined in eq.(3.8)). In the first case, xj2 = y1 and by the property of the generators
given in eq.(3.5), we have y1 ∈ QR⋆N . Since y1 ∈ QR⋆N , we can again apply Lemma 6
and therefore π˜j2 = πj2 . As for the second case, let π˜j2 =: π˜(x2
ℓ2−→ y2). Since we assume
that the adversary did not make bad queries, it is guaranteed that x2 ∈ QR⋆N and, by
Lemma 6, we get π˜j2 = πj2 .
On iterating the above argument over all the proofs in v, we get v = (πj)j∈trace(i) =
Si(∅) contradicting the premise of the claim.
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Chapter 4
PPAD-Hardness and Fiat-Shamir
In this chapter, we present the second construction of hard-on-average distribution on
the Relaxed-Sink-of-Verifiable-Line problem, denoted RSVL2. This construction
can be thought of as a strengthening of the result from the previous section. In partic-
ular, it can be viewed as an alternative instantiation of the ideas there with two main
differences concerning the underlying assumptions. First, the underlying computational
problem is switched to from Iterated-Squaring to #SAT and therefore we rely here
on the (worst-case) hardness of #P, which is weaker than the concrete number theoretic
Assumption 2. Secondly, the underlying interactive protocol needs to be switched accord-
ingly to the classical Sumcheck Protocol for #SAT ∈ IP [75]. We describe this protocol,
both its original form and the variations required for our construction, in §4.2.
The construction RSVL2 itself relies also on the recursive proof-merging technique. It
is presented in detail in §4.3, albeit a bit different from the previous construction RSVL1.
As for its hardness, we additionally rely on the assumption that Fiat-Shamir Transform
is (unambiguously) sound for the Sumcheck Protocol. We show that this is true in the
random-oracle model. Moreover in §4.4, using ideas from [27], we show that it also holds
under some strong assumptions on fully-homomorphic encryption.
We start off with an informal overview of the chapter.
4.1 Overview
4.1.1 Main Results
We base PPAD-hardness on the soundness of the Fiat-Shamir Transform, which we de-
scribed in §1.3.1. The particular protocol to which we apply the Fiat-Shamir Transform
is the Sumcheck Protocol by Lund et al. [75], which is an n-round interactive proof for
the number of satisfying assignments to a given SAT instance over n variables. We show
that solving the End-of-Line problem is no easier than breaking the soundness of the
non-interactive argument obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir Transform to the sum-
check protocol. Note that we do not explicitly require (adaptive) unambiguous soundness.
As we shown later in Proposition 2 (§4.1.2) for the case of Sumcheck Protocol unambigu-
ous soundness reduces to plain soundness.
Theorem 7 (informal). Solving the End-of-Line problem is at least as hard as breaking
the (adaptive) soundness of the Fiat-Shamir Transform applied to the Sumcheck Protocol.
We prove this theorem by constructing an efficiently-sampleable distibution of End-
of-Line instances, where solving this distribution requires either breaking the soundness
of the Fiat-Shamir Transform, applied to the Sumcheck Protocol or solving a#P complete
problem (and thus any problem in #P). Since breaking the soundness of Fiat-Shamir is
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reducible to #SAT (in fact to SAT) it follows that efficiently solving the above distri-
bution is at least as hard as breaking Fiat-Shamir. (We note that, like in the previous
chapter, all our theorems apply to the class CLS as well.).
On the soundness of Fiat-Shamir. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic is widely used in prac-
tice, and constructing hash functions for which the transform is sound is a central and
long-standing open question in cryptography. Empirical evidence in support of the sound-
ness of Fiat-Shamir is the fact that it has been successfully “field tested” for over three
decades, though it should be mentioned that the context in which the transform was
originally proposed focused on constant-round protocols, whereas the Sumcheck Protocol
has n rounds.
From a foundational perspective, Goldwasser and Kalai [55] demonstrated theoretical
barriers towards the instantiation of Fiat-Shamir in the case of certain arguments (i.e.,
computationally sound proof systems: see Definition 20). Secure instantiations for proofs
(i.e., statistically sound proof systems) such as the Sumcheck Protocol, are an active area
of recent research. Several recent works have shown that, under strong cryptographic
assumptions, the heuristic is sound when it is applied to certain interactive proofs [68,
29, 27, 31, 87]. For our specific purposes it is sufficient that there exists a specific hash
family for which the transform is sound for the Sumcheck Protocol. Thus, the family
can be “tailored” to the protocol. As far as we know, the application of Fiat-Shamir
to sumchecks has only been considered recently, most notably in the “sumcheck style”
protocol by Pietrzak [88] from the previous chapter and in very recent work of Canetti
et al. [27].
4.1.1.1 Instantiating Fiat-Shamir
We obtain two instantiations of the Fiat-Shamir Transform to the Sumcheck Protocol:
first with a random oracle and second with the recent construction of Canetti et al. [27].
Random oracle instantiation. We give supporting evidence that the Fiat-Shamir
Transform may retain soundness of the Sumcheck Protocol by proving that this indeed is
the case when the hash function in the transform is modeled as a Random Oracle. What
we show is in fact stronger, namely that the transformed protocol satisfies unambiguous
soundness, which is what our reduction actually requires (see §4.1.2 for further discussion).
One important consequence is the following.
Theorem 8. Relative to a random oracle, solving End-of-Line is at least as hard as
solving #SAT (and in particular at least as hard as inverting any one-way function).
FHE-based instantiation. Canetti et al. [27] construct a hash family for which, under
the assumption that any one of a broad class of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
schemes has almost optimal security against polynomial-time adversaries, the Fiat-Shamir
Transform is sound when it is applied to (certain instantiations of) the Sumcheck Protocol.
Adapting their results to our setting gives rise to a hard distribution in the class CLS.
Theorem 9 (Informal Statement, see Theorem 14). Assuming that any one of the LWE-
based fully homomorphic encryption schemes in the literature (such as [21, 20, 19, 49,
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22]) has optimal security against quasi-polynomial-size key-recovery attacks, and assuming
further that the #SAT problem over polylog variables is (worst-case) hard for polynomial
time algorithms, there exists an efficiently-sampleable hard distribution of End-of-Line
instances.
Here and below, by optimal security against quasi-polynomial-size attacks, we mean
that every quasi-polynomial-size circuit family breaks the assumption with probability at
most quasipoly(λ)/2λ.
To obtain this result, we need a hash function for which the Fiat-Shamir Transform
is sound when it is applied to a Sumcheck Protocol for a hard language. Specifically, we
consider the Sumcheck Protocol for a formula with poly-logarithmically many variables.
By the random self-reducability of #P [74, 54], the assumption that the #SAT problem
for formulas with polylog variables is (worst-case) hard for polynomial time algorithms,
gives rise to a hard #SAT distribution over such formulas.1
The results of Canetti et al. [27] do not immediately give a hash function as needed.
This is because they consider applying the Fiat-Shamir Transform to doubly-efficient
interactive proofs, where the honest prover runs in polynomial time.2 We, on the other
hand, need to apply the transform to a sumcheck over a quasi-polynomial number of
assignments, where the honest prover runs in quasi-polynomial time. Adapting their
results to our setting, we show that assuming almost-optimal security of the FHE scheme
for quasi-polynomial adversaries implies that the transform is sound for the Sumcheck
Protocol we consider. See §4.4 for an exposition on this result and a formal statement of
Theorem 9.
Sampling hard instances of EOL. By reducing appropriately chosen one-way func-
tions to #SAT, our result opens up the possibility of sampling hard instances of End-of-
Line, whose size is significantly smaller than the ones potentially obtained by reducing
from indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) and related assumptions. First, the random or-
acle can be instantiated heuristically with a concrete practical hash function (e.g., SHA3).
The reduction from #SAT is best instantiated with a small SAT instance in which each
variable appears in a small constant number of clauses. Hard distributions of such SAT
instances arise for example from Goldreich’s candidate one-way function [53]. This opens
up the possibility, given an efficient reduction from End-of-Line to Nash, of sampling
reasonably-sized distributions of games for which solving Nash is heuristically hard and
against which existing heuristics (such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm) can be tested.
4.1.2 Techniques
Our main technical contribution is a stateful incrementally-verifiable procedure that, given
a SAT instance over n variables, counts the number of satisfying assignments. The
counting is performed via an exponential sequence of polynomial-time computation steps,
1Specifically, there is a distribution over #SAT instances with polylog variables and a polynomial-
time reduction from solving this distribution with non-negligible probability to solving the problem in
the worst case (with high probability). Such a result follows similarly to the worst-case to rare-case
reductions in the recent work of Goldreich and Rothblum [54].
2In fact, they need a stronger efficient sampleability property. A sum-check for a poly(m)-sized
function over n variables is sampleable in time poly(m, 2n).
64
where we maintain an intermediate state between consecutive steps. Incremental verifia-
bility means that each intermediate state includes proof of its correctness, and the proof
can be updated and verified in time poly(n). The proofs are based on a non-interactive
Sumcheck Protocol obtained using the Fiat-Shamir methodology. The main technical
challenge is efficient incremental updates to these proofs. We use this incrementally-
verifiable counting procedure to construct, given a #SAT instance, an instance of the
Relaxed-Sink-of-Verifiable-Line (RSVL) problem. We show that finding a solu-
tion to the RSVL instance requires either breaking the unambiguous soundness of the
non-interactive sumcheck, or solving the original #SAT instance. This constitutes the
first step of our blueprint. For the second step, i.e. to obtain PPAD or CLS hardness,
we simply invoke Lemma 4. We proceed with a high level explanation of the first step.
Sums and sumcheck proofs. Our incrementally-verifiable construction computes sums
of low-degree polynomials over exponential numbers of terms. Fix a finite field F and an
n-variate polynomial f : Fn → F over the field F, where f has degree at most d in each
variable (think of d as a constant). We are interested in computing sums of the form:∑︂
z∈{0,1}n
f(z).
We are also interested in sumcheck proofs, proving that y is the correct value of such a
sum. More generally, we consider the tasks of computing, proving and verifying sums
where a prefix of the variables are fixed to values β = (β1, . . . , βj) ∈ Fj. We refer to these
as prefix sums, or the sum with prefix β. A sumcheck proof can prove statements of the
form: ∑︂
z∈{0,1}n−j
f(β, z) = y,
which we refer to as a statement of size 2n−j.
Given a SAT formula ϕ over n variables, a claim about the number of satisfying
assignments can be expressed as a sumcheck claim over an appropriately chosen field
using multilinear extensions [75]. The polynomial f is derived from ϕ, and the individual
degree can be as low as 4. For this, we first transform ϕ into a 3SAT-4 formula (a
3CNF where each variable appears in at most 4 clauses), using the (Karp) reduction from
counting satisfiable assignments of general CNFs to counting satisfying assignments of
3SAT-4 formulae [102]. A standard arithmetization yields an appropriate polynomial f
over the field. In what follows, we use the numbers {0, 1, . . . , d} to refer to the “first”
(d+ 1) field elements.
Incrementally-verifiable counting. Our incrementally-verifiable counting procedure
is given as input the field F and an n-variate polynomial f over this field (described as an
arithmetic circuit of size poly(n) and degree d). We also consider giving the procedure,
as part of its input, a prefix β ∈ Fj. The goal of the procedure is computing the value y
of the sum with prefix β, and a sumcheck proof for this value.
This computation is performed in a sequence of incremental steps. Towards this, we
specify two poly(n)-time algorithms: S and V. The procedure S performs single steps,
receiving as input the current state, and computing the next state. The completeness
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requirement is that applying S sequentially for L = L(n) steps, starting at a fixed known
initial state s0, leads to a final state sL comprised of the correct value y of the sum with
prefix β, as well as a proof π of y’s correctness. We use st to denote the t-th state along
the path from s0 to sL. In our construction, each intermediate state st includes its index
t ∈ [1, L]. Since we are computing the value of an exponential sum, we expect the number
of steps L to be exponential. We use m = m(n) to denote a bound on the size of the
state (the memory used by this process), and P = P (n) to denote a bound on the size
(and verification time) of the final proof π.
Soundness is guaranteed using the verification procedure V, which takes as input a
state and accepts or rejects. The unambiguous soundness requirement is that it should
be intractable for an adversary who is given the input to compute a state s′ with index
t s.t. s′ ̸= st but V accepts s′. We note that this is a strong soundness requirement, and
we use the strength of this guarantee to reduce to the RSVL problem.
An incrementally-verifiable counting procedure as described above directly gives rise
to an instance of the RSVL problem, where any solution either specifies the correct
count, or describes a state s′ ̸= st that V accepts. We first overview the verifiable counter
construction, and close by elaborating on the RSVL problem and on the reduction to it.
A recursive construction. Suppose that (Sn−j,Vn−j) can compute sums of size 2n−j
in an incrementally-verifiable manner. Suppose further that this computation takes L
steps, uses m memory, and has a final proof of size P . We want to recursively construct
an incrementally-verifiable procedure (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1) for computing sums of size 2n−j+1,
which takes O(L) steps, uses m+ O(P ) + poly(n) memory, and has a final proof of size
P + poly(n). If we could do so, then unwinding the recursion would give a procedure
for computing sums of size 2n with 2O(n) steps, poly(n) space and poly(n) proof size
(at the base of the recursion, the trivial procedure (S0,V0) for computing sums of size 1
takes a single step, uses poly(n) memory and has an “empty” proof). In this overview
we ignore the time needed to verify the proof, but we note that it is closely tied to the
size P of the final proof. We note that a similar recursive structure underlies Valiant’s
incrementally-verifiable computation procedure [103].
To construct (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1), given a prefix β ∈ Fj−1, the naive idea is to use Sn−j
to sequentially compute two sums of size 2n−j. We refer to the process of running Sn−j
for L steps to compute a prefix sum as a full execution of (Sn−j). In the naive approach,
a full execution of Sn−j+1 is comprised of two sequential full executions of Sn−j: a first
execution for computing the sum for prefix (β, 0) ∈ Fj, and a second execution computing
the sum for prefix (β, 1) ∈ Fj. The first full execution yields a sum y0 and a proof π0.
These are carried through in the second full execution, which yields a sum y1 and a proof
π1. The final result is y = (y0 + y1), and a naive proof for this result is the concatenated
proof (y0, π0, y1, π1). We can construct (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1) to implement and verify the above
execution, and it follows that if the base procedure was unambiguously sound, then the
new procedure will also be unambiguously sound. The number of steps and the memory
grow exactly as we would like them to: in particular, the space complexity of the new
procedure is indeed roughly m+P , since we only need to “remember” the proof and end
result from the first execution while performing the second execution. The main issue
is that the proof length and verification time have doubled. If we repeat this recursion
many times, they will become super-polynomial.
A natural approach is to try and merge the proofs: given (y0, π0) and (y1, π1), to
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construct a proof π for the total count y = (y0 + y1). Ideally, the merge would be
performed in poly(n) time, and π would be of similar length to π0 and π1. This was the
approach used in [103], who used strong extractability assumptions to achieve efficient
proof-merging (we recall that this construction does not have unambiguous proofs, see
above). Our approach is different: we use a (long) incrementally-verifiable proof-merging
procedure, which is constructed recursively (and is unambiguously sound). Proof merging
cannot be performed in poly(n) time, indeed it requires O(L) steps, but this is fine so long
as the merge itself is incrementally-verifiable and does not use too much memory or proof
size. To obtain an incrementally-verifiable proof-merging procedure, we show that the
proof system we use supports a reduction from proof-merging to incrementally-verifiable
counting. In particular, given the counts {yγ}dγ=0 for the (d+1) prefix sums with prefixes
{(β, γ)}dγ=0 (sums of size 2n−j), computing a proof π for the count y = (y0+y1) of the sum
with prefix β (a sum of size 2n−j+1) reduces to computing a single additional prefix sum
of size 2n−j. This merge procedure relies heavily on the structure of the non-interactive
sumcheck proof system, we give an overview below.
Given the merge procedure, we can detail the recursive construction of (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1).
Given a prefix β ∈ Fj−1, a full execution of Sn−j+1 runs (d + 1) full executions of Sn−j,
computing the prefix sums (and proofs) for sums with prefixes {(β, γ)}dγ=0 (these are sums
of size 2n−j). Let {(yγ, πγ)}dγ=0 be the (respective) prefix sums and proofs. We then run
a final full execution of Sn−j to compute a “merged” proof π for the sum with prefix β (a
sum of size 2n−j+1). Once the merged proof is completed we can “forget” the intermediate
values {(yγ, πγ)}dγ=0. We end the entire process with a proof that is not much larger than
the proofs for sums of size 2n−j. Computing the merged proof boils down to computing an
additional sum of size 2n−j with a prefix (β, σ) for a single field element σ ∈ F. Thus, the
number of steps for a full execution of Sn−j+1 is O(d · L) (recall that d is constant), and
the memory used is m+O(d · P ). Unwinding the recursion, we obtain an incrementally-
verifiable counting procedure which takes 2O(n) steps, with poly(n) memory and proof
size.
We proceed to detail the proof system we use, and then describe the reduction from
proof-merging to incrementally-verifiable counting.
The non-interactive sumcheck. In the interactive Sumcheck Protocol, an untrusted
(and not necessarily efficient) prover wants to convince a verifier that:∑︂
z∈{0,1}n
f(z) = y.
The protocol proceeds in n rounds. In the first round, the prover sends a univariate
polynomial ˜︁g1 obtained by leaving the first variable in f free, and summing over all 2n−1
assignments to the remaining variables. Note this univariate polynomial is of degree d,
and thus it can be specified by sending its F-representation, i.e., its valuations over the
first (d+ 1) field elements, and the prover sends these valuations α1 = {α1,γ = ˜︁g1(γ)}dγ=0
as its message. On receiving the F-representation, the verifier interpolates to recover˜︁g1, and checks that this polynomial is consistent with the prover’s past claims, i.e., that˜︁g1(0) + ˜︁g1(1) = y (otherwise the verifier rejects immediately). The verifier then picks a
random field element β1 and sends it to the prover.
More generally, the first i rounds fix polynomials ˜︁g1, . . . , ˜︁gi and a prefix of field elements
β := (β1, . . . , βj) . In the (i+1)-th round the parties run the same two-message protocol
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described above to verify the i-th claim:∑︂
z∈{0,1}n−i
f(β, z) = ˜︁gi(βi).
Note that this i-th claim is about the sum with the prefix β = (β1, . . . , βj), which is of
size 2n−i. After n rounds, the verifier can simply verify the n-th claim on its own using
a single evaluation of f on the point (β1, . . . , βn). Soundness of the protocol follows from
the fact that if the i-th claim is false, then for any ˜︁gi+1 sent by a cheating prover, w.h.p.
over the choice of βi+1 the (i + 1)-th claim will also be false (because of the Schwartz-
Zippel Lemma). Unambiguity means that even if the i-th claim is true, then if a cheating
prover sends any polynomial ˜︁gi+1 that is not equal to the “prescribed” polynomial gi+1(x)
that would have been sent by the honest prover, then w.h.p. over the choice of βi+1 the
(i + 1)-th claim will be false (even though the i-th claim was true!). More generally, we
can use the same protocol to verify sums with a fixed prefix β ∈ Fj for any j ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
This requires only (n− j) rounds of interaction.
To make this protocol non-interactive, we use the Fiat-Shamir methodology. Given
a hash function H, the prescribed proof for an instance (F, y, f) specifies the prescribed
prover’s messages (α1, . . . ,αn) in a particular execution of the Sumcheck Protocol. The
particular execution is specified by computing for each i the verfier’s challenge βi =
H(F, y, f,α1, β1, . . . , βi−1,αi). To verify such a proof, the verifier: (i) computes each βi
(using the hash function, as above), and (ii) checks that the sumcheck verifier would
accept the input (F, y, f) given the transcript (α1, β1, . . . ,αn, βn). We assume that this
non-interactive protocol is adaptively unambiguously sound: given the hash function H,
no polynomial-time prover can find a false statement (F, ˜︁y, f) and an accepting proof for
that statement. Nor can a cheating prover find a true statement (F, y, f) and an accepting
proof that differs from the prescribed one. Similarly to the interactive sumcheck, we can
also use the non-interactive sumcheck to verify sums with a fixed prefix β ∈ Fj. In fact, if
we define the language appropriately, adaptive soundness of this protocol directly implies
adaptive unambiguous soundness. We elaborate on this below, see Proposition 2.
Merging proofs by computing a (small) sum. Recall our setting: for a fixed prefix
β ∈ Fj−1, we have computed the sums with prefixes {(β, γ) ∈ Fj}dγ=0, which have values
{yγ}dγ=0, together with corresponding proofs {πγ}dγ=0 for those values. We want now to
compute the proof π for the sum with prefix β. This proof corresponds to a larger sum,
and so it should contain an additional (collapsed) round of interaction. What should
the prover’s first message in the protocol for this statement be? The first message is
comprised of the values of the polynomial gj, where gj(γ) equals the sum with prefix
(β, γ). Thus, the first message is simply the values α1 = {yγ}dγ=0. Once we know the
prover’s first message α1, we can compute the verifier’s random challenge σ by applying
the Fiat-Shamir hash function to the instance and to α1. To complete a transcript for
the non-interactive Sumcheck Protocol (and a proof for the sum with prefix β), we now
need a proof for the next claim, i.e., a proof that:∑︂
z∈{0,1}n−j
f(β, σ, z) = g1(σ).
In particular, all we need is to compute a sum of size 2n−j with prefix (β, σ), and a proof for
this sum. Once the value and proof for this larger sum are computed, we can “forget” the
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values and proofs {yγ, πγ}dγ=0 that were computed for the prefixes. This completes the re-
duction from incrementally-verifiable proof-merging to incrementally-verifiable counting.
More generally, we have shown that the sum and proof for a statement of size 2n−j+1
can be obtained by computing (d+ 1) proofs for statements of size 2n−j (with a common
prefix of length 2j−1, followed by each one of the first (d + 1) field elements), and an
additional proof for a final statement of size 2n−j (with the same common prefix, but
a different j-th element that depends on the Fiat-Shamir hash function). Note that
while sums with boolean prefixes correspond to the counting the number of satisfying
assignments in subcubes of the hypercube {0, 1}n, the sums with prefixes that include
elements outside {0, 1} have no such correspondence and in particular the summands can
be arbitrary field elements.
4.1.2.1 From Soundness to Unambiguous Soundness
Recall from Definition 19 that an interactive proof system is unambiguously sound if the
following holds. The proof system specifies a prescribed strategy for the honest prover
to follow on YES instances. If, given a YES instance, the prover first deviates from its
prescribed strategy in some round, then no matter what strategy it follows in subsequent
rounds, the verifier will reject with high probability over its subsequent coin tosses. Note
that this is a type of soundness requirement for YES instances. Similarly, we say that a non-
interactive argument system is unambiguously (adaptively) sound if there is a prescribed
proof for every YES instance, and no efficient cheating prover can come up with a pair
(x, ˜︁π) that is accepted by the verifier unless x is a YES instance and ˜︁π is its prescribed
proof.
The Sumcheck Protocol is known to be unambiguously sound [93]. For our results,
we need to assume that when the Fiat-Shamir Transform is applied to it, the resulting
non-interactive argument is adaptively unambiguously sound. We find the assumption
that unambiguous soundness is preserved by the Fiat-Shamir Transform to be a natural
one. We present supporting evidence for this assumption by demonstrating that it is
true in the random oracle model (Theorem 11). We also show that for a particular
instantiation of the Fiat-Shamir Transform (which suffices for PPAD-hardness), adaptive
unambiguous soundness reduces to standard adaptive soundness. To be more precise, we
show that adaptive soundness of the non-interactive Sumcheck Protocol applied to a
particular language LSC , defined below, implies adaptive unambiguous soundness for the
same language (Proposition 2). Moreover, the protocol’s adaptive unambiguous soundness
for LSC suffices for (unambiguous) soundness of our incrementally-verifiable computation
scheme.
The language LSC is defined over tuples that include an instance to the Sumcheck
Protocol, a fixed prefix (β1, . . . , βj) ∈ F, and a fixed partial transcript of the Sumcheck
Protocol. For 0 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ n an instance is of the form
ISC := (F, y, f, (β1, . . . , βj), ˜︁αj+1, βj+1, . . . , ˜︁αi).
The language is defined as follows:
1. When i = j = 0, this is simply a standard input for the Sumcheck Protocol, and
the instance is in the language if and only if indeed the sum of f over all 2n inputs
equals y.
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2. For i = j ≥ 1, the instance is in the language if and only if the sum over all 2n−j
assignments with prefix (β1, . . . , βj) equals y.
3. Otherwise, the instance is in the language if and only if the final prover message ˜︁αi
is consistent with the prescribed (honest) prover’s message, given the fixed prefix
(β1, . . . , βj) and the verifier’s messages βj+1, . . . , βi−1 (there is no condition on y or
on the prior prover messages, only the last one matters).3 It follows that the verifier
ends up in an accepting state if the Sumcheck Protocol (with prefix (β1, . . . , βj)) is
carried out from i-th round onwards (even if the sum of f over all 2n inputs does
not equal y.).
With this language in mind, we can view each round of the sumcheck as reducing from a
claim that a instance is in LSC , to a claim that a longer instance is in LSC . Soundness
means that if the initial claim is false, then w.h.p. the new claim is also false. Unambiguity
means that even if the initial instance was in the language, if the prover doesn’t follow
the prescribed strategy, then w.h.p. over the verifier’s choice of βi, the new instance is not
in the language.
For our incrementally-verifiable computation scheme, it suffices to assume that the
non-interactive sumcheck is an adaptively unambiguously sound non-interactive argument
system for the language LSC (see the full construction in §4.2). The following claim shows
that in fact it suffices to assume adaptive soundness, which itself implies unambiguity.
Proposition 2. If the (non-interactive) Sumcheck Protocol is an adaptively sound ar-
gument system for the language LSC, then it is also an adaptively unambiguously sound
argument system for LSC.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists an adversary A that, given a hash
function H, can find with noticeable probability an instance ISC ∈ LSC , whose prescribed
proof is π, and an accepting proof ˜︁π ̸= π. Let
ISC = (F, y, f, (β1, . . . , βj),αj+1, βj+1, . . . ,αi),
˜︁π = (˜︁αi+1, . . . , ˜︁αn) and π = (αi+1, . . . ,αn). Let ℓ∗ ∈ [1, n− i] be the smallest index such
that ˜︁αi+ℓ∗ ̸= αi+ℓ∗ . Note that such a ℓ∗ must exist because ˜︁π ̸= π. For k ∈ [i, ℓ∗ − 1], if˜︁βk = H(ISC , ˜︁βi, ˜︁αi+1, ˜︁βi+1, . . . , ˜︁αk),
it follows that the instance
I∗SC =
(︂
ISC , ˜︁βi, ˜︁αi+1, ˜︁βi+1, . . . , ˜︁αi+ℓ∗)︂ = (︂F, y, f,α1, β1, . . . ,αi, ˜︁βi, ˜︁αi+1, . . . , ˜︁αi+ℓ∗)︂
is a NO instance for LSC since ˜︁αi+ℓ∗ differs from the prescribed value. The proof for this
new instance is π∗ := (˜︁αℓ+1, . . . , ˜︁αn). By construction, if ˜︁π is an accepting proof for ISC ,
then also π∗ will be an accepting proof for I∗SC . We can exploit A to break the adaptive
soundness of the same argument system by simply guessing ℓ∗, then computing (I∗SC , π
∗)
as described above and returning it. Given A returns a valid proof, the reduction succeeds
with probability at least 1/n.
3Here, when we refer to the prescribed prover, we are ignoring the fact that the actual claim being
proved (i.e. the value of y) might be false, as the prescribed prover in the sum check protocol does not
need to use the value y to compute its messages.
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4.2 The Sumcheck Protocols
The Sumcheck Protocol was introduced by Lund et al. [75] to show that #P is contained
in IP. In this section, we first recall the original interactive protocol SC and then describe
its generalisation GSC (§4.2.2) that is useful in our construction RSVL2. Intuitively, GSC
is an interactive protocol for the language LSC and therefore takes a prefix and a partial
transcript of the original Sumcheck Protocol SC as its instance. This is followed by
the description of non-interactive protocol GSC obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir
Transform to GSC (§4.2.3).
4.2.1 Sumcheck Protocol
Fix a finite field F and a subset H ⊆ F (usually H = {0, 1}). In the original Sumcheck
Protocol, a (not necessarily efficient) prover takes as input an n-variate polynomial f :
Fn → F of degree at most d in each variable (think of d as a constant significantly smaller
than |F|). The prover’s goal is to convince a verifier that∑︂
z∈Hn
f(z) = y,
for some value y ∈ F. The verifier only has oracle access to f , and is given the constant y ∈
F. The verifier is allowed a single oracle query to f , and runs in time poly(n, d, log(|F|)).
In Algorithm 4.1, we review the standard Sumcheck Protocol from [75], denoted by
SC =
(︁
P(y, f),Vf (y)
)︁
.
P is an interactive Turing machine, and V(·) is a probabilistic interactive Turing machine
with oracle access to f : Fn → F. The prover P(y, f) runs in time poly(|F|n).4 The
verifier Vf (y) runs in time poly(n, log(|F|), d) and queries the oracle f at a single point.
The communication complexity is poly(n, log(|F|), d), and the total number of bits sent
from the verifier to the prover is O(n · log(|F|)). Moreover, this protocol is public-coin;
i.e., all the messages sent by the verifier are truly random and consist of the verifier’s
random coin tosses.
Remark 10 (Representing polynomials). For a finite field F, let {0, . . . , d} denote its
first d+ 1 elements. Given a univariate polynomial g of degree d over F, we say that
α := {αγ = g(γ)}dγ=0
is an F-representation of g. Note that this representation is unique since any two degree
d polynomials over F can agree on at most d values (i.e., by Schwartz-Zippel Lemma).
Therefore, given α, it is possible to reconstruct g by using standard interpolation tech-
niques (e.g., Lagrange interpolation).5
4Here we assume the prover’s input is a description of the polynomial f , from which f can be computed
(on any input) in time poly(n).
5The choice of {0, . . . , d} to represent polynomials is arbitrary and, in principle, one could use any
d+ 1 distinct set of field elements.
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Algorithm 4.1 Sumcheck Protocol SC [75]
1: procedure P(y, f) ▷ Prover
parameters
1. description of a finite field F and its subset H ⊂ F
2. dimension n ∈ N and individual degree d ∈ N
input
1. field element y ∈ F
2. n-variate polynomial f : Fn → F of individual degree at most d
2: for i ∈ [1, n] do ▷ At the start of round i, P knows β1, . . . , βi−1
3: Compute the degree-d univariate polynomial
gi(x) :=
∑︂
zi+1,...,zn∈H
f(β1, . . . , βi−1, x, zi+1, . . . , zn)
4: Send gi(x) to V via its F-representation αi = {αi,γ = gi(γ)}dγ=0 ▷ P→ V
5: Receive challenge βi from V ▷ P← V
6: end for
7: HALT ▷ The prover halts without any output
8: end procedure
9: procedure Vf (y) ▷ Verifier
parameters same as P
oracle n-variate polynomial f : Fn → F of individual degree at most d
input field element y ∈ F
output a bit indicating ACCEPT or REJECT
10: Initialise y0 = y
11: for i ∈ [1, n] do ▷ At the start of round i, V knows yi−1
12: Receive d+ 1 field elements ˜︁αi = {˜︁αi,γ}dγ=0 from P ▷ P→ V
13: Compute the degree-d polynomial ˜︁gi by interpolating ˜︁αi
14: if
∑︁
x∈H ˜︁gi(x) ̸= yi−1 then return 0
15: else
16: Choose a random element βi ← F and set yi := ˜︁gi(βi) ▷ Next challenge
17: Send βi to P ▷ P← V
18: end if
19: end for
20: if yn = f(β1, . . . , βn) then return 1 ▷ V uses a single oracle call to f
21: else return 0
22: end if
23: end procedure
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4.2.2 Generalised Sumcheck Protocol
Recall the definition of the language LSC from §4.1.2.1. The Sumcheck Protocol SC
described above can be considered to be a proof system for “plain” LSC — i.e., LSC
without a prefix and partial transcript (i.e., i = j = 0). In this section, we describe
the generalised Sumcheck Protocol GSC for general LSC , i.e. where i and j can be both
greater than zero. The protocol is given in Algorithm 4.2, and a few remarks are in order.
1. Firstly, for our construction of RSVL in §4.3 we only require the protocol GSC
with prefixes (i.e., i = j > 0) — the protocol in its fully generality (i.e., with
0 < j < i ≤ n) is used only in Proposition 2.
2. Secondly, the verifier in GSC is given the polynomial f , unlike oracle-access as in
SC. Thus, the verifier’s run-time can be poly(n, d, log(|F|), |f |), where |f | refers to
the size of the polynomial f under some appropriate representation (e.g., arithmetic
circuits).
We show in Theorem 10 that this protocol is an unambiguously-sound interactive proof
system for LSC .
Theorem 10. Consider the language LSC with instances of the form ISC := (F, y, f,β, τ ),
where y is a element in the field F, f : Fn → F is an n-variate polynomial of degree at
most d < |F| in each variable, β ∈ Fj is any prefix, and τ ∈ (Fd+1 × F)i−j is any fixed
partial transcript. The Generalised Sumcheck Protocol GSC, described in Algorithm 4.2,
is a (d(n − i)/|F|)-unambiguously sound interactive proof system for LSC. That is, for
every ISC it satisfies the following three properties.
• Completeness: If ISC ∈ LSC,
Pr
βi+1,...,βn←Fn−i
[(P(y, f,β, τ ),V(y, f,β, τ )) = 1] = 1.
• Soundness: If ISC /∈ LSC then for every (computationally unbounded) interactive
Turing machine ˜︁P,
Pr
βi+1,...,βn←Fn−i
[︂(︂˜︁P(y, f,β, τ ),V(y, f,β, τ ))︂ = 1]︂ ≤ d(n− i)|F| . (4.1)
• Unambiguity: If ISC ∈ LSC then for every (computationally unbounded) interac-
tive Turing machine ˜︁P that deviates from the protocol in some round in [i+ 1, n], V
accepts with probability at most d(n− i)/|F|, where the probability is over the coins
of the verifier..
Proof. We show below that the three properties hold for the plain case (i.e., i = j = 0)
and in the end sketch how the argument can be easily extended to the general case. Com-
pleteness follows from the protocol description. We argue soundness6 and unambiguity
in Claim 10.1 and Claim 10.2 below. In both the claims, we proceed via an induction
on the number of variables n. We also make extensive use of the univariate formulation
of the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma [99, 106], which states that the probability with which a
6The presentation of the proof here closely follows that of a lecture note by Thaler.
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Algorithm 4.2 Generalised Sumcheck Protocol GSC
1: procedure P(y, f,β, τ ) ▷ Prover
parameters
1. description of a finite field F and its subset H ⊂ F
2. dimension n ∈ N and individual degree d ∈ N
input
1. field element y ∈ F
2. n-variate polynomial f : Fn → F of individual degree at most d
3. prefix β = (β1, . . . , βj) ∈ Fj
4. partial transcript τ parsed as αj+1, βj+1, . . . ,αi, βi ∈
(︁
Fd+1 × F)︁i−j
2: for k ∈ [i+ 1, n] do ▷ At the start of round k, P knows β1, . . . , βk−1
3: Compute the degree-d univariate polynomial
gk(x) :=
∑︂
zk+1,...,zn∈H
f(β1, . . . , βk−1, x, zk+1, . . . , zn)
4: Send gk(x) to V via its F-representation ▷ P→ V
αk = {αk,γ = gk(γ)}dγ=0
5: Receive challenge βi from V ▷ P← V
6: end for
7: HALT ▷ The prover halts without any output
8: end procedure
9: procedure V(y, f,β, τ ) ▷ Verifier
parameters and input same as P
output a bit indicating ACCEPT or REJECT
10: if i = j then yi := y ▷ Transcript empty; carry out SC with prefix β
11: else yi := ˜︁gi(βi), where ˜︁gi the degree-d interpolation of αi
12: end if
13: for k ∈ [i+ 1, n] do ▷ At the start of round k, V knows yk−1
14: Receive d+ 1 field elements ˜︁αk = {˜︁αk,γ}dγ=0 from P ▷ P→ V
15: Compute the degree-d polynomial ˜︁gk by interpolating ˜︁αk
16: if
∑︁
x∈H ˜︁gk(x) ̸= yk−1 then return 0
17: else
18: Choose a random element βk ← F and set yk := ˜︁gk(βk) ▷ Next challenge
19: Send βk to P ▷ P← V
20: end if
21: end for
22: if yn = f(β1, . . . , βn) then return 1 ▷ V uses a single call to f
23: else return 0
24: end if
25: end procedure
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degree-d univariate polynomial f over a field F evaluates to zero at a randomly-chosen
point in F is at most d/|F|:
Pr
x←F
[f(x) = 0] ≤ d|F| .
As a consequence, the probability that two distinct degree-d polynomials f and g over F
agree on a random point is also at most d/|F|:
Pr
x←F
[f(x) = g(x)] ≤ d|F| .
For two univariate polynomials f and g over F, by f ≡ g we denote that the two polynomi-
als are equivalent in the sense that they agree on all points in F, i.e., ∀x ∈ F : f(x) = g(x);
similary, f ̸≡ g denotes that f and g are not equivalent.
Claim 10.1. If
∑︁
z∈Hn f(z) ̸= y, then V rejects with probability at least 1− d · n/|F|.
Proof. Base case: In the base case of n = 1, there is only one round of interaction and˜︁P sends an F-representation of some polynomial g∗1. If g∗1 ̸≡ g1, then by Schwartz-
Zippel Lemma the probability that g∗1(β1) = g1(β1) is at most d/|F| over the choice
of the challenge β1 ∈ F. Therefore, V rejects with probability at least 1− d/|F|.
Induction hypothesis: We assume that the soundness guarantee in eq.(4.1) holds for
all (n − 1)-variate polynomials. That is, if ∑︁z2,...,zn∈Hn−1 f(z2, . . . , zn) ̸= y then V
rejects with probability at least 1− (n− 1) · d/|F|.
Induction: Suppose that ˜︁P sends an F-representation of some polynomial g∗1 ̸≡ g1 in the
first round. Again, by Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, g∗1(β1) ̸= g1(β1) with probability at
least 1 − d/|F| over the choice of β1. Conditioned on this event, ˜︁P is left to prove
the following false claim in the second round:
g∗1(β1) =
∑︂
z2,...,zn∈Hn−1
f(β1, z2, . . . , zn).
Since this is a claim involving (n−1)-variate polynomials, by our induction hypoth-
esis, V rejects in one of the subsequent rounds with probability at least 1− (n− 1) ·
d/|F|. Let’s denote this event by Vn−1 and by Vn the overall event that V rejects. It
follows that
Pr
β1,...,βn←Fn
[Vn] = Pr
β1,...,βn←Fn
[g∗1(β1) ̸= g1(β1) ∧ Vn−1]
= Pr
β2,...,βn←Fn−1
[Vn−1|g∗1(β1) ̸= g1(β1)] · Pr
β1←F
[g∗1(β1) ̸= g1(β1)]
≥
(︃
1− d · (n− 1)|F|
)︃
·
(︃
1− d|F|
)︃
= 1− d · (n− 1)|F| −
d
|F| −
d2 · (n− 1)
|F|2 ≥ 1−
d · n
|F| .
Claim 10.2. Suppose that
∑︁
z∈Hn f(z) = y. If ˜︁P deviates from the prescribed protocol
then V rejects with probability at least 1− d · n/|F|.
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Proof. Base case: In the base case of n = 1, there is only one round of interaction and ˜︁P
sends an F-representation of some polynomial g∗1. If ˜︁P deviates and sends g∗1 ̸≡ g1,
then by Schwartz-Zippel Lemma the probability that g∗1(β1) = g1(β1) is at most
d/|F| over the choice of the challenge β1 ∈ F. Therefore, V rejects with probability
at least 1− d/|F|.
Induction hypothesis: We assume that ambiguity holds for all (n − 1)-variate poly-
nomials. That is, if
∑︁
z2,...,zn∈Hn−1 f(z2, . . . , zn) = y and if
˜︁P deviates from the
prescribed strategy in some round in [1, n− 1] then V rejects with probability at
least 1− (n− 1) · d/|F|.
Induction: Suppose that ˜︁P sends an F-representation of some polynomial g∗1 in the first
round. There are two (complementary) cases: either g∗1 ≡ g1 or g∗1 ̸≡ g1. Clearly, the
first case reduces to the induction hypothesis. In the second case, the probability
that V rejects outright in the first round is at least (1−d/|F|) by the Schwartz-Zippel
Lemma. Putting together, we have
Pr
β1,...,βn←Fn
[Vn] = Pr
β1,...,βn←Fn
[Vn ∧ (g∗1 ≡ g1 ∨ g∗1 ̸≡ g1)]
= Pr
β1,...,βn←Fn
[Vn|g∗1 ≡ g1] · Pr[g∗1 ≡ g1] + Pr
β1,...,βn←Fn
[Vn|g∗1 ̸≡ g1] · Pr[g∗1 ̸≡ g1]
≥
(︃
1− d · (n− 1)|F|
)︃
· Pr[g∗1 ≡ g1] +
(︃
1− d|F|
)︃
· Pr[g∗1 ̸≡ g1]
≥ 1− d · (n− 1)|F| · Pr[g
∗
1 ≡ g1]−
d
|F| · Pr[g
∗
1 ̸≡ g1]
≥ 1− d · (n− 1)|F| −
d
|F| = 1−
d · n
|F|
where Vn−1 and Vn are defined as in Claim 10.1.
Extending to general LSC. It is easy to see that the claims above can be easily
extended to accommodate a prefix β = (β1, . . . , βj). To see why the same applies when
considering transcripts, we need to take a closer look at the definition of LSC from §4.1.2.1.
Recall that an instance
ISC := (F, y, f, (β1, . . . , βj), ˜︁αj+1, βj+1, . . . , ˜︁αi)
belongs to LSC if and only if the final prover message ˜︁αi is consistent with the prescribed
(honest) prover’s message gi for the prefix β1, . . . , βi−1. To argue soundness, note that if˜︁αi is inconsistent then, by Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, ˜︁P ends up proving a wrong sum in
round i+ 1 with high probability. An analogous argument applies for unambiguity.
4.2.3 Non-Interactive Sumcheck Protocol
We consider the non-interactive version of the Sumcheck Protocol obtained by apply-
ing the Fiat-Shamir Transform to the protocol GSC from Algorithm 4.2. The protocol,
denoted GSC, is described in Algorithm 4.3. The verifier’s “challenges” βi in GSC are
obtained by applying a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → F to the transcript thus far, which
is comprised of the instance and the prover’s messages up to that round. The prover
GSC.P runs in time poly(|F|n). The verifier GSC.V runs in time poly(n, |f |) and space
O(n · log(|F|)).
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Algorithm 4.3 Non-Interactive Sumcheck Protocol GSC
1: procedure PH(y, f,β, τ ) ▷ Prover
parameters
1. description of a finite field F and its subset H ⊂ F
2. dimension n ∈ N and individual degree d ∈ N
3. hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → F
input
1. field element y ∈ F
2. n-variate polynomial f : Fn → F of individual degree at most d
3. prefix β = (β1, . . . , βj) ∈ Fj
4. partial transcript τ parsed as αj+1, βj+1, . . . ,αi, βi ∈
(︁
Fd+1 × F)︁i−j
output Proof π
2: for k ∈ [i+ 1, n] do
3: Compute the degree-d univariate polynomial
gk(x) :=
∑︂
zk+1,...,zn∈H
f(β1, . . . , βk−1, x, zk+1, . . . , zn)
4: Compute its F-representation αk = {αk,γ = gk(γ)}dγ=0
5: Compute the challenge ▷ Fiat-Shamir
βi = H(F, y, f,β, τ ,αi+1, βi+1, . . . , βk−1,αk)
6: end for
7: Return π := {αi+1, . . . ,αn}
8: end procedure
9: procedure VH(y, f,β, τ , π) ▷ Verifier
parameters same as P
input
1. y, f,β, τ as in P
2. Proof π parsed as {˜︁αi+1, . . . , ˜︁αn} ∈ (Fd+1)i−j
output a bit indicating ACCEPT or REJECT
10: if i = j then yi := y ▷ Transcript empty; carry out SC with prefix β
11: else yi := ˜︁gi(βi), where ˜︁gi the degree-d interpolation of αi
12: end if
13: for k ∈ [i+ 1, n] do ▷ At the start of round k, V knows yk−1
14: Compute the degree-d polynomial ˜︁gk by interpolating ˜︁αk
15: if
∑︁
x∈H ˜︁gk(x) ̸= yk−1 then return 0
16: else
17: Compute βi = H(F, y, f,β, τ ,αi+1, βi+1, . . . , βk−1,αk) and set yk := ˜︁gk(βk)
18: end if
19: end for
20: if yn = f(β1, . . . , βn) then return 1 ▷ V uses a single call to f
21: else return 0
22: end if
23: end procedure
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4.2.4 Our Assumption on Fiat-Shamir
The assumption that underlies our main theorem pertains to the soundness of the com-
piled protocol GSC from Algorithm 4.3. In particular, we assume that the Fiat-Shamir
Transform is unambiguously (adaptively) sound when applied to the parent interactive
Sumcheck Protocol GSC and, as a result, that GSC is an unambiguously (adaptively)
sound non-interactive argument system for the language LSC . More formally:
Assumption 3. The Fiat-Shamir Transform is unambiguously sound for the Generalised
Sumcheck Protocol GSC from Theorem 4.2. In other words, there exists a family of hash
functions H : {0, 1}∗ → F such that when Fiat-Shamir Transform is instantiated with
(random) H ← H, the non-interactive Sumcheck Protocol GSC from Theorem 4.3 is
(δ, ϵ)-unambiguously (adaptively) sound argument system for the language LSC for some
δ and ϵ that are negligible in n, the number of variables.
For the particular instatiation of Fiat-Shamir Transform described in Algorithm 4.3,
by Proposition 2, the above assumption can be relaxed to simply requiring (adaptive)
soundness. As already pointed out, this suffices for our application in §4.3. In Theorem 11
below, we show that the assumption holds relative to random oracles. In fact we directly
show the stronger property of unambiguous soundness.
Theorem 11. Fix a finite field F. Let GSC :=
(︁
PH ,VH
)︁
denote the protocol from Algo-
rithm 4.3 where the hash function H is instatiated with a random function from the set
of all functions H : {0, 1}∗ → F. Then GSC is a (Qd/|F|)-unambiguously sound non-
interactive proof system for the language LSC, where Q = Q(n) denotes the number of
queries made to the random oracle. That is, it satisfies the following three properties.
• Completeness: For every ISC = (F, y, f,β, τ ) ∈ LSC, where y ∈ F is an element
in the field F, f : Fn → F is an n-variate polynomial of degree at most d < |F| in
each variable, β ∈ Fj is a prefix, and τ ∈ (Fd+1 × F)i−j is a partial transcript,
Pr
H←H
[︁
VH
(︁
(y, f,β, τ ),PH(y, f,β, τ )
)︁
= 1
]︁
= 1.
• Soundness: For every (computationally unbounded) cheating prover strategy ˜︁P that
makes at most Q queries to H,
Pr
H←H
((y,f,β,τ ),˜︁π)←˜︁PH
[︁
VH(y, f,β, τ , ˜︁π) = 1 ∧ (F, y, f,β, τ ) /∈ LSC]︁ ≤ Qd|F| .
• Unambiguity: For every (computationally unbounded) cheating prover strategy ˜︁P
that makes at most Q queries to H,
Pr
H←H
((y,f,β,τ ),˜︁π)←˜︁PH
π←PH(y,f,β,τ )
[︁
VH((y, f,β, τ ), ˜︁π) = 1 ∧ ˜︁π ̸= π ∧ (F, y, f,β, τ ) ∈ LSC]︁ ≤ Qd|F| .
Proof. A query is a tuple of the form
(F, y, f,β, ˜︁αj+1, ˜︁βj+1, . . . , ˜︁βℓ−1, ˜︁αℓ),
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where f is a polynomial over the field F, y ∈ F, β = (β1, . . . , βj) is a prefix, and ˜︁αk ∈ Fd+1
and ˜︁βk ∈ F for k ∈ [j + 1, ℓ] where ℓ ∈ [1, n− j]. For a statement (y, f,β) (either in or
not in the language LSC), we consider the output αj+1, . . . ,αn of the prescribed prover
P when invoked on (y, f,β) and the associated hash values βj+1, . . . , βℓ−1. Let
βℓ := H(F, y, f,β,αj+1, βj+1, . . . , βℓ−1,αℓ) and ˜︁βℓ := H(F, y, f,β, ˜︁αj+1, ˜︁βj+1, . . . , ˜︁αℓ)).
Also, let gℓ(x) (resp., ˜︁gℓ(x)) denote the unique degree-d polynomial obtained by interpo-
lating the field elements in αℓ (resp., ˜︁αℓ). We say that the query
(y, f,β, ˜︁αj+1, ˜︁βj+1, . . . , ˜︁βℓ−1, ˜︁αℓ)
is bad if
1. ˜︁αℓ ̸= αℓ (which implies that the polynomial gℓ(x) ̸= ˜︁gℓ(x)) and
2. ˜︁gℓ(˜︁βℓ) = gℓ(βℓ).
Since βℓ and ˜︁βℓ are outputs of a random oracle and the polynomials gℓ(x), ˜︁gℓ(x) are
different, the probability of a particular query being bad is at most d/|F| by the Schwartz-
Zippel lemma. Therefore by a union bound over all the queries, the probability that the
adversary made a bad query during its execution is at most Qd/|F|.
Note that in the absence of bad queries, denoted ¬bad, an adversary cannot break
either soundness or unambiguity of the non-interactive Sumcheck Protocol. It follows
that the probability the adversary breaks the soundness or unambiguity is also at most
Qd/|F|. More formally, let break denote the event that an adversary that makes at most Q
queries to the random oracle finds a proof that breaks either the soundness or unambiguity
of the non-interactive such check protocol. The probability of break can be bounded as
follows:
Pr[break] = Pr[break ∧ (bad ∨ ¬bad)]
≤ Pr[break ∧ bad] + Pr[break ∧ ¬bad]
= Pr[break|bad] · Pr[bad] ≤ Qd/|F|.
Remark 11. The proof follows the fact that the random oracle is “collision-intractable”
for “sparse” relations, which in the case of Theorem 11 is the relation defined by the
transcript. Later, in §4.4, we will see an alternative instantation of collision-intractable
hash function for this relation from assumptions on lattices.
4.3 The Reduction
In this section, we present theRSVL instance RSVL2 constructed using the non-interactive
Sumcheck Protocol GSC from §4.2.3 as a building block. The proposed instance counts
— incrementally and verifiably — the number of satisfying assignments (i.e., the sum) of
an n-variate polynomial f with individual degree at most d. To be specific, the standard
path in the RSVL instance starts at a fixed initial state s0 (the source) and ends at a
final state sL (the sink) comprised of the sum
y =
∑︂
z∈{0,1}n
f(z),
79
as well as a proof π of y’s correctness. The i-th (intermediate) state along the path
from s0 to sL, which we denote by si, consists of appropriately-chosen prefix sums and
associated proofs. (To be precise, each state also includes an index t ∈ [0, d+ 1]≤n that
is determined by its counter i.) The successor S performs single steps, receiving as input
the current state si, and computing the next state si+1. The verification procedure V,
which takes as input a state s and a counter i and accepts if s is the i-th state.
Since the sink will contain the overall sum y with a proof, any adversary that attempts
to solve the RSVL instance by finding a type (i) solution (see, Definition 16) must
compute the sum for f , the correctness of which can be verified using the proof. On
the other hand, it is intractable for an adversary to find a type (ii) solution (i.e., a false
positive (s′, i) such that s′ ̸= si but V accepts s′ as the i-th vertex on the RSVL line)
because of the unambiguous soundness of the non-interactive sumcheck proof system. The
above is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 12 (Main Theorem). For a parameter n ∈ N, fix a finite field F of sufficiently
large size p (say O(2n)). Let f be an n-variate polynomial over F of individual degree at
most d. Pick a hash function H uniformly at random from a family H. Let
S := Sf,H : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m and V := Vf,H : {0, 1}m × [1, 2m]
be constructed as in Algorithm 4.6 with
m = m(n, d, p) = (d+ 1)n log(p) and L = L(n, d) =
∑︂
j∈[0,n]
(d+ 2)j.
Given an adversary A that solves instances of RSVL2 = (S,V, L, (0
n, f(0n), ∅)) in polyno-
mial time TA = TA(n) and a non-negligible probability ϵ = ϵ(n), it is possible to either
• find the sum
∑︁
z∈{0,1}n f(z) in time O(TA) with probability ϵ, or
• break the unambiguous soundness of the non-interactive Sumcheck Protocol (As-
sumption 3) with probability ϵ/(d+ 1) · n.
The proof of the theorem is given in §4.3.3. As explained in §4.1.1, in order to define
a hard distribution of RSVL instances, the polynomial f in RSVL2 is, for example, the
arithmetization of a one-way function. The main technical component of our reduction
are the successor circuit S and the verifier circuit V, described in §4.3.1 and §4.3.2. S
an V, together, implement the incrementally-verifiable counter for statements of size 2n.
They are defined using a sequence of circuits
(Sn,Vn), . . . , (S0,V0),
where (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1) is an incrementally-verifiable counter for statements of size 2n−j+1
and is implemented recursively using (Sn−j,Vn−j). At the base of the recursion, (S0,V0)
computes sums of size 1 and is therefore trivial: it takes a single step, uses poly(n)
memory and has an “empty” proof. The circuits (S,V) simply invoke (Sn,Vn).
We implement these procedures using circuits and to ensure that the size of these
circuits does not blow up, we have to exploit the recursive structure of Sumcheck Protocol.
In our construction, if (Sn−j,Vn−j) takes L steps, uses m bits of memory, and generates
a final proof of size P bits, then (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1) takes O(dL) steps, uses m + O(dP ) +
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poly(n) memory, and has a final proof of size P +poly(n). On unwinding the recursion,
it can be shown that (S,V) runs for 2O(n) steps, uses poly(n) space and has proof size
of poly(n). But most importantly S and V are polynomial-sized circuits, and therefore
each step can be carried out in poly(n) time. In other words, we get an RSVL instance
describing a directed graph with 2O(n) vertices each with a label of size poly(n), where
the successor and verifier functions have efficient descriptions.
4.3.1 The Recursive Construction
The circuits (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1) in our incrementally-verifiable counting procedure have hard-
wired into them
1. f , an n-variate polynomial over a field F of individual degree at most d (described
as an arithmetic circuit of size poly(n) and degree d), and
2. H, the description of a hash function from the family H.
It takes as its input a prefix β = (β1, . . . , βj−1) ∈ Fj−1 (and also the transcript τ as
explained below). The goal of the procedure is computing the value y of the sum with
prefix β, along with a sumcheck proof for this value.
In order to describe how (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1) is implemented using (Sn−j,Vn−j), we need
to take a closer look at the non-interactive Sumcheck Protocol GSC given in Algorithm 4.3.
For this application, its suffices to consider the protocol with the transcript being empty
(i.e., j = i). Suppose that the prover GSC.P has been invoked on the β = (β1, . . . , βj−1)-
prefix sum ∑︂
z∈{0,1}n−j+1
f(β, z) = yj−1, (4.2)
which is a statement of size 2n−j+1. At the end of the first iteration, GSC.P reduces this
sumcheck to checking a smaller (β, σ)-prefix sum yj = gj(σ) of size 2
n−j, where gj(x) is
the univariate polynomial ∑︂
z∈{0,1}n−j
f(β, x,z)
specified by the field elements αj,0 = gj(0), . . . , αj,d = gj(d), and σ is the “challenge”, i.e.,
a hash value depending on αj,0, . . . , αj,d.
Now, suppose we are given incrementally-verifiable procedures (Sn−j,Vn−j) to compute
sums of size 2n−j, which takes L(n−j) steps, uses m(n−j) memory, and has a final proof
of size P (n−j) bits. Our construction of (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1) takes (d+2)·L(n−j) steps, uses
m(n−j)+(d+1)·P (n−j) memory, and has a final proof of size P (n−j)+(d+1) log(p) bits
(where, if you recall, p denotes the size of the field F). On unwinding the above recursive
expressions for L, m and P , we conclude that (Sn,Vn) is procedure for computing sums
of size 2n with 2O(n) steps and poly(n) space, and the final proof is of size poly(n).
To achieve this construction, we exploit the structure of Sumcheck Protocol. Note that
the polynomial gj(x) can itself be recursively computed with proof. To be more precise,
for each γ ∈ [0, d], we sequentially run (Sn−j,Vn−j) to compute the valuations αj+1,γ with
a proof certifying the sum ∑︂
z∈{0,1}n−j−1
f(β, γ, z) = αj+1,γ = gj(γ) (4.3)
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Once we possess αj+1,0, . . . , αj+1,d after the (d+1) sequential applications of (Sn−j,Vn−j),
the challenge σ can be computed and subsequently the prefix-sum∑︂
z∈{0,1}n−j−1
f(β, σ, z) = yj = gj(σ) (4.4)
for the next round can also be computed using (Sn−j,Vn−j) in an incrementally-verifiable
manner. In other words, we have reduced computing the proof for the β-prefix sum given
in eq.(4.2) to (i) (d+ 1) new sumchecks given in eq.(4.3) concerning the computation of
polynomial gj(x), and (ii) the second iteration of the original sumcheck given in eq.(4.4),
which serves as an incrementally-verifiable proof-merging procedure. Moreover, all the
(d + 2) sumchecks above involve work proportional to the computation of sumchecks of
size 2n−j−1, and therefore they can be computed using (Sn−j,Vn−j).
The working of the procedure (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1) on an input a prefix β = (β1, . . . , βj−1)
can therefore be described on a high level as follows.
1. Compute the polynomial gj(x), represented by the field elements {αj,γ = gj(γ)}dγ=0,
incrementally and verifiably by invoking (Sn−j,Vn−j) on (β, γ)
2. Compute the β-prefix sum by adding (β, 0)- and (β, 1)-prefix sums αj,0 and αj,1
3. Calculate the “challenge” σ and compute the partial proof for the original sumcheck:
compute the proof for the (β, σ)-prefix sum gj(σ) using (Sn−j,Vn−j)
4. Obtain the “merged proof” for the β-prefix sum by appending {αj,γ}dγ=0 to the proof
for (β, σ)-prefix sum
5. Return the β-prefix sum with proof
Keeping the above recursive procedure in mind, we proceed to detail the recursive suc-
cessor and verifier circuits Sn−j+1 and Vn−j+1.
The recursive successor. Recall that (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1), on input a prefix β = (β0, . . . , βj−1),
calls the procedure (Sn−j,Vn−j) sequentially d + 2 times. This results in a sequence of
states s0, . . . , sL(n−j+1), where sL(n−j+1) is comprised of the sum
y =
∑︂
z∈{0,1}n−j+1
f(β, z)
as well as a proof π of y’s correctness. Since the invocations of (Sn−j,Vn−j) are sequential,
an intermediate state si along the path from s0 to sL(n−j+1), is comprised of at most (d+2)
“sub-states”, one for each invocation of (Sn−j,Vn−j).
In more details, each state si is associated with an index t ∈ [0, d+ 1]≤(n−j+1) which
is determined by the counter i. Loosely speaking, the index t of the i-th state si is the
i-th vertex in the perfect (d+ 2)-dary tree that the standard depth-first search visits for
the last time (see the discussion in §4.3.2 for more details). If t = (t1, . . . , tℓ) (where
ℓ ∈ [0, n− j + 1]) then si consists of t1 sub-states, where
• the first t1 − 1 are final, i.e., correspond to full executions of (Sn−j,Vn−j), and
therefore consist of a single tuple of the form (y, π), and
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• the t1-th sub-state is either final and consists of a single tuple (y, π) as in the
previous case or is itself intermediate (i.e., not corresponding to a full execution of
(Sn−j,Vn−j)) and therefore consists of a sequence of tuples of the form (y, π).
The successor circuit Sn−j+1, on input a prefix β and the current state s with index t,
computes the next state. Depending on the conditions of sub-states in s, it takes one of
the following actions:
• Case A: The state s consists of d + 2 final sub-states of (Sn−j,Vn−j). Such sub-
states contain the information necessary to compute the sum for the prefix β and
assemble its proof (by merging). As a result, the next state is the final state of
(Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1).
• Case B: The state s consists of t1 < d + 2 final sub-states of (Sn−j,Vn−j). In this
case, Sn−j+1 initiates the next (i.e., t1 + 1-th) execution of (Sn−j,Vn−j).
• Case C: The t1-th sub-state s′ is intermediate. Here, Sn−j+1 simply calls the suc-
cessor Sn−j to increment s′ — and as a result the state s — by one step.
The resulting construction of Sn−j+1 is formally described in Algorithm 4.4. There we
have also addressed a minor detail (which also applies to Vn−j+1) that we have up to
now brushed under the rug: in order to compute the challenges σ, the counters need some
additional information. To this end, Sn−j+1 receives as an auxiliary argument the protocol
transcript that serves as the input to H, denoted by τ . From the description of GSC in
Algorithm 4.3, τ should contain the following information:
1. the original statement (F, f, y,β), left empty if the sum y has not been computed
yet, and
2. a partial proof π for β-prefix sum, which consists of all the values αi and βi that
have been computed up to the current iteration (as specified in the description of
GSC.P).
The recursive verifier. Given as input the prefix β, the state s and an index t, the
verifier Vn−j+1 ensures that s equals the intermediate state si for (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1), where
i is the counter that is associated with t.
If the state s is final for (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1) then t = ε and s is a single tuple of the form
(y, π). This can be verified directly by invoking GSC.V.
Otherwise s consists of at most (d+2) (final or intermediate) sub-states of (Sn−j,Vn−j),
and Vn−j+1 verifies each of these sub-states by invoking Vn−j. To be precise, for each sub-
state s′ in s, Vn−j+1 first computes
1. the prefix β′ for s′, which is either (β, γ) for γ ∈ [0, d], or (β, σ) for a challenge σ,
and
2. the index t′ for β′, which is either ε in case s′ is final for (Sn−j,Vn−j), or (t2, . . . , tℓ)
otherwise.
Next, it checks the validity of the sub-state s′ recursively by invoking Vn−j.
The formal description of Vn−j+1 is given in Algorithm 4.5. Similarly to the successor
Sn−j+1, Vn−j+1 also receives the transcript as input to ensure that it possesses the necessary
information to compute the challenges.
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Algorithm 4.4 The recursive successor circuit Sn−j+1 in RSVL2.
1: procedure Sn−j+1(β, t, s, τ )
hardwired
1. an n-variate polynomial f of individual degree d over F
2. the description of a hash function H ∈ H
input
1. a prefix β = (β1, . . . , βj−1) ∈ Fj−1
2. an index t = (t1, . . . , tℓ) ∈ [0, d+ 1]≤(n−j+1)
3. a state s ∈ F∗ parsed as {(y0, π0), (y1, π1), . . . , }
4. a transcript τ containing the statement and partial proofs
output the next state
base case S0(β, ε, ∅, ∅): return (f(β), ∅)
2: if t = ε and s ̸= ∅ then return s ▷ already in final state: self-loop
3: if t = d+ 1 then return {yγ}dγ=0 appended to πd+1 ▷ Case A: merge
4: Compute sub-state s′ by truncating {(yγ, πγ)}t1−1γ=0 from s
5: Set t′ := (t2, . . . , tℓ) as the index of the sub-state s′
6: if t = d or t1 = d+ 1 then ▷ increment/initialise d+ 2-th sub-state
7: if τ = ∅ then initialise with statement τ := (F, y0 + y1, f,β) ▷ Case B
8: Compute updated transcript τ ′ by appending {yγ}dγ=0 to τ ▷ Case C
9: Compute the challenge σ := H(τ ) and append σ to τ
10: Increment/initialise d+ 2-th sub-state: s′ := Sn−j((β, σ), t′, s′, τ )
11: Append {(yγ, πγ)}dγ=0 back to s′ to update s
12: return it
13: else ▷ t ̸= d and t1 ̸= d+ 1
14: if t ∈ [0, d− 1] then ▷ Case B: initialise t1 + 1-th sub-state
15: return {(yγ, πγ)}t1γ=0 appended to Sn−j((β, t1 + 1), ε, ∅, ∅)
16: else ▷ Case C: increment t1-th sub-state
17: return {(yγ, πγ)}t1−1γ=0 appended to Sn−j((β, t1), t′, s′, ∅)
18: end if
19: end if
20: end procedure
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Algorithm 4.5 The recursive verifier circuit Vn−j+1 in RSVL2.
1: procedure Vn−j+1(β, t, s, τ )
hardwired
1. an n-variate polynomial f of individual degree d over F
2. the description of a hash function H ∈ H
input
1. a prefix β = (β1, . . . , βj−1) ∈ Fj−1
2. an index t = (t1, . . . , tℓ) ∈ [0, d+ 1]≤(n−j+1)
3. a state s ∈ F∗ parsed as a set of pairs of prefix sums and proofs
{(y0, π0), (y1, π1), . . . , }
4. a transcript τ containing the statement and partial proofs
output a bit indicating ACCEPT or REJECT
base case V0(β, ε, (y, ∅), ∅): Accept if y = f(β) and reject otherwise
2: if t = ε then return the bit b← GSC.V((yε, f,β), πε) ▷ final state
3: for γ ∈ [0, t1 − 1] do ▷ verify all final sub-states
4: if Vn−j((β, γ), ε, (yγ, πγ), ∅) = 0 then return 0
5: end for
6: Compute t1-th sub-state s
′ by truncating {(yγ, πγ)}t1−1γ=0 from s
7: Set t′ := (t2, . . . , tℓ) as the index of the sub-state s′
8: if t1 = d+ 1 then
9: if τ = ∅ then initialise with statement τ := (F, y0 + y1, f,β)
10: Compute updated transcript τ ′ by appending {yγ}dγ=0 to τ
11: Compute the challenge σ := H(τ ) and append σ to τ
12: if Vn−j((β, σ), t′, s′, τ ′) = 0 then return 0
13: else ▷ t1 < d+ 1
14: if Vn−j((β, t1), t′, s′, ∅) = 0 then return 0
15: end if
16: return 1 ▷ Accept
17: end procedure
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4.3.2 The RSVL Instance
The label of the i-th vertex vi in the proposed RSVL instance is a tuple (t, si), where
si ∈ F∗ is a state and t ∈ [0, d+ 1]≤n its index determined by the counter i. To be
precise, t is the (address of) i-th vertex in the perfect (d + 2)-dary tree7 that the depth-
first search leaves (i.e. visits for the final time). To map a counter i ∈ [1, L] to an index
t ∈ [0, d+ 1]≤n, we use a bijective map DFS(·). Note that this makes sense only if
T =
⃓⃓⃓
[0, d+ 1]≤n
⃓⃓⃓
,
which we show below. Its inverse is denoted by DFS−1(·). Thus, the standard RSVL
path consists of the sequence of labels
(0n, s1), (0
n−11, s2), (0n−1, s3), . . . , (11, sL−2), (1, sL−1), (ε, sL).
The successor and verifier circuits (S,V) for the RSVL instance can now be imple-
mented using (Sn,Vn) as shown in Algorithm 4.6. In short, on input a counter i and a
label (t, s), the verifier circuit V simply checks if t matches DFS(i) and then invokes the
recursive verifier circuit Vn on the state s and the index t. On the other hand, on input
a label (t, s), the successor S first ensures that s is indeed the i-th intermediate state by
checking its correctness using V. Then it increments the state by calling the recursive
successor function Sn. It returns this new state along with an incremented index as the
next label.
Efficiency. We argue that S and V are both poly(n)-sized circuits. Observe that for
Sn−j+1 at most one recursion Sn−j is active at any given point. The rest of the operations
within Sn−j+1 (viz., append, truncate, compute the hash etc.) are all efficient. Therefore
|Sn−j+1| < |Sn−j| + poly(n) with |S0| = poly(n), and consequently |S| = poly(n). A
similar argument holds for the verifier circuit V, taking into account the fact that even
though there are multiple active recursive calls within Vn−j+1, all but one are of depth 1.
This is true as the verification of the final sub-states in Vn−j is carried out by a single call
to GSC.V.
Parameters. Recall that L(n−j+1), m(n−j+1) and P (n−j+1) denote the number
of steps, amount of memory and the final proof size for (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1), respectively.
Since Sn−j+1 runs Sn−j (d + 2) times and then takes one step for merging, we have
L(n− j + 1) = (d+ 2)L(n− j) + 1. By unwinding the recursion with T (0) = 1, we get
L = L(n, d) =
∑︂
j∈[0,n]
(d+ 2)j =
⃓⃓⃓
[0, d+ 1]≤n
⃓⃓⃓
.
For simplicity, assume that t ∈ F≤n. From the description of (S0,V0), it is clear that
m(0) = P (0) = log(p) (where p, if you recall, denotes the size of the finite field F). From
the description of (Sn−j+1,Vn−j+1), we have m(n− j +1) ≤ m(n− j) + (d+1) log(p) and
P (n− j + 1) = P (n− j) + (d+ 1) log(p). On solving the recursion, we get m = m(n) ≤
(d+ 1)n log(p) and P = P (n) ≤ (d+ 1)n log(p).
7A (d + 2)-ary tree is called perfect if all its interior nodes have (d + 2) children and all leaves have
the same depth.
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Algorithm 4.6 The RSVL instance RSVL2.
procedure Vf,H(v, i)
hardwired
1. an n-variate polynomial f of individual degree d over F
2. the description of a hash function H ∈ H
input
1. a label v parsed as (t, s) ∈ [0, d+ 1]≤n × F∗ where t is the index and s the state
2. a counter i ∈ [1, L]
output a bit indicating ACCEPT or REJECT
if t ̸= DFS(i) then return 0
return the bit b← Vn(ε, t, s, ∅)
end procedure
procedure Sf,H(v)
hardwired same as V
input a label v parsed as (t, s) ∈ [0, d+ 1]≤n × F∗
output the next label
Set the index i := DFS−1(t)
if V(v, i) = 0 then return v ▷ self-loop
else return (DFS(i+ 1), Sn(ε, t, s, ∅))
end if
end procedure
4.3.3 Analysis
In this section we restate and prove the main theorem of the chapter.
Theorem 12 (Main Theorem). For a parameter n ∈ N, fix a finite field F of sufficiently
large size p (say O(2n)). Let f be an n-variate polynomial over F of individual degree at
most d. Pick a hash function H uniformly at random from a family H. Let
S := Sf,H : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m and V := Vf,H : {0, 1}m × [1, 2m]
be constructed as in Algorithm 4.6 with
m = m(n, d, p) = (d+ 1)n log(p) and L = L(n, d) =
∑︂
j∈[0,n]
(d+ 2)j.
Given an adversary A that solves instances of RSVL2 = (S,V, L, (0
n, f(0n), ∅)) in polyno-
mial time TA = TA(n) and a non-negligible probability ϵ = ϵ(n), it is possible to either
• find the sum
∑︁
z∈{0,1}n f(z) in time O(TA) with probability ϵ, or
• break the unambiguous soundness of the non-interactive Sumcheck Protocol (As-
sumption 3) with probability ϵ/(d+ 1) · n.
Corollary 1. If #SAT is hard (in the worst case) then, relative to a random oracle,
there exists a hard distribution of End-of-Line instances.
87
Remark 12. In the original paper [34], we had claimed that the corollary holds just
relative to a random oracle, without the additional assumption on #SAT. The argument
there was that since P ̸= NP relative to a random oracle [9], there exist hard instances
of #SAT (since P ̸= #P). However, as pointed out in [12], we overlooked the fact that
we need an explicit representation of the #SAT instance in the Sumcheck Protocol. The
#SAT instance that results from the above argument may not have an explicit (succinct)
representation since it is defined relative to a random oracle.
Proof. Given a SAT formula ϕ over n variables, a claim about the number of satisfying
assignments can be expressed as a sumcheck claim over F. The polynomial f is derived
from ϕ, and the individual degree can be as low as 4. For this, we first transform ϕ
into a 3SAT-4 formula, a 3CNF where each variable appears in at most 4 clauses. A
standard arithmetization yields an appropriate polynomial fϕ over the field. A reduction
from #SAT to RSVL (relative to a random oracle) follows Theorem 12 with f = fϕ, and
Theorem 11 with, for example, p = |F| = O(2n) and Q ∈ poly(n). The reduction from
RSVL to EOML given in Lemma 4 completes the corollary.
Proof (of Theorem 12). The high level structure of the proof is similar to that of The-
orem 6. Recall that by Definition 16 the adversary A can solve an RSVL instance in
two ways: find either (i) the standard sink or (ii) a false positive i.e., a pair (v, i) s.t.
V(v, i) = 1 while Si((0n, f(0n), ∅)) ̸= v.
Finding a type (i) solution is tantamount to solving the #SAT instance f since the sink
of the RSVL instance RSVL2 is (ε, sL = (yL, πL)) and contains the number of solutions
to f in the form of yL. In the discussion below we rule out solutions of type (ii) under
Assumption 3. Taken together, the theorem follows.
Let v be of the form (t, {(˜︁y1, ˜︁π1), . . . , (˜︁yℓ, ˜︁πℓ)} and let
vi = S
i(0n, f(0n), ∅) = (t, {(y1, π1), . . . , (yℓ, πℓ)})
be the correctly computed vertex. Also, let
{︂˜︁β1, . . . , ˜︁βℓ}︂ and {β1, . . . ,βℓ} denote the
associated prefixes. We first establish that there exists at least one index k∗ ∈ [1, ℓ] such
that the proof ˜︁πk∗ breaks the unambiguous soundness of the non-interactive Sumcheck
Protocol.
Assume for contradiction that A violated neither soundness nor unambiguity in the
process of finding the type (ii) solution (v, i) s.t. V(v, i) = 1 but Si((0n, f(0n), ∅)) ̸= v.
We show that (v, i) could not have been a type (ii) solution. To this end, we establish
iteratively from k = 1 to k = ℓ that (˜︁yk, ˜︁πk) = (yk, πk).
When Vn is invoked by V on (ε, t, s, ∅) it recurses until (˜︁y1, ˜︁π1) is a final sub-state for
some (Sn−j,Vn−j). At this point the validity of (˜︁y1, ˜︁π1) is checked using a single call to
GSC.V. Recall that it is assumed that neither soundness nor unambiguity was broken.
Since (˜︁y1, ˜︁π1) passes verification and ˜︁β1 = β1, it is guaranteed that the proofs (˜︁y1, ˜︁π1)
(y1, π1) are for the same statement. Therefore (˜︁y1, ˜︁π1) = (y1, π1) is the correct sub-state.
Assuming that the first k − 1 sub-states in v are correct, we will infer that the k-th
sub-state is also correct. The first step is to show that βk is correctly computed, for which
there are two possibilities. If βk corresponds to a challenge then, since y1, . . . , yk−1 have
been validated, βk is also guaranteed to be computed by hashing the same arguments as
in the protocol specification; otherwise, βk is computed by a simple increment, which the
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verifier again checks for. Therefore, by the same argument as for k = 1, we get ˜︁πk = πk
and ˜︁yk = yk.
Consequently, all the labels in v are as prescribed by the successor circuit S, contra-
dicting the premise of the lemma that v ̸= Si((0n, f(0n), ∅)). One therefore concludes that
there exists at least one index k∗ ∈ [1, ℓ] such that either
• GSC.V((˜︁yk∗ , f, ˜︁βk∗), ˜︁πk∗) = 1, and ∑︁z∈{0,1}n−jk∗ f(˜︁βk∗ , z) ̸= ˜︁yk∗ ; or
• GSC.V((˜︁yk∗ , f, ˜︁βk∗), ˜︁πk∗) = 1, and ˜︁πk∗ ̸= GSC.P(˜︁yk∗ , f, ˜︁βk∗) where GSC.P is the pre-
scribed prover.
Here, the first case corresponds to the setting that there is an accepting proof for an
incorrect statement, while the second case corresponds to an accepting proof different
from that output by the prescribed prover.
Given an adversary A that finds such a vertex i with probability ϵ we can build an
adversary A′ that, depending on the case we are in, breaks soundness or unambiguity.
The strategy for A′ in either case is identical and is described below:
1. Run A on the RSVL instance (S,V, L, (0n, f(0n), ∅)).
2. Let the output returned by A be of the form (t, {(˜︁y1, ˜︁π1), . . . , (˜︁yℓ, ˜︁πℓ)}).
3. Sample a random index k∗ ← [1, ℓ].
4. Return
(︂(︂
f, ˜︁βk∗ , ˜︁yk∗)︂ , ˜︁πk∗)︂, where ˜︁βk∗ is the prefix associated to (˜︁yk∗ , ˜︁πk∗).
A′ runs for a time that is roughly the same as that of A (i.e., TA). The analysis for A
′’s
success probability is simple and we describe it only for the first case (as the other case is
identical). Informally, since there exists an index k∗ that breaks soundness, A′ succeeds
as long as it is able to guess this index correctly. Formally,
Pr [A′ succeeds] ≥ Pr [A succeeds] · Pr [k∗ is a correct guess|A′ succeeds]
≥ ϵ · 1
(d+ 1) · n
The first inequality follows from the fact that if A succeeds, there is at least one index
k∗ such that GSC.V((˜︁yk∗ , f, ˜︁βk∗), ˜︁πk∗) = 1, and ∑︁z∈{0,1}n−jk∗ f(˜︁βk∗ , z) ̸= ˜︁yk∗ . The second
inequality follows from the fact that a label contains at most M(n) ≤ (d+1) ·n tuples of
the form (y, π).
4.4 Instantiating Fiat-Shamir
There has been exciting recent progress [28, 68, 29, 27, 29, 31, 87] on instantiating the
Fiat-Shamir Transform using correlation-intractable hash functions (CIHFs) [30]. In this
section, we discuss the applicability of these results to our setting. We observe that
the results in [27] can be extended to our setting, yielding a hash family for which the
Fiat-Shamir Transform is sound when applied to the Sumcheck Protocol over polylog
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variables, albeit under quasi-polynomial variants of the (strong) assumptions made in that
work.
Our starting point is the application of the Fiat-Shamir Transform in [27] to construct
publicly verifiable succinct arguments (pv-SNARGs). We note that while the assump-
tions required when the Fiat-Shamir Transform is used to construct Non-interactive Zero
Knowledge (NIZK) proofs are significantly more standard (e.g., plain LWE in [87]), these
results hold limited relevance to our setting. This is because the time required to evalu-
ate those hash functions is as large as the time needed to compute the (honest) prover’s
messages in the interactive proof protocol. In our context, this means that evaluating
the hash function would take super-polynomial time since the prover in the Sumcheck
Protocol runs in time exponential in the number of parameters.
The subsequent text is (to a large extent) adapted from [27], with several (important)
changes that are needed to obtain results in our setting, with the notation adapted.
We highlight changes in the assumptions and theorem statements. For a comprehensive
discussion, we refer the reader to [27].
4.4.1 Collision-Intractable Hash Functions
We begin with definitions, starting with the notion of correlation-intractability [30] that
we require for our application. A function is quasi-polynomial in a parameter λ if it
is of the form λpolylog(λ). We denote the set of all quasi-polynomial functions in λ by
quasipoly(λ).
Definition 22. For a relation ensemble R = {Rλ ⊆ Xλ × Yλ}λ∈N, a hash family H =
{Hλ : Iλ ×Xλ → Yλ}λ∈N is said to be R-correlation-intractable against quasi-polynomial
adversaries if for every quasi-polynomial-size A = {Aλ}λ∈N, there exists an ϵ such that
Pr
I←Iλ
x←Aλ(I)
[(x,Hλ(I, x)) ∈ Rλ] ≤ ϵ
For the context of our work, we will need ϵ to be a negligible function. We want to
guarantee such a property in the standard model. But even in the random oracle model,
this only makes sense for relations R that are sparse, which we formalize below.
Definition 23 (Sparsity). For any relation ensemble R = {Rλ ⊆ Xλ × Yλ}, we say that
R is ρ-sparse if for all λ ∈ N and any x ∈ Xλ,
Pr
y←Yλ
[(x, y) ∈ Rλ] ≤ ρ(λ).
Remark 13. When we talk about correlation-intractability with respect to quasi-polynomial
time adversaries, it is not sufficient for ρ to be negligible. We will in fact require ρ to be
smaller than any inverse quasi-polynomial function.
We will need the ability to sample from the relation R. In fact, it is sufficient to be
able to approximately sample from the relation. We begin by defining what it means for
a distribution to be approximated.
Definition 24. A distribution P multiplicatively ϵ-approximates a distribution Q if for
all outcomes w, it holds that
Pr
x←P
[x = w] ≥ ϵ · Pr
x←Q
[x = w] .
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We proceed to formalize the notion of approximately sampling from a relation R.
Definition 25 (Approximate Sampleability of Relations). A relation ensemble R =
{Rλ ⊆ Xλ × Yλ}λ∈N is non-uniformly ϵ-approximately sampleable if there is a circuit en-
semble {Rλ}λ∈N such that for every x ∈ Xλ, the distribution Rλ(x) multiplicatively ϵ-
approximates the uniform distribution on the (by assumption, non-empty) set
{y′ ∈ Yλ : (x, y′) ∈ Rλ}.
We say that R is (non-uniformly) efficiently approximately sampleable if it is non-
uniformly ϵ-approximately sampleable for some ϵ ≥ 1/poly(λ).
For our application, we need relations where the sampling function R runs in quasi-
polynomial time.
4.4.1.1 CIHFs from Key-Dependent Message Security
Next we present the construction of CIHFs from secret-key encryption schemes that are
key-dependant message (KDM) secure due to Canetti et al. [29]. Intuitively, the hash-
ing key is a ciphertext and messages (to be hashed) are interpreted as decryption keys.
The hashing is then performed by decrypting the hash key/ciphertexts under the mes-
sage/decryption key.
Definition 26. Let SKE = {(Kλ,Eλ,Dλ)}λ∈N be a secret-key encryption scheme with
message space {0, 1}ℓ for ℓ = ℓ(λ). The CIHF associated to this encryption scheme,
denoted HSKE is
HSKE =
{︂
Hλ : Iλ ×Kλ → {0, 1}ℓ
}︂
λ∈N
where Hλ(C, x) := Dλ(x,C)
where a key is sampled (from I) as the random ciphertext C := Eλ(K,M) obtained by
sampling K ← Kλ along with M ← {0, 1}ℓ.
Turning our attention to encryption schemes, we first define what it means for an
encryption scheme to have universal ciphertexts.
Definition 27. A secret-key encryption scheme SKE = {(Kλ,Eλ,Dλ)}λ∈N with mes-
sage space Mλ has universal ciphertexts if for any secret key K ∈ Kλ, the distribu-
tion Eλ(K,UMλ) multiplicatively 1/poly(λ)-approximates the distribution Eλ(Kλ, UMλ),
where UMλ denotes the uniform distribution over Mλ.
Moving to security, we will define the security of certain primitives with respect to
quasi-polynomial adversaries, parameterised by a class of functions δ. For every quasi-
polynomial adversary, there exists a function δ ∈ δ such that the success probability of
the adversary is bounded by δ. In the context of our work, we will consider δ to contain
functions of the form quasipoly(κ)/2κ, where κ will denote the key length. We now
define key-dependent message (KDM) security for a homomorphic encryption scheme.
The security definition for the regular encryption scheme follows in a similar manner,
with the evaluation key being empty.
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Definition 28 (KDM-security). Let FHE = {(Kλ,Eλ,Dλ,Fλ)}λ∈N be a secret-key fully-
homomorphic encryption scheme with message space Mλ, let f = {fλ : Kλ →Mλ}λ∈N
be a (potentially probabilistic) function. FHE is said to be δ-immune to key recovery by
an f -KDM query against quasi-polynomial adversaries if for each quasi-polynomial-sized
A = {Aλ}λ∈N, there exists a δ ∈ δ such that:
Pr
(K,E)←Kλ
(M1,...,Mℓ)←fλ(K)
{Ci←Eλ(K,Mi)}i∈[1,ℓ]
[Aλ(E,C1, . . . , Cℓ) = K] ≤ δ(λ)
Throughout this section we will abbreviate the above by saying that FHE is f -KDM δ-
secure against quasi-polynomial adversaries. If F is a set of functions then we say that
FHE is F -KDM δ-secure against quasi-polynomial adversaries if FHE is f -KDM δ-secure
against quasi-polynomial adversaries for all f ∈ F .
This is a modification of the f -KDM security used in [27]. Here, an adversary is
allowed to run in quasi-polynomial time. Looking ahead, F will be the collection of all
functions, with ℓ bits of output, that can be computed in quasi-polynomial time.
KDM-security and Regev Encryption. Our construction of CIHF and its security
hinge on the Regev encryption scheme [92], which we define below.
Definition 29 (Secret-Key Regev Encryption). For any positive integer q = q(λ) ≤
2poly(λ), n′ = n′(λ) ≤ poly(λ), and any poly(λ)-time sampleable distribution ensembles
χsk = {χsk(λ)}λ∈N and χe = {χe(λ)}λ∈N (4.5)
over Zq, we define Regevn′,q,χsk,χe to be the secret-key encryption scheme {(Kλ,Eλ,Dλ)}
where:
– Kλ is the distribution χn′sk.
– Eλ : Zn
′
q × {0, 1} → Zn′q × Zq is defined so that Eλ(s,m) is obtained by sampling a
uniformly random vector a← Zn′q , sampling e← χe(λ), and outputting(︂
a, st · a+m ·
⌈︂q
2
⌋︂
+ e
)︂
.
– Dλ : Zn
′
q ×
(︁
Zn′q × Zq
)︁→ {0, 1} is defined so that Dλ(s, (a, b)) is the bit m for which
b− st · a is closer to m · ⌈︁ q
2
⌋︁
than to (1−m) · ⌈︁ q
2
⌋︁
.
A pair (a, b) ∈ Zn′q ×Zq is a Regev encryption of m ∈ {0, 1} under s ∈ Zn′q with B-bounded
noise if b− st · a−m · ⌈︁ q
2
⌋︁
is in the interval [−B,B)
We now define a homomorphic encryption scheme that is sufficient for our application.
In some sense, these are FHE schemes that have implicit in them a (low-noise) secret-key
Regev ciphertext.
Definition 30 (Regev-Extractable Secret-Key Homomorphic Encryption). A secret-key
fully-homomorphic bit-encryption scheme {(Kλ,Eλ,Dλ,Fλ)}λ∈N is considered (n′, q, χsk)-
Regev-extractable with B(λ)-bounded noise if it satisfies the following structural proper-
ties.
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1. The distribution of s when sampling (s, E)← Kλ is χn′sk with χsk as in eq.(4.5).
2. There is a poly(λ)-time evaluable extract function X = {Xλ}λ∈N such that
(a) For any λ, any s ∈ χn′sk, and any m ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that Xλ(Eλ(s,m)) is a
Regev encryption (a, b) of m under s with B-bounded noise, and where a is
uniformly random in Zn′q .
(b) For any m1, . . . ,mn′ ∈ {0, 1}, any circuit C : {0, 1}n
′ → {0, 1}, and any
(s, E) ∈ Kλ, it holds with probability 1 that
Xλ(Fλ(E,C,Eλ(s,m1), . . . ,Eλ(s,mn′)))
is a Regev encryption (a, b) of C(m1, . . . ,mn′) under s with B-bounded noise.
For our applications, we require the Regev-extractable schemes to have the following
security property.
Definition 31 (CPA and circular optimal (CCO) security). Let FHE be an FHE scheme
with key distributions {Kλ}λ∈N. For (K,E) ∈ Kλ, let [[K]] denote the binary representa-
tion of K, and let κ = κ(λ) denote the length of such a representation. For any ℓ = ℓ(λ),
FHE is said to be quasi-polynomially (κ, ℓ, δ)-CCO-secure if for every ensemble of ℓ-bit
messages {mλ}λ∈N, FHE is f -KDM δ-secure against quasi-polynomial adversaries for the
“augmented bit-by-bit circular security function”
f =
{︂
fλ : Kλ → {0, 1}ℓ+κ
}︂
where fλ(k) = mλ∥[[k]].
4.4.2 Fiat-Shamir for the Sumcheck Protocol
Now that we have the relevant definitions, we show these help us achieve the desired result.
As indicated while defining the various primitives, we will need to work with adversaries
that have quasi-polynomial running time. A central component of this construction is
the following theorem from [27, 29] which reduces collision-intractability of the CIHFs to
KDM-security. We restate the theorem below, with some important differences for our set-
ting. We have defined our underlying primitives to require both correlation-intractability,
and KDM security, against adversaries running in quasi-polynomial time.
Theorem 13 ([29]). Let SKE = {(Kλ,Eλ,Dλ)}λ∈N be a secret-key encryption scheme
with universal ciphertexts, message space {0, 1}ℓ, and key distribution Kλ equal to the
uniform distribution on {0, 1}κ for some κ = κ(λ). If SKE is F-KDM δ-secure against
quasi-polynomial adversaries and R is a ρ-sparse relation that is λ−O(1)-approximately
F-sampleable, then for every quasi-polynomial time adversary, there is a δ ∈ δ such that
HSKE is R-correlation-intractable with
ϵ :=
δ(λ) · ρ(λ)
2−κ
· λO(1).
We omit the proof here, as it follows in an identical manner to the proof of the
corresponding theorem in [27]. To instantiate the above theorem, we will require CCO-
security against quasi-polynomial time adversaries for the FHE scheme, which is different
from the assumption stated in [27].
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Assumption 4 (Existence of quasi-polynomially CCO-secure FHE). For some n′, q, χsk,
there exists a quasi-polynomially (κ, ℓ, δ)-CCO secure secret key FHE scheme that is
(n′, q, χsk)-Regev-extractable with B-bounded noise for κ = λΘ(1), ℓ = λΩ(1), B ≤ q/Ω˜(λ)
and χn
′
sk that is sampleable in O˜(n
′) time using κ+O(log λ) random bits.
The following claim states that if the assumption is true, then the Regev encryption
scheme has universal ciphertexts and satisfies KDM security. As stated earlier, another
difference in our assumption is that the class of function F ℓ contains all functions, with
output size ℓ, computable in quasi-polynomial time.
Claim 13.1. If Assumption 4 is true, then there exist parameters n′ = n′(λ), q = q(λ),
and χsk = χsk(λ) such that for some ℓ = λ
Ω(1), Regevn′,q,χsk,χe is F ℓ-KDM δ-secure, whereF ℓ is the class of functions with ℓ-bit output computable in quasipoly(λ) time, where χe
is the uniform error distribution on [−q/4, q/4), and where κ is the length of the binary
representation of an element of χn
′
sk.
Proof Sketch. Here we briefly sketch the main difference in the proof that necessitates the
different assumption from the underlying FHE scheme. For the proof details, we refer the
reader to the original proof in [27].
Let AKDM be the adversary that breaks the KDM security of the Regev encryption
scheme. We will use AKDM to build an adversary ACCO that breaks Assumption 4. ACCO
is given as input the challenge (E, c1, . . . , cℓ+κ), where cℓ+1, . . . , cℓ+κ is the encryption of
the secret key K.
On initialization, AKDM queries the challenger with a function f
∗ ∈ F ℓ of its choice,
and expects an encryption of f ∗(K). In order to facilitate this, ACCO uses the homomor-
phic evaluation function F to homomorphically compute f ∗(K) as F(E, f ∗, cℓ+1, . . . , cℓ+κ).
But given that F ℓ consists of all functions computable in quasi-polynomial time, the
above F computation may take quasi-polynomial time. The rest of the reduction remains
unchanged.
Therefore, the reduction requires ACCO to perform a quasi-polynomial computation,
which in turn necessitates that Assumption 4 be secure against quasi-polynomial adver-
saries.
We can now state the main theorem: under circular-security assumptions against
quasi-polynomial time adversaries for the FHE scheme, the Fiat-Shamir Transform when
applied to the Sumcheck Protocol is an adaptively-sound argument.
Theorem 14. If Assumption 4 is true, then the non-interactive Sumcheck Protocol GSC
from Algorithm 4.3, instantiated with the hash family HSKE, is adaptively unambiguously
sound for the language LSC (see §4.1.2), with formulas on n = polylog(λ) variables.
Remark 14. We note that the size of the field F, defined to be 2ω(n), is larger than
any quasi-polynomial in the parameter λ. This follows from the fact that for correlation-
intractability to make sense against quasi-polynomial adversaries, we require the relation
to be sufficiently sparse. Setting the field-size to be quasi-polynomial is not sufficient since
a quasi-polynomial time adversary can break correlation-intractability even when the hash
function is modeled as a random oracle by trying quasi-polynomially many different values
of x.
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Proof. We proceed in two stages, initially establishing that a CIHF for the relevant relation
implies that the Fiat-Shamir Transform is adaptively-sound. Next, we show that under
suitable choices of parameters for the underlying primitives, we can instantiate such a
CIHF.
Stage I: From correlation-intractability to soundness. The use of CIHFs to in-
stantiate the Fiat-Shamir Transform was suggested in [30]. The first stage of our reduction
can be seen as a straightforward adaptation of their argument (as provided in [27]) to our
setting. For the first part, we restate the following claim from [27], removing the efficiency
requirements needed for their result, and adapting it to the specific case of the Sumcheck
Protocol.
The following relation specifies whether partial transcript in Sumcheck Protocol is bad
or good. For any i ∈ [j + 1, n], an i-th round partial transcript consists of the statement
(F, y, f,β), and τi := αj+1, βj+1, . . . ,αi, βi. Recall that αi = {αi,γ}dγ=0 defines a unique
degree d polynomial gi. Formally the relation RSC is defined as,
RSC := {((F, y, f,β, τi,α), β) : (F, y, f,β, τi) ∈ B ∧ (F, y, f,β, τi,α, β) ∈ G}
for some i-th round partial transcript. We say that a partial transcript (F, y, f,β, τi) ∈ B
(bad) if
(F, gi(βi), f,β, βj+1, . . . , βi) ̸∈ LSC
where βj+1, . . . , βi and gi are obtained from τi. Roughly, a partial transcript is bad if it
leads the verifier in the interactive protocol to reject with high probability. Correspond-
ingly, we say that a partial transcript (F, y, f,β, τi) ∈ G (good) if
(F, gi(βi), f,β, βj+1, . . . , βi) ∈ LSC ,
again roughly translating to a partial transcript that leads the verifier to in the interactive
protocol to accept. We now state the claim.
Claim 14.1. Let Π = (PSC ,VSC) be the O(polylog(λ))-round public-coin interactive
protocol for the language LSC with perfect completeness and adaptive soundness. If a
hash family H is RSC correlation-intractable, and evaluable in time poly(λ), then Fiat-
Shamir Transform gives an adaptively-sound argument for LSC.
Proof. This follows in a straightforward manner as in the proof in [27], and is included here
for completeness. The completeness of the protocol follows from the completeness of the
underlying protocol (P,V). For the adaptive soundness, we prove this via contradiction.
Suppose there exists a cheating prover P∗ that on input (1λ, H), where H is sampled from
Hλ, that produces a string (F, y∗, f ∗, β∗1 , . . . , β∗j ) /∈ LSC . i.e∑︂
z∈{0,1}n−j
f ∗(β∗1 , . . . , β
∗
j , z) ̸= y∗
and (α∗j+1, . . . ,α
∗
n) such that V accepts the transcript derived using H. We shall use this
cheating prover P∗ to create an adversary A = {Aλ}λ∈N that breaks the RSC-correlation-
intractability of H. On receiving H ∈ Hλ, Aλ does the following:
1. Run P∗ on input (1λ, H) to obtain (F, y∗, f ∗, β∗1 , . . . , β∗j ) and (α∗j+1, . . . ,α∗n).
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2. Sample a random index i∗ ← [j + 1, n− 1].
3. Return
(︁
F, y∗, f ∗, β∗1 , . . . , β∗j , τi∗ ,α∗i∗+1
)︁
, where ∀k ∈ [1, i]:
βk = H(F, y∗, f ∗, β∗1 , . . . , β∗j , τk−1,α∗k).
From Sumcheck Protocol, for every accepting transcript for (F, y∗, f ∗, β∗1 , . . . , β∗j ) /∈ LSC ,
there must exist at least one round k such that:
(F, y∗, f ∗, β∗1 , . . . , β∗j , τk) ∈ B and
(︁
F, y∗, f ∗, β∗1 , . . . , β∗j , τk,α∗k+1, βk+1
)︁ ∈ G.
Note that this follows from the fact that (F, f ∗, y∗, β∗1 , . . . , β∗j ) /∈ LSC , and for V to accept,
the complete transcript must be G. Thus with probability ϵ/(n − j − 1), Aλ selects the
appropriate index k, and outputs the correct partial transcript. This contradicts our
assumption of correlation-intractability.
Stage II: Building the appropriate CIHF. It remains to show that we can build a
CIHF for the relation RSC . Now, we need to establish certain properties from the relation
RSC in order to invoke Theorem 13. We start with two simple claims regarding the relation
RSC . For simplicity of exposition, let us denote by gi+1 the prescribed polynomial (given
prefix β) to be sent in round i+ 1, i.e.
gi+1(x) :=
∑︂
z∈{0,1}n−i−1
f(β, βj+1, . . . , βi, x,z).
Claim 14.2. RSC is a ρ-sparse relation for ρ = d/|F|.
Proof. Given (F, y, f,β, τi,α), we compute the fraction of β such that
((F, y, f,β, τi,α), β) ∈ RSC .
For (F, y, f,β, τi,α, β) ∈ G, we require β to be such that ˜︁g(β) = gi+1(β), where ˜︁g(x)
denotes the polynomial described by α, and gi+1(x) is as defined above. This follows
from the definition of LSC . The polynomial gi+1(x) − ˜︁g(x) has degree at most d (since
g(x) has degree at most d), and is non-zero (since ˜︁g is not the prescribed polynomial).
Thus, from Schwartz-Zippel lemma, there are at most d roots to the above polynomial,
and thus d values β such that ˜︁g(β) = gi+1(β). Thus the fractions of such values are d/|F|.
Since, we have set |F| to be of size ω(quasipoly(λ)), ρ is negligible.
Claim 14.3. RSC is sampleable in quasipoly(λ)-time.
Proof. The algorithm for sampling a β given ((F, y, f,β, τi,α) works in the following
manner. Using the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm [32], we can enumerate all roots with
probability 2/3, and therefore with any probability arbitrarily exponentially close to 1.
If the factorization succeeds, we can sample an element from this set of all roots with
arbitrarily small sampling error. As described above, it is sufficient to output a random
root of gi+1(x) − ˜︁g(x). The running time of the above sampling strategy derives from
the fact that to compute the polynomial gi+1, we need to compute an exponential sum
over polylog(λ) variables. We note that from Remark 14, the size of field is larger than
any quasi-polynomial, and thus we do not know if we can do this determinisitcally in
quasi-polynomial time.
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Theorem 13 requires RSC to be sampled by a function in F . Thus, in our setting,
F represents the set of all functions computable in quasipoly(λ) time. We additionally
make the following simple observations regarding the Sumcheck Protocol:
– The total number of rounds ρ in the protocol is polylog(λ). This follows from the
structure of the protocol wherein each round corresponds to reducing the claim by
a single variable, and we have set the number of variables to be polylog(λ)
– The length of each verifier message is |βi| = ω(polylog(λ)) by our choice of param-
eters. This follows from the fact that each βi ∈ F.
– The size of the input to the hash function, (F, y, f,β, τρ), is poly(λ). This follows
from the fact that in addition to the description of the function f (of size poly(λ)),
the input consists of ρ rounds of prover, and verifier, messages. A prover mes-
sage consists of only O(d) elements from F. Given that the number of rounds are
polylog(λ), this gives an additive overhead of ω(polylog(λ)) to the description of
f .
Finally,to instantiate Theorem 13, we need an appropriate encryption scheme with
universal ciphertexts, and KDM security for all quasi-polynomial computable functions.
Specifically, we require an encryption scheme SKE = (SKE.G, SKE.E, SKE.D) with keys of
length κ = κ(λ) ≥ λΩ(1) and universal ciphertexts that are δ-KDM secure for arbitrary
quasi-polynomial computable functions, of output length ℓ.
Assumption 4 implies that secret key Regev encryption satisfies these properties, with
secret distribution χsk that is uniform on [−B,B) for some B, and error distribution
χerr that is uniform on
[︁− q
4
, q
4
)︁
. For the corresponding scheme n′ is set to be such that
(2B + 1)n
′ ∈ {0, 1}|τ |, where |τ | is the size of the largest input to the hash function, and
ℓ = ω(polylog(λ)) is the size of a single verifier message.
We now have all the requisite conditions for Theorem 13, and thus invoking the result,
the Fiat-Shamir Transform gives us an adaptively-sound argument system. From Propo-
sition 2, an adaptively-sound argument system is also an adaptively unambigiously-sound
argument system, thus completing the proof.
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Chapter 5
Future Directions
We have seen how the average-case hardness of lower classes of TFNP can be established
using assumptions that are of a different flavour from indistinguishability obfuscation.
Moreover, it seems plausible that hardness in PPAD and CLS could be established from
standard cryptographic assumptions like Factoring or well-studied primitives such as
fully-homomorphic encryption: we saw some evidence for this in the previous chapter.
Our results and techniques motivate several natural research directions.
Hardness relative to random oracles. In [34], the paper that corresponds to Chap-
ter 4, we had claimed that the second construction yields hardness inCLS ⊆ PPAD
relative to a random oracle: i.e., PH ̸= CLSH for a random oracle H. However, as
we saw in Remark 12 this claim is wrong. Using further ideas from incrementally-
verifiable computing, a recent result [12] has shown that such a statement is indeed
true for the class PLS: PH ̸= PLSH for a random oracle H. However, for classes
PPAD and CLS this still remains an interesting open problem.
It is worth pointing out that constructing RSVL instances is closely tied to the
question of constructing verifiable delay functions (VDFs) [16, 17]. Loosely speak-
ing, a VDF is a deterministic function f : X → Y that takes long sequential time T
to compute, but can be verified efficiently in time t≪ T (say t = log(T )). Note that
this makes a VDF a weaker object compared to RSVL.1 It was recently shown that
there are barriers to constructing VDFs having certain properties in the random
oracle model [76, 41]. To be more precise, it was shown that perfectly-unique VDFs
(i.e., every pair (x, f(x)) has a single valid proof) and tight VDFs (i.e., proofs can
also be generated in time almost T ) cannot be constructed in the random-oracle
model. Therefore, these impossibility results carry over to constructing RSVL in
the random oracle model, and any approach at showing PPAD-hardness via RSVL
should bypass these impossibility results. Note that this is true for the RSVL con-
structions in the thesis as they are not tight (there is a blow-up by log(3) factor in
the exponent) and the proofs are only computationally-unique.
Replacing random oracles. A natural question that is worth following up is whether
the Fiat-Shamir Transform for the second construction can be instantiated under
assumptions weaker than Assumption 4. This will require a finer understanding of
the notion of collision-intractability for Sumcheck Protocol.
Note that this question is equally interesting (and arguably easier to address) in
the setting of our first construction, where the random oracle is used to obtain
a non-interactive version of Pietrzak’s proof for certifying that y = f(N, x, T ) =
x2
T
mod N . Given that 1) the algebraic statement that is being proved has a very
specific structure and 2) Pietrzak’s proof system has statistical soundness, it might
1However, if one considers a stricter “continuous” form of VDF, where the proof needs to be available
also for intermediate states of computation, then it corresponds exactly to RSVL [42].
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be possible to instantiate Fiat-Shamir using standard assumption or alternatively
design a non-interactive proof system for certifying y = f(N, x, T ) directly, i.e.,
without relying on Fiat-Shamir.
One such approach would be to adapt the recent results from [67] to our settings, in
particular to the second construction. In [67] a delegation scheme is constructed
for arbitrary computations under a new, but falsifiable, assumption on bilinear
maps. They start off with a long CRS (common reference string) and then use
bootstrapping techniques from [103, 11] to obtain delegations schemes with short
CRS. Since we don’t have to deal with general computation, it might turn out that
their construction can be adapted to suit our needs under weaker assumptions.
Reducing from Factoring. Factoring is often regarded as one of the “rogue” prob-
lems in TFNP [52] as it has withstood attempts to be placed in one of the sub-
classes (with respect to Karp reductions). In the thesis we worked primarily with
Iterated-Squaring which, as we saw, is Karp-reducible to Factoring. Thus,
hardness of Factoring is necessary for our hardness assumption on Iterated-
Squaring (Assumption 2) to hold. However, similar to the RSW assumption or
the RSA assumption, it is not clear if hardness of Factoring is sufficient. There-
fore, orthogonal to the question raised above (about removing random oracles), it
is natural to ask if our techniques can be improved to reduce from Factoring in
the random-oracle model. For instance, is it possible to implement one of the many
factorisation algorithms in an incrementally verifiable manner? We describe below
some of our attempts and explain why they failed.
1. Exploiting the SVL oracle. Our reduction basically shows that the access to an
RSVL oracle enables one to compute exponential powers modulo a composite
efficiently (and incrementally-verifiably). One could ask whether this oracle
can be exploited to factor integers. Unfortunately, this problem seems closely
related to a long-unresolved problem from [14] in the context of pseudo-random
generators (PRG). The PRG in [14] (known as the Blum-Blum-Shub) works
in the same modulus N as in Iterated-Squaring. Starting from a random
seed x ∈ Z∗N , it generates random stream of bits by squaring the current state
and extracting its least significant bit (LSB): i.e.
LSB(x2)→ LSB(x22)→ LSB(x23) · · · → LSB(x2T ) (modN). (5.1)
One of the open questions posed there (in §9) is whether random access to this
stream allows factoring N .
2. Computing square-root. The structure of the squaring function on the modulus
in Iterated-Squaring (IS) is fairly well-understood [14]. It is known that
for elements x ∈ QRN it has a cyclic structure{︂
x, x2, x2
2
, x2
3
, . . . , x2
π(x)
= x mod N
}︂
, (5.2)
with the length of the cycle π(x) related closely to the factors of N . Moreover,
the penultimate entry in this sequence x2
π(x)−1
is the square-root of x modulo
N , and computing it is equivalent to factoring N [91]. Therefore, in order to
reduce from Factoring, one could define an SVL instance which computes
the sequence in eq.(5.2) incrementally-verifiably as we did for IS.
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However, there is one issue: it is not clear how to set the length parameter L
beforehand (since it is hard to compute without the factors). To this end, let’s
define a slight variant of the SVL problem, without the length parameter, and
with the sink vertex that is obtained by simply following the successor function
till it self-loops set as the solution. The successor function in the instance
can now be defined just like in our first construction but with one difference:
since there is no length parameter, it continues to incrementally and verifiably
compute IS until the penultimate entry in the sequence i.e., x2
π(x)−1
, (which
can be tested efficiently by squaring the current value) at which point it self-
loops. In order to now mimic the reduction from SVL to EOL (Lemma 2)
for the above variant of SVL, we need to maintain a counter that tracks the
distance from the source in the label. The successor would have to increment
this counter at every step.
Although the approach seems to work at first, a closer inspection reveals an
inherent problem. This problem arises from the introduction of the counter in
the label, and has to do with the fact that
x2
i
= x2
i+π(x)
mod N.
A successor function that is input the label with a counter i+π(x) has no way
of knowing that this point is beyond the sequence and therefore simply applies
the normal succession rule. As a result, it will soon run out of space for labels
and therefore will be forced self-loop at the lexicographically-last label, making
it an easy-to-find sink (called “Pavel” sinks in some circles).
We remark that we run into similar issues if we try to incrementally-verifiably
implement the factoring algorithms that rely on cycle-finding (e.g., Pollard’s
[90] or Brent’s [23] algorithm). The bottom-line is that we will have to tackle
cycles of unknown length if we are to make any progress towards reducing from
Factoring.
Reducing from Factoring-like assumptions. It should also be of interest if assump-
tions related to Factoring, such as RSA and composite residuosity (CR) as-
sumption [83], can be reduced to EOL (even in the random-oracle model). These
problems both reduce to Factoring (see Figure 5.1) and it is widely believed that
RSA is not equivalent to Factoring [18]. Moreover, they have a richer structure
that could be exploited.
Towards this goal, it would be interesting to look at the family of classes PPA-k (for
k ∈ N) defined in [84], where PPA-2 corresponds to PPA from §1.1.1.1. The class
has recently generated a lot of interest as it was shown that PPAD ⊆ PPA-k for
every k ≥ 2 [60, 57]. Therefore, a good starting point to showing PPAD-hardness
from Factoring and its related assumptions would be to study their relationship
with PPA-k (for k > 2), which still remains open.
Incrementally-verifiable computation of Lucas sequences. The crucial observation
we make in this thesis is that the possibility to merge proofs somewhat-efficiently is
sufficient for performing certain computations in an incrementally-verifiable manner.
We expect this technique to find applications in different contexts.
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Factoring
RSA
CR IS
?
?
Figure 5.1: Factoring and its related assumptions. A → B denotes that problem A
reduces to problem B. The arrows with a question mark denote unknown relationships.
One such possibility could be to the computation of Lucas sequences [71], which are
certain constant-recursive recurrence relations of the form
xn = P · xn−1 +Q · xn−2,
where P,Q ∈ N are two parameters. An alternative method to compute n-th term
in this sequence is using iterated squaring in an extension field using the closed form
xn = α
2n + β2
n
, where α, β are elements of the extension field that can be derived
from P and Q. Thus its computation is similar to that of Iterated-Squaring,
and similar techniques potentially apply.
One of the applications of Lucas sequences is in Lucas-Lehmer test, which is used
to test the primarily of Mersenne primes, i.e. are primes of the form Mp = 2
p − 1.
Given a prime p, to test whether Mp is also a prime we first compute the sequence
s0 = 4, s1, . . . , sp−2 modMp, where si+1 = s2i modMp. By a theorem of Lucas and
Lehmer it follows that Mp is a prime iff sp−2 = 0 modMp. We would like to point
out that the largest known prime known was discovered using this method and has p
of size around 80 million digits. Therefore, these computations are extremely time-
consuming (taking order of months) and the only way that another party can verify
is by repeating the computation. By using incrementally-verifiable procedure, one
could generate a certificate of primarily along with the computation, which would
enable other parties to validate such primes more efficiently.
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Chapter A
Missing Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5 (Bad queries are hard to find). For any N = p ·q where p = 2p′+1, q = 2q′+1
are (λRSA/2)-bit safe primes, the following holds: any adversary that makes at most Q
queries to the random oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ will make a bad query with probability
at most 3 ·Q/2λ
Proof (of Lemma 5). Recall that a query is a tuple (µ, x, y, T ) where µ, x, y ∈ QR+N and
T ∈ N, and the query (µ, x, y, T ) is bad if x ∈ QR⋆N and moreover either
(i) x′ ̸∈ QR⋆N ; or
(ii)
(︂
x2
T ̸= y or µ ̸= x2T/2
)︂
and x′2
T/2
= y′,
where r := H(µ, x, y, T ), x′ := xr ◦ µ and y′ := µr ◦ y. We show that
Pr
r
[(y′ = x′2
T/2
) ∨ (x′ /∈ QR⋆N)] ≤ 3/2λ.
This suffices as H is modelled as a random oracle Using Pr[a∨ b] = Pr[a∧ b] + Pr[b], this
can be rewritten as
Pr
r
[(y′ = x′2
T/2
) ∧ (x′ ∈ QR⋆N)] + Pr
r
[x′ /∈ QR⋆N ] ≤ 3/2λ. (A.1)
We bound the two probabilities separately in Claims 14.4 and 14.5, and the lemma follows
by a union bound over all the queries.
Claim 14.4. Prr[x
′ /∈ QR⋆N ] ≤ 2/2λ.
Proof. By eµ we denote the unique value in Zp′q′ satisfying xeµ = µ (it’s unique as µ ∈
⟨x⟩ = QR+N and
⃓⃓
QR+N
⃓⃓
= p′q′). As x, µ ∈ QR+N , also x′ = xr ◦ µ = xr+eµ is in QR+N ,
and ⟨x′⟩ = QR+N holds if ord(x′) = p′q′, which is the case except if (r+ eµ) = 0 mod p′ or
(r + eµ) = 0 mod q
′ or equivalently if
r ∈ B := {Z2λ ∩ {(−eµ mod p′), (−eµ mod q′)}} . (A.2)
Note that this is uses the fact that 2λ < min(p′, q′), which is a consequence of the choice
of p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 as λRSA/2-bit primes: as noted in Remark 4, λRSA is
usually (much) larger than the corresponding security parameter λ. Clearly |B| ≤ 2 and
the claim follows.
Claim 14.5. Prr[(y
′ = x′2
T/2
) ∧ (x′ ∈ QR⋆N)] ≤ 1/2λ .
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Proof. If y ̸∈ QR+N , then also y′ = µr ◦ y ̸∈ QR+N (as a ∈ QR+N , b ̸∈ QR+N implies
a ◦ b ̸∈ QR+N). As x′ ∈ QR⋆N and y′ ̸= x′2
T/2
cannot hold simultaneously in this case the
probability in the claim is 0. From now on we consider the case y ∈ QR+N . We have
Pr
r
[y′ = x′2
T/2 ∧ x′ ∈ QR⋆N ] = Pr
r
[y′ = x′2
T/2 | x′ ∈ QR⋆N ] · Pr
r
[x′ ∈ QR⋆N ] (A.3)
For the second factor in eq.(A.3) we have with B as in eq.(A.2)
Pr
r
[x′ ∈ QR⋆N ] =
2λ − |B|
2λ
. (A.4)
Conditioned on x′ ∈ QR⋆N the r is uniform in Z2λ \ B, so the first factor in eq.(A.3) is
Pr
r
[y′ = x′2
T/2 | x′ ∈ QR⋆N ] = Pr
r←Z
2λ
\B
[y′ = x′2
T/2
] . (A.5)
Let ey ∈ Zp′q′ be the unique value such that xey = y. Using ⟨x⟩ = QR+N in the last step
below we can rewrite
y′ = x′2
T/2 ⇐⇒
µry = (xrµ)2
T/2 ⇐⇒
xr·eµ+ey = x(r+eµ)◦2
T/2 ⇐⇒
r · eµ + ey = (r + eµ) · 2T/2 mod p′q′
rearranging terms
r(eµ − 2T/2) + ey − eµ2T/2 = 0 mod p′q′ . (A.6)
If eµ = 2
T/2 this becomes
ey − 2T = 0 mod p′q′
which does not hold as by assumption we have y ̸= x2T . So from now on we assume
eµ ̸= 2T/2 mod p′q′. Then for a = eµ − 2T/2 ̸= 0 mod p′q′ (and b = ey − eµ2T/2) eq.(A.6)
becomes
r · a = b mod p′q′
which holds for at most one choice of r from its domain Z2λ \ B, thus
Pr
r←Z
2λ
\B
[y′ = x′2
T/2
] ≤ 1
2λ − |B|
and the claim follows from the above equation and eq.(A.3)-eq.(A.5) as
Pr
r
[(y′ = x′2
T/2
) ∧ (x′ ∈ QR⋆N)] = Pr
r←Z
2λ
\B
[y′ = x′2
T/2
] · Pr
r
[x′ ∈ QR⋆N ]
≤ 1
2λ − |B| ·
2λ − |B|
2λ
≤ 1
2λ
.
